DO NOTE USE-- QUARANTEENED !!!Reflections of an Israeli Peacebuilder Who Also Serves in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) - Exceprted
Newsletter 292 — October 31, 2024
Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess
On October 29, 2024, we received an email from a colleague who works at an Israeli NGO, Amal Tikva, while also serving in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Active Reserve. (Our regular readers will note that we already introduced her in Newsletter-289.) She gave us permission to publish our correspondence on BI, although she asked us to use a pseudonym, rather than her real name. So we refer to her below as "Gail."
After graduating from college in the U.S, Gail emigrated to Israel and drafted into the IDF. After serving in the IDF for almost 3 years, she went on to complete her master's degree at the Hebrew University in Conflict Research, Management and Resolution in 2022. For the last few years, Gail has been working in various peacebuilding NGOs in the Israeli-Palestinian context, in roles related to program development and coordination, monitoring and evaluation, and dialogue facilitation. The NGO with which she is currently working, Amal Tikva, carried out in depth research regarding the state of peacebuilding and civil society in Israel after October 7th. Gail wrote because she has been following our newsletters and thought that we might be interested in reading Amal Tikva's report. It relates, she said, to many of the analyses we have carried out in the last year in our own articles.
Gail was right. We were very interested in the report, which shares the results of hour-long interviews with leaders of 41 peaceubuilding organizations in Israel that have been operating since the war began. Respondents were asked about whether and how they have adapted their activities to the context of war. We will be sharing more about it soon.
But before we do that, we wanted to share some of our emailed conversation with Gail, in which she describes some of her own experiences and thinking, and the thinking of other Israeli citizens, peacebuilders, and members of the IDF about the war and the current situation in Israel, Gaza, and Lebanon. Note: Here Gail is talking about her own knowledge and experience; she is not speaking for Amal Tikva. We had a great conversation with Amal Tikva's Chief Strategy Officer yesterday, and will be sharing that as soon as we can. But Gail has a unique perspective on many of the issues we've been talking about in this newsletter, given that she has a strong academic background in the peace and conflict field and is simultaneously working as a peacebuilder and as an active member of the IDF reserves. For that reason, we think her insights are particularly valuable.
Peacebuilding is Still Happening in the Context of War
Gail's introduction in the tan box above was, essentially, the contents of her first letter to us. We responded that we thought the report was fascinating for a variety of reasons. We will share more about that later, but briefly, to put Gail's answers in context, one of the very surprising findings was that the numbers of peacebuilders who were directly affected or who had family directly affected by the war — killed, taken hostage, been displaced, or had been called up for IDF duty, was much, much smaller than I would have expected. Gail responded that she was surprised too, saying "just about every Israeli and Palestinian knows someone who was killed—it may just not be a relative. Personally, I had several friends who were killed on October 7th, but in terms of the data for this report, they wouldn't "count" because they were friends and not relatives." The numbers were also, low, she though,t because there were very few peacebuilders in Gaza, most peacebuilders were women (who are less likely to be in the active reserves) and most lived in the big cities which were not nearly as dangerous as the far north (near Lebanon), or the far south (near Gaza).
We were also surprised that so many peacebuilding organizations were still active, and actually growing in response to the war. Gail responded:
Absolutely peacebuilding organizations are still running programs despite the ongoing war. You are not the only one I have heard be surprised by this, however. I think it is surprising for many who are abroad to hear that actually despite the situation, organizations have been capable of continuing efforts and programs.
How they worked depended on the kind of work they were doing, Gail explained. Some that had been doing "bi-national" programming (working with Israeli Jews and Palestinians together) had to switch to "uni-national programming" (just working with Israeli Jews or Palestinians separately. But some organizations have been able to continue their bi-national work.
We also expressed particular interest in the report's Recommendation #3, that future peacebuilding work should try to include people who are generally considered "spoilers" of peacebuilding processes — people who try to subvert, or destroy them, not participate in them. We wondered whether that was possible to do, given that Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran seem to believe that it is their religious duty to destroy Israel.
How to Deal with Spoilers in Peacebuilding Processes
In response to our question about including spoilers in their processes, Gail responded:
About the belief that is is a duty to destroy Israel and the Jews, I think this is largely a misconception and is based on one interpretation of Koran passages. Yes, Hamas and Hezbollah have outright declared these things as their goal and use certain interpretations of Koran passages to back it up. However, in my experience both working in peacebuilding with Palestinians as well as just having Palestinian acquaintances and friends who are not at all involved in peacebuilding efforts, this is not their belief. The vast majority of civilians on the ground have no interest in destroying the Jewish people and also say that this Islamic declaration by groups like Hamas and Hezbollah is largely out of particular interpretations of religious text.
With that in mind, I don't have an answer, and neither does Amal Tikva, for how to involve the "real" spoilers - the spoilers who are the decision makers or holders of power and influence. However, on the ground level, the civilian level, I think the term "spoilers" really just refers to the skeptics, or those who believe that violence is the only way forward, because they feel powerless. In that case, I do think it is possible to engage them, and the growing trend in uni-national programming is one way to enable this.
Uni-national programming draws people from communities who are generally opposed to peacebuilding work to participate and engage. This aids in strengthening the values of nonviolent approaches to conflict resolution. A similar thing can be said about binational programming in which the "focus" of the programming is not dialogue per say, but some other shared interest — such as regional climate issues, or micro-business development training. Programs which engage participants based on other interests and needs often succeed in reaching beyond the echo chamber. They are able to bring together people who would otherwise not participate or engage in peacebuilding activities, and therefore have a larger impact in changing community perspectives towards the use of violence or nonviolence.
As for the more top-level and powerful spoilers, I think it will take some real creativity. As the report says, these spoilers may actually support the ultimate goal [of solving conflict through nonviolent conflict resolution] if it were to be expressed within their value systems. I think a big question though, is how do we do that? How can we translate goals of peace into a language that is culturally-accepted and fits into incredibly conservative and/or religious or what we may consider extreme value systems? How can we get them to understand that nonviolent constructs are actually going to be the most effective way to achieve their religious and nationalistic aspirations? I am not sure we know how to do that yet.
Iran and other Iranian proxies certainly can act and do act as a spoiler to peace. However, at least on the grassroots level, our aim is working with the people on the ground and bridging those efforts with mid-level leadership (religious leaders, community leaders, etc.) and growing new leadership within the community. At the end of the day, peacebuilding efforts are between Israelis and Palestinians — not Israelis and Hezbollah, not Israel and Iran or Lebanon. I feel that those efforts are contained to a more political, military, and diplomatic level. Maybe, in some way, this does need to change and somehow peacebuilding efforts should engage with these actors as well...but I don't know how we would do that.
Parallels between Israeli-Palestinian and U.S. Red-Blue Peacebuilding
Heidi responded to Gail that her observations made sense to me, and reminded me of the strategy being used by Better Together America, which I had just learned about though an interview with Caleb Christen and Vinay Orekondy. Though working in the United States, not Israel, Vinay described how they "looked at what is dysfunctional [primarily federal politics], and side-stepped that by working locally. That seemed to me to be what Amal Tikva is doing too.
Gail responded:
I can definitely see the parallels between what they [BTA] are aiming to do and what many [Israeli peacebuilding] organizations, including Amal Tikva, are aiming to do here on the ground in terms of local work and breaking efforts down into manageable parts.
Something that super stuck out to me was when you discussed [in the newsletter about BTA] the pitfall of classic dialogues. This is also an issue in Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, and what many people have come to critique, and why many are doubtful about the ability of peacebuilding to work. Up until recently, most programs in the peacebuilding field in Israel/Palestine have been largely centered around "co-existence" and "getting to know the other" through either contact programs which bring participants together and help them get to know each other and build relationships through a non-conflict related dynamic i.e., PeacePlayers Middle East (basketball), Budo for Peace (martial arts), Freddie Kirvine Tennis Initiative; or, through dialogue programs intended to help the "other" to learn the other side's narrative and get to know each other and change perspectives.
In more recent years, there has been a bit of a paradigm shift. While these programs still do exist, many in the field are realizing that it isn't good enough, exactly for the reasons you mentioned—"participants tend to go home to their 'same old toxic culture,' and their transformed attitudes don't tend to last very long." Dialogue programs and contact programs don't make any "practical" difference on the ground. It may change perspectives temporarily, but when people go back into the same social systems, faced with inequality, racism, violence, and whatever else — these changed views don't last.
So the idea is that in addition to these efforts to change perspectives, an emphasis has to also be put on changing the social structures on the ground which are forming the reality that exists. It moves into activism and policy work and education for social change.
The paradigm shift has gone from a desire to "coexist," in which each community theoretically lives separately at peace, to understanding that our communities, whether we like it or not, are interconnected and dependent on each other. Therefore, what is actually needed is to work towards a more "shared society" which involves real change and not only perspective change.
Gail then went on to comment on our newsletter which compared October 7 to September 11. We published her response in a Newsletter 289, together with another reader's response, so I won't repeat it here.
Israelis Want the War to End, But They Also Realized It Was Necessary and Flocked to Sign Up.
To touch on some of the other questions you asked in a previous email — the vast majority of Israelis want the war to end. They see both Hamas and Netanyahu as equally responsible for the failure to come to an agreement which would end the war and release the hostages. The majority feeling is that Netanyahu has no real interest in getting the hostages released, but rather continues to use war as a political pawn to keep him in power. Whether this is truly the case or not, I cannot say... but this is one of the major perspectives held in Israeli society right now.
As I am sure you know, the political environment in Israel has been in a state of upheaval, long before Oct. 7th. In 2020 and 2021, tens of thousands of people took to the streets in protest of Netanyahu, wanting to oust him from government. These protests went on for over a year. In 2023, civilians again took to the streets in mass protest, including national strikes against the proposed judicial reform. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis took part in these protests. The 2022 election was the 5th election in over 4 years, due to the government collapsing time after time. Following, Oct. 7th, civilians have again been taking to the streets every single week in protest of the government and Netanyahu, blaming them for the failure to release the hostages, and demanding that the government comes to an agreement which will release them.
With that said, following Oct 7th, almost every reservist was called up, and those who are not active reservists fought to gain some assignment as reservists — to aid the cause in some way. Everyone wanted to draft and felt the need to be an active part of defending the country
This comes in stark contrast to the threats made and positions taken during the protests against the judicial reform, in which many many reservists refused to show up for their reserve duty as a form of protest against the proposed reform. The dominant perspective then was "why should we risk our lives for a country who doesn't care about us?"
And yet, as could be expected of Israeli society, the second that the call to reserve duty was not just for yearly exercises or regular temporary stations on borders etc, and actually became a serious need to defend the country, everyone, including those who refused to serve as protest against judicial reform, immediately showed up to reserve duty. And many people who don't actively serve in the reserves found ways to get drafted. There are those who are far beyond the required age for reserve duty who chose to volunteer and continue serving, and there are those who, for other reasons, have exemptions from reserve duty and fought to cancel their exemptions so that they could volunteer in various roles. In my eyes, and in many others, this is because the need to defend the country was no longer seen as a duty to the country as in "government" and was now a necessity to protect civilians on the ground — because everyone knows someone or knows someone who knows someone who was either murdered or taken hostage.
So most Israelis want the war to end, but with a hostage deal. The idea of the war ending without getting the hostages back is not accepted. Most believe that the war could have been over much, much sooner and not have been dragged out as much if both Hamas and Netanyahu would have taken negotiations seriously and would have actually been interested in putting the war to an end.
So there is push back to end the war, but the dominant perspective is not against the war outright. Most agree that it was necessary for Israeli forces to enter Gaza to destroy Hamas infrastructure and root out Hamas itself.
Gail went on to say that there was not as much division about Israel's decision to enter Lebanon, as it seemed there was no other way to make Northern Israeli's homes safe from constant Hezbollah rockets, and tunnels that seemed to have been built to prepare for another October 7-type attack. However, there are other controversies regarding the war:
[One relates to] Israel providing humanitarian aid to Gazans. ...[Some Israelis conflate all Gazans with Hamas, and the fact that many of those who took part in the atrocities on October 7th were not affiliated with Hamas or any other terror group only strengthens this perspective. So some Israelis believe that we should not provide them with aid and they do not deserve our aid. They believe that providing them with aid only emboldens them to continue their actions, and that we should cut them off from all aid in order to force their hand. On the flip side, there are those who understand that not all Gazans are Hamas or terrorists, and many are just innocent civilians who are negatively impacted by the war, and that we have some sort of responsibility to help them.
Gail finished that letter with a reflection on how hard the last year has been for her personally.
It's been a particularly challenging time to 'balance' my strong belief in nonviolent conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts together with my belief that the IDF is necessary and we have a right to defend ourselves, even through military action. It's a thin line to walk and I have been heavily criticized from others on both ends of the spectrum.
She also has lost friends over these issues. She reflects more on this conundrum and its challenges in her full comments.
Gail's Response to Mike Buck's Response to Us:
On October 28,2024, Gail sent another email, responding to Mike Buck's comments in Newsletter 289 about the similarities between October 7 and September 11. The full text of that email is here. She first goes further than we did explaining how Israel does its utmost best to "play by the rules of war," even when the other side (Hamas and Hezbollah) do not and when Hamas and Hezbollah use strategies (such as human shields) that are designed to prevent Israel from defending itself at all if it wants to protect civilians. She also responded to Mike's assertion that Mossad is doing the same thing by having its headquarters in Tel Aviv. She admits she has wondered about this herself, but she still sees it as non-comparable.
The bases that do exist near civilian areas are non-combat. They do not store weapons, they are not locations from which weapons are launched, and they are not where soldiers carry out training or combat operations. The Kirya is an intelligence campus, as is the Mossad headquarters, and Tel HaShomer is a base where civilians go to draft into the army, as well as a medical facility. Their existence still can be criticized for being in civilian areas, but it is still not comparable to Hamas's use of civilian shields in which weapons caches, launch sites, and combat operations are carried out in civilian homes, in hospitals, in schools, and underneath them.
She ended that email with a comment about UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) and UNHCR (The UN Refugee Agency).
Not only has UNRWA provided huge amounts of monetary aid and other resources which have then been stolen by Hamas, but also much of this was done knowingly. Also, many UNRWA workers have turned out to also be members of Hamas. Even more importantly though, UNRWA has been a disservice to Palestinians because instead of aiding Palestinians to become self-sufficient, they have formed a relationship of codependency. UNRWA has been heavily criticized from an international development aspect, because instead of helping and supporting the Palestinian people to gain employment, rebuild, find their own resources (go back to living and supporting themselves independently and self-sufficiently), they instead have made the Palestinian people dependent on UNRWA, making it so the UNRWA can never be dissolved.
Also there is the question regarding UNHCR and UNRWA. Why does UNRWA exist if UNHCR does? The Palestinian people need support and aid, I am not saying they do not. But the Palestinian people are the only displaced persons and refugee group [in the world] who have a separate UN body catering to them. Also, under the UNRWA, Palestinian people will forever be considered refugees, even those who have full citizenship in the country they live in, and even those who were born after displacement. A Palestinian child born today has refugee status. Under UNHCR, this is not the case. International law states that refugee status ceases when there is: (i) re-availment of national protection; (ii) re-acquisition of nationality; (iii) acquisition of a new nationality; or (iv) re-establishment in the state of origin.
To read Gail's full response to Mike Buck's comments in Newsletter 289, go here. And to read our full exchange, which covers more topics, and has more information on the topics discussed here, go to Gail’s full Personal Reflection.
Lead Graphic Photo Credit: url: From Wikimedia Commons. URL: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7f/Israel-Palestine_peace.svg. Attribution: Wickey-nl, CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>,
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