Track I - Track II Cooperation

 

By
Susan Allen Nan
Andrea Strimling

January 2004
 

Cooperation between official (Track One) and unofficial (Track Two) actors is an issue of increasing attention within both governmental and non-governmental circles in the US and many other parts of the world. Both communities increasingly recognize that the prevention and resolution of complex conflicts depend on a wide range of activities by diverse actors, and that coordination and cooperation maximize the opportunities for complementarity and synergy.[1] They also increasingly recognize the many challenges associated with coordination and cooperation.

This paper reviews the historical evolution of the theory and practice of Track One - Track Two cooperation; provides a brief overview of the current state of the field in the United States; and identifies key themes, lessons learned, and directions for future work.[2]

I. Historical Evolution


Additional insights into track I - track II cooperation are offered by several Beyond Intractability project participants.

The terms "Track One" and "Track Two" have their origin in a 1981 article by William D. Davidson and Joseph Montville, entitled "Foreign Policy According to Freud" and published in Foreign Affairs. They wrote the article at a time when there was little recognition within the US Department of State about the contributions of non-governmental organizations to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, helping to raise awareness of NGO roles in complex conflicts and putting on the agenda the issue of the relationships between official and unofficial activities.

Since that seminal article, numerous articles and books have been published on the actual and potential relationships between official and unofficial activities. Some have focused on Track Two, describing and analyzing processes such as Interactive Conflict Resolution[3] and Analytical Problem Solving Workshops[4], and developing key concepts such as sustained dialogue[5], and multi-level peace processes.[6] Others have focused on cooperation and coordination between official and unofficial actors and processes, including issues of contemporaneous and sequential complementarity.[7]

In addition, a number of scholars and practitioners have built on the Track One - Track Two model by identifying other actors and activities and highlighting the relationships among them. For example, Louise Diamond's and John McDonald's 1993 book Multi-Track Diplomacy [8] presented a model of nine tracks organized in a wheel, with "Track 9 -- Public Opinion/Communication" at the center.

The Nine Tracks of Multi-Track Diplomacy

Source: Diamond and McDonald, The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD)

(This model is described in some detail by John McDonald in the essay he wrote for this knowledge base on Multi-Track Diplomacy.)

Susan Allen Nan developed the term Track One and a Half Diplomacy and defined it as referring to conflict resolution activities facilitated by unofficials and directly involving official negotiators for the conflict parties.[9] Others have adapted existing language, for example suggesting other meanings for "Track One and a Half" and "Track Three".[10] A number of scholars and practitioners also have argued for a different model of unofficial/official interaction, one that does not involve "tracks." Harold Saunders, for example, uses the concept of a "multi-level peace process" to frame his analysis of governmental/non-governmental cooperation.[11] Diana Chigas, in her essay on Track Two Diplomacy, clarifies the distinctions between official and unofficial activities.

The evolution of the dialogue about governmental - nongovernmental cooperation in complex conflicts is by no means limited to the academic community. Rather, it has become an increasing issue of concern within the diplomatic, security, and non-governmental conflict resolution communities. Increasingly, programs are being organized to bring diverse actors together to share information and, in some cases, to cooperate on the ground in conflict situations. In 2002, for example, the US State Department's Secretary's Open Forum and the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution co-sponsored a program at the State Department entitled, "Integrating Track One and Track Two Approaches to International Conflict Resolution: What's Working? What's Not? How Can We Do Better?" In 2003, the Alliance for Conflict Transformation, the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the US Institute of Peace co-sponsored a symposium entitled, "Track One - Track Two Cooperation." The program was attended by approximately 85 senior US diplomats, military leaders, civil servants, media professionals, non-governmental conflict resolution practitioners, and scholars.

State of the Field

Effective cooperation builds a whole that is more than the sum of the parts.

Although there is no consensus on the language of official-unofficial cooperation (e.g., "Track One - Track Two diplomacy"[12], "Track One and a Half Diplomacy"[13], "multi-track diplomacy"[14], "public-private partnership", "multilevel peace process"[15]), there is a growing consensus within the US that effective cooperation between official and unofficial actors working in complex conflicts is an important component of successful conflict prevention and resolution, as well as longer-term peacebuilding processes.

In part, the increasing attention to cooperation is fueled by growing recognition of the limitations of any single approach to build sustainable peace and security in situations of violent and/or protracted conflict, as well as the importance of both top-down and bottom-up approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It is also the result of a trend toward public-private partnerships within the US government.

Within the US Department of State, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense, and other federal agencies, leaders increasingly emphasize the need to communicate more effectively with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as the potential value of public-private partnerships to achieve sustainable peace and security (refer to Under-Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky's speech from the aforementioned "Track One - Track Two Cooperation" symposium). NGOs, for their part, are reaching out more actively and strategically to build relationships, share information, and in some cases cooperate directly with governmental organizations. For example, the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution, a network of leading, US-based conflict resolution organizations working internationally, and InterAction, a network of development organizations, are working to provide opportunities for their members to interact regularly with leaders in government. Governmental leaders, in turn, are increasingly receptive to and interested in these connections

Of course, NGOs differ in their interest and capacity to work with government agencies, and government agencies differ in their interest and capacity to work with NGOs. For some NGOs, close interaction with government, especially on the ground in conflict situations, could compromise the impartiality, legitimacy, and effectiveness of NGO work. For some government agencies, NGOs pose risks related to quality control, among other concerns. Therefore, the state of the field is one of different kinds and degrees governmental-nongovernmental interactions in complex conflicts.

III. Key Themes and Lessons Learned

In spite of the growing awareness among both governmental and nongovernmental actors of the importance of effective cooperation, such cooperation remains elusive in many complex conflicts. This points to the need for structured opportunities to improve both the practice of cooperation and the theoretical understanding of what makes it effective.

The November 2003 symposium on Track One - Track Two Cooperation referenced above offered one such opportunity. In preparation for the symposium, the organizers developed a framework of questions to guide the dialogue. The questions were: "Why is cooperation important?" and "How can we do it better?" These basic questions were then broken down into more detailed sets of questions, as follows:

  • Why is cooperation important? What is the purpose of cooperation? What results have we seen or would we expect to see from effective cooperation?

  • How can we do it better?

  • What is "it" that we are trying to do better? Communicate? Coordinate? Cooperate? Collaborate?

  • What is "better" cooperation? How do we define "success"? How do we know it when we have it? How do we measure and evaluate it, and against what criteria?

  • Who are "we"? Who has been involved in efforts to cooperate? Who should be involved? What are the appropriate boundaries defining the actors and communities in question?[16]

  • How can we cooperate more effectively? What processes, systems, mechanisms, and strategies have been used or could be used to promote cooperation? What principles have guided or should guide these efforts?

  • When should cooperation take place? Is cooperation always appropriate, and if not, under what conditions is it appropriate? Do answers to these questions differ depending on the stage of a conflict, and if so, how?

Following are preliminary answers to these questions, drawing on the literature in the field, a series of interviews with official and unofficial actors, the presentations and dialogue during the symposium, and our own experience with Track One - Track Two cooperation. They are by no means intended as comprehensive or definitive answers to these questions, but rather as part of an evolving multi-disciplinary dialogue about official-unofficial interaction in complex conflicts.

No single actor or activity can create sustainable peace and security. Cooperation among official and unofficial actors can enhance the potential for achieving shared and complementary goals related to peace and security.

A. Why?

Why is cooperation important? What is the purpose of cooperation? What results have we seen or would we expect to see from effective cooperation?

As explained above, there is growing consensus among both official and unofficial actors that no single actor or activity is enough to build sustainable peace and security in situations of complex conflict, and that the achievement of those goals requires both top-down and bottom-up approaches. Specifically, governmental actors increasingly recognize that non-governmental or "Track Two" processes can create the fertile ground necessary for conflicting parties to reach a negotiated settlement.[17] More important, they recognize that negotiated settlements will not hold unless they are supported by a peace constituency.[18]

Nongovernmental actors, for their part, increasingly focus on the strategic connections between their work at various levels of society and the official diplomatic work of governmental actors. The Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, a multi-year research project led by the Collaborative for Development Action, has developed a model of effective peacebuilding that emphasizes the interconnections between processes that involve "more people" and processes that involve "key people" in building peace. This approach also emphasizes the different strengths that insiders and outsiders to the conflict (both Track One and Track Two) can bring to peace processes.[19] Others have challenged the very notion of "outsiders", arguing that third-party intervenors are actually actors in the conflict.[20] John Paul Lederach has developed a model of peacebuilding that highlights the importance of vertical integration between the top, middle, and grassroots level of society, as well as horizontal integration across each level.[21] As demonstrated in the opening section, many other practitioners and scholars have argued that cooperation is essential for effective conflict prevention and resolution, and for the achievement of lasting peace and security in societies torn by violent conflict.

B. How?

What processes, systems, mechanisms, and strategies have been used or could be used to promote effective cooperation? What principles have guided or should guide these efforts?

Concrete approaches to cooperation in complex conflicts are receiving increasing attention by both scholars and practitioners. These are described in the intervention coordination module and are applicable to Track One - Track Two cooperation and to interdisciplinary cooperation in complex conflicts more broadly. Recent innovative work focuses on principles of roles, relationships, and structure;[22] decentralized planning;[23] and networks of effective action (NEAs).[24]

Adapting the roles, relationships, and structures principles[25] of cooperation to the specific context of official-unofficial cooperation implies the need to:

  • Clarify clearly defined separate complementary roles for official and unofficial intervenors in order to develop shared visions of mutually reinforcing activities to reach shared goals of stronger peace processes.
  • Develop personal and institutional relationships of trust and respect between official and unofficial intervenors.
  • Develop long-term initiatives and encourage field-based cooperation (decentralized planning) amongst staff representing official and unofficial efforts.
Track One and Track Two actors can cooperate effectively throughout the life cycle of conflicts, including conflict prevention, conflict management, and in post-war peace building and development. This does not mean, however, that official and unofficial actors should always cooperate.

C. When?

When should cooperation take place? Is cooperation always appropriate, and if not, under what conditions is it appropriate? Do answers to these questions differ depending on the stage of a conflict, and if so, how?

Track One and Track Two actors can cooperate effectively throughout the life cycle of conflicts, including conflict prevention, conflict management, and in post-war peacebuilding and development.[26] This does not mean, however, that official and unofficial actors should always cooperate. Cooperation is not an end in itself. Rather, they should only cooperate when shared goals are furthered by cooperation. There are times when close interaction with official actors would compromise the perceived impartiality, and therefore effectiveness of, NGOs. There also are situations in which governments must deal directly with other governments on state-to-state business, and NGOs are not directly involved, or when governments will choose not to involve NGOs that may differ with official governmental policies. In such situations, the focus should be on appropriate communication, rather than cooperation.

Although it may seem counter-intuitive, governmental actors do not always think of themselves as doing "Track I" work, and non-governmental actors do not always think of themselves as doing "Track II" work. As indicated above, the categories "Track One" and "Track Two" are fuzzy concepts. The "we" who should cooperate includes Track One actors, Track Two actors, and individuals within both communities who have in-depth understanding of the other community.

D. Who are "we"?

Who has been involved in efforts to cooperate? Who should be involved? What are the appropriate boundaries defining the actors and communities in question?

Although it may seem counter-intuitive, governmental actors do not always think of themselves as doing "Track I" work, and non-governmental actors do not always think of themselves as doing "Track II" work. As indicated above, the categories "Track One" and "Track Two" are fuzzy concepts. At the November 2003 symposium, "Track One-Track Two Cooperation," various government representatives claimed to have done work that was not really Track One. Elsewhere, NGO work has been described as Track One and a Half.[27] Track One Diplomacy and Track Two Diplomacy are further described in other modules in this knowledge base.

Individuals who have experience in both the Track One and Track Two worlds indicate that this experience often allows them to be particularly effective when engaging in Track One - Track Two cooperation. The people that have successfully engaged in effective Track One - Track Two cooperation to date seem to be people who have an understanding of both the Track One and the Track Two approaches to conflict management and resolution.[28] There is a strong role for "champions" of cooperation within both the official and unofficial communities; these champions seem to be more effective when they bring an intimate understanding of both official and unofficial approaches. For example, Montville and McDonald, both noted earlier as pioneers who laid the groundwork for cooperation between officials and unofficials, are retired foreign service officers who have had active NGO-based careers in conflict resolution in their post-Track One days. The evidence indicates that the "we" who should cooperate includes Track One actors, Track Two actors, and individuals within both communities who have in-depth understanding of the other community.


http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track-1-2-cooperation


  • What is "it"? What are the various forms that "cooperation" has taken or could take? What is the range of interaction and relationships among cooperating organizations?

    The general types of cooperation have been identified[29] and described in more detail in the Intervention Coordination module as:

    • Sharing information, sharing analysis
    • Planning together
    • Resource sharing
    • Working in collaboration

    Considering these concepts in the context of Track One - Track Two cooperation specifically, we see that the kinds of cooperation can be summarized as four "Cs":

    • Communication (Sharing information, sharing analysis)
    • Coordination (Planning together, synchronizing)
    • Cooperation (Resource sharing, maximizing the impact of separate initiatives)
    • Collaboration (Working in collaboration, maximizing the impact of joint initiatives).

    One participant in the November 2003 symposium cautioned that we should note also the negative possibility of a fifth "C": cooptation.[30] Some NGOs worry that government funding of and involvement in their efforts will lead to overall cooptation by government driven agendas, which may not match their own.

    There is a lack of consensus within the field regarding the desirability of an additional and more intensive form of cooperation, which we refer to as "integration." For some, integration implies relationships that are too close, with the associated risks of perceived "contamination" and/or cooptation. For others, integration implies a loss of the creative possibilities associated with many actors working independently. Yet, the vision of an integrated approach to peacebuilding, with multi-level and interdisciplinary cross-fertilization between official and unofficial diplomacy, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, and peacebuilding, is one that has captured the attention of many people from both governmental and non-governmental circles.[31]

    • What is better? What is "better" cooperation? How do we define "success"? How do we know it when we have it? How do we measure and evaluate it, and against what criteria?

    As argued above, cooperation is not an end itself, but should be employed only to the extent that it enhances actors' abilities to more effectively reach shared or complementary goals. Therefore, rigorous evaluation of cooperative efforts is necessary to evaluate their effectiveness and to learn how to increase effectiveness in the future.

    Evaluation is rapidly emerging as a centrally important arena for research in the field. Other modules in this knowledge base provide more information on evaluation of conflict resolution work, and much of this is applicable to evaluating the efficacy of cooperation efforts. See essay on Evaluation and Assessment of Interventions . In particular, the evaluative approach called "formative evaluation" offers an opportunity for improving the emerging practice of Track One - Track Two cooperation. As Track One and Track Two increasingly attempt to cooperate in conflict prevention and resolution, formative evaluation can be used to improve cooperation initiatives that are under way. Other emerging evaluation methodologies should be employed, as well, to evaluate the marginal impacts of cooperation in terms of specific articulated objectives and the long-term goals of peace and security.

    Lessons Learned and Directions for Future Work

    As explained above, the conflict resolution field is at the early stages of applying rigorous evaluation mechanisms to Track One - Track Two cooperation. As this work progresses, additional lessons will emerge. Susan Allen Nan[32] suggests the following approaches to improving Track One - Track Two cooperation:

    • Improve Track One - Track Two relationships and increase mutual understanding. Identify appropriate methods for increasing understanding within the Track One and Track Two communities of clearly-defined, complementary roles in conflict prevention, management, peacebuilding and post-conflict development. Develop mechanisms for increasing personal and institutional relationships of trust and mutual respect between official and unofficial intervenors.
    • Increase field-based cooperation and shared visions within work on a particular conflict area. Develop shared visions of mutually reinforcing activities in regards to specific shared goals in specific peace processes in order to increase opportunities for effective cooperation. Likewise, improve relationships through field-based cooperation and decentralized planning throughout long-term work in specific conflict zones.

    Both Track One and Track Two actors have called for increased conflict-specific communication among those working on a specific conflict as a way of building better cooperation.[33] Some forums already exist for conflict-specific communication among intervenors. For example, Paula Garb of University of California, Irvine, regularly convenes coordination meetings of the NGOs and IGOs working on the Georgian-Abkahz conflict, and the U.S. State Department regularly meets with NGOs interested in the peace process in Sudan. Other such forums are in development. The Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution, for example, has been asked to develop a regular forum for NGOs and government agencies working in Afghanistan. Additional conflict-specific forums would further strengthen Track One - Track Two cooperation as well as general cooperation among the intervenors in specific conflicts.

    The Track One - Track Two symposium identified the following recommendations for future work.[34]

    • Create more opportunities for regular communication and relationship development between Track One and Track Two professionals.
    • Develop greater understanding of the diverse roles Track One and Track Two actors play in different contexts, understanding that the roles may evolve over time.
    • Implement flexible and adaptive joint planning processes that evolve in changing environments.
    • Convene regular regional meetings for Track One and Track Two professionals working in those areas.
    • Where appropriate, create explicit roles for convening and facilitating cooperative efforts.
    • Identify and capitalize on examples of successful cooperation, and apply lessons learned, as appropriate, to other contexts.

    In conclusion, Track One - Track Two cooperation offers much promise for contributing to sustainable peace and security. A number of approaches for improving Track One-Track Two cooperation have been developed, but they have only been applied in limited cases. In the future, many more cooperative mechanisms, adapted to specific needs and contexts, will likely emerge. Further research in this area is essential to understand and increase the effectiveness and broad application of cooperation. This is an important area for improving the efficacy of conflict resolution and peacebuilding work.

    ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

    Intervention Coordination.

    Track Two Diplomacy.

    Track One Diplomacy.

    Track One-Track Two Cooperation Symposium.


    [1] Kriesberg, Louis, "Coordinating Intermediary Peace Efforts". In Negotiation Journal, Volume: 12 Issue: 4, 1996; Susan Allen Nan, Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria. George Mason University, 1999; and Nan, Susan Allen. "Track One - Track Two Coordination." Presentation to the Secretary's Open Forum, State Department, September, 2002.

    [2] This paper was developed as part of the process of preparing for and synthesizing lessons learned from a symposium on Track One - Track Two cooperation, held at the US Institute of Peace on November 24, 2003. The symposium was a cooperative effort by Alliance for Conflict Transformation, Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and United States Institute of Peace. Additional symposium materials may be found at Track 1 and Track 2 Cooperation.

    [3] Fisher, Ronald J. Interactive Conflict Resolution. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997.

    [4] Mitchell, Christopher R. and Michael Banks. Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem Solving Approach. London: Pinter, 1996.

    [5] Saunders, Harold. A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001.

    [6] Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace. Washington DC : USIP Press, 1998.

    [7] Ronald J. Fisher, Loraleigh Keashly, "Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation Within a Contingency Model of Third Party Consultation, The". In Journal of Peace Research , Volume: 28 Issue: 1, 1991. Kriesberg, Louis, "Coordinating Intermediary Peace Efforts". In Negotiation Journal, Volume: 12 Issue: 4, 1996; Susan Allen Nan, Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria. George Mason University, 1999; and Nan, Susan Allen. "Track One - Track Two Coordination." Presentation to the Secretary's Open Forum, State Department, September, 2002.

    [8] Diamond, Louise and John McDonald. Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 1993.

    [9] Nan, Susan Allen. Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria. George Mason University, 1999.

    [10] See the Track Two Diplomacy Essay. See also Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management, and Transformation of Deadly Conflict. Polity Press, 1999.

    [11] Saunders, Harold. "Prenegotiation and Circumnegotiation: Arenas of the Peace Process." In Crocker, et al, eds. Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 2001.

    [12] Davidson, William D. and Joseph V. Montville, "Foreign Policy According to Freud." Foreign Policy. Number 45, 1981, pp. 145-157.

    [13] Nan, Susan Allen. Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria. George Mason University, 1999.

    [14] Diamond, Louise and John McDonald. Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 1993.

    [15] Saunders, Harold. "Prenegotiation and Circumnegotiation: Arenas of the Peace Process." In Crocker, et al, eds. Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 2001. Voorhees, James. Dialogue Sustained: The Multilevel Peace Process and the Dartmouth Conference. Washington, D.C. : USIP Press, 2002.

    [16] Thanks to Diana Chigas for emphasizing the issue of definitions and boundaries.

    [17] See, for example, the speech made by Ambassador Jan Eliasson during the November 24, 2003 symposium on Track One - Track Two Cooperation

    [18] See, for example, the importance placed on voter acceptance in 1998 of the Good Friday Agreement regarding Northern Ireland. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/ref1998.htm

    [19] Anderson, Mary B. and Lara Olson. Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Cambridge, MA : Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., 2003. http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=RPP&pname=Reflecting%20on%20Peace%20Practice

    [20] For an example from the development field, see Peter Uvin's Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. Kumarian Press, 1998.

    [21] Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace. Washington DC : USIP Press, 1998.

    [22] Nan, Susan Allen. Intervention Coordination, 2003,; and Nan, Susan Allen. Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria. George Mason University, 1999.

    [23] Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, Planning for Intervention: International Cooperation in Conflict Management . Kluwer Law International, 1999.

    [24] Robert Ricigliano, Networks of Effective Action: Implementing a Holistic Approach to Peacebuilding . Peace Studies Program, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, 2003.

    [25] These principles first appeared in Nan, Susan Allen. Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria. George Mason University, 1999; and are summarized Nan, Susan Allen, Intervention Coordination, 2003.

    [26] This was emphasized by Ambassador Jan Eliasson during the Track One - Track Two symposium November 24, 2003.

    [27] Nan, Susan Allen. Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria. George Mason University, 1999.

    [28] See, for example, presentations by Ambassador John McDonald and Joseph Montville at the Track One - Track Two Cooperation symposium.

    [29] Nan, Susan Allen. Intervention Coordination, 2003,; and Nan, Susan Allen. Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria. George Mason University, 1999.

    [30] Thanks to Christopher Mitchell for pointing out this fifth "C."

    [31] See, for example, the New Paths to Peace Conference held November 5-7, 2003 at University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. [32] Nan, Susan Allen. Intervention Coordination, 2003; and Nan, Susan Allen. Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria. George Mason University, 1999.

    [33] Nan, Susan Allen. "Effective Networking for Conflict Transformation." London: International Alert, 2001; Mitchell, Christopher R. Comments made at the Track One - Track Two Cooperation symposium in Washington, D.C., November 24, 2003.

    [34] These were identified by Pamela Aall, Susan Allen Nan, and Andrea Strimling during the symposium. See Andrea Strimling's closing remarks.

  • Use the following to cite this article:
    Nan, Susan Allen and Andrea Strimling. "Track I - Track II Cooperation." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004 <>.

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