Case Study: Conflict in Mindanao

By
Stephanie Talarek

May 2019

Introduction

The conflict in Mindanao, an island located in the Southern Philippines archipelago, is considered one of the “world’s longest-running internal conflicts” and has seen 120,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands displaced since 1969.1 and 2 “The population of the Philippines is approximately 100 million, twenty-two million living on Mindanao, the largest island in the country. Of these, approximately 10% are Muslim, divided into thirteen ethnolinguistic subgroups, known collectively as the Moro; another 5% are upland ethnic minorities, generally referred to as indigenous people.”2 The Muslims of Mindanao refer to themselves as Moros, a name given to them by their Spanish colonizers, and their homeland as Bangsamoro.2 The Moros all share a sense of injustice by the Philippine government, having suffered from the effects of war, intra-clan conflicts, abuse and corruption by local leaders, high crime rates, poor governance and lack of justice.2 and 3

Since conflict in Mindanao has been going on for centuries, the people of the Philippines, outside of Mindanao, have little interest or true knowledge of the conflict.4 Mindanao is distant, both culturally and physically, from the rest of the Philippines, and few people have made contact with the Moros. The Moros consistent refusal to integrate, be marginalized and conquered has led the majority of Filipinos to recognize the Moros as “unreasonable, stubborn and fanatical, and has made them unsympathetic to their plight.”4 Very few truly understand the root causes of the Mindanao conflict nor the Moros grievances and goals.4 For much of the countries existence, Philippine social biases, traditions and education only work to solidify these anti-Moro prejudices.4

Over the last four decades there have been numerous peace agreements between the Philippine government and Moros. In this paper I will look at the agreements’ failures and/or successes of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, Jeddah Accords, 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA), 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domains (MOA-AD), 2012 Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), 2014 Comprehensive agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) and how these agreements have lead up to the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), and whether or not the BOL may surpass the former agreements and become the success the Mindanao peace process needs.   

Background

Spain

The Moros have been in conflict since as far back as the 16th century when Spaniards came to the Philippines to set up rule and tried to pacify the Filipinos.4 The majority of people in Mindanao had been Muslim for centuries before the Spaniards came, so they resisted the Spanish and their Christian assimilation for centuries.3 and 5 From the time when the Spanish arrived, the Moros have been minimalized from politics, economic development and Philippine society.3 Despite Spain’s forced rule, the Moros have always thought of themselves as independent.5

The US and Philippine Independence

After the Spanish-American War, the Philippines were transferred to the US.5 At the time, the Moros signed an agreement with the US that stated they would remain neutral in US affairs in the Philippines if the US would not interfere in Moro affairs in the regions of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.5 However, this agreement was not successful.5

The US passed the Philippines Organic Act in an attempt to give the Philippines a modern future.5 This Act merged Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago under a Mindanao governor appointed by the Philippine government, established new schools with a non-Muslim curriculum, outlawed slavery and polygamy, and implemented a US-style legal system.5 Moros protested against this because it gave no consideration to Muslim laws and the authority of sultans or other tribal leaders.5

In 1935, Philippine independence started to surface, and the Moros asked the US to give them their independence from the “Christian Philippines.”6 However, this request was denied, and instead the US encouraged the agricultural Filipino Christians in the more occupied northern areas to move to Mindanao to progress the region’s economy.6 This only proved to escalate tensions as the Moros were now becoming a minority in their homeland.6

Philippine Independence

When the Philippines were granted their independence from the US in 1946, its economy bloomed at first, however, it quickly crashed by the 1950’s and tensions escalated as this shed light on how much better off the Mindanao Christian majority were economically than the Moros.6 In addition, Christian facilities and infrastructure bloomed while Moros’ did not, fueling the Moros feelings of being deliberately ignored.6

Resentments and tension continued to grow with the sustained migration of Christians to Mindanao throughout the 1950s and 1960s, which in turn caused the Philippine government to create and implement national laws and an education system in the hope of creating national unity. However, the Moros were outraged as this ignored their traditional values and continued to put a strain on affairs.

From 1913-1970’s, the Moros became a “political, demographic and landowning minority” in their homeland, the Moros failed to protect their way of life and culture and there was discontent over political marginalization.9 This led to the Moros leading a rebellion in the early 1970s calling for their independence.9

The Jabidah Incident occurred in 1968, in which Moro conscript soldiers were massacred by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Philippine military) and led to the founding of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1972, whose intention was to create an independent united Moro homeland for the Moros “that was linked to the broader outside Muslim world.”6, 7 and 9 Due to this, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in Mindanao, which escalated the conflict into war.7 and 9

1976 Tripoli Agreement (Tripoli Agreement)

With a military stalemate occurring on both sides, the high financial cost of the conflict taking a toll on the Philippine government, and the 1970’s oil crisis occurring, peace talks emerged between the MNLF and the Philippine government.1 The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) played a significant role bringing the two sides together and helping to seek a political solution to the conflict because it threatened an oil embargo on the Philippines due to the hardships placed on the Moros under martial law, and stated that the Philippine government must begin peace talks with the MNLF.1 Since the Philippines was reliant on the OIC countries’ oil, Philippine President Marcos agreed to peace talks.

The OIC consisted of Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Senegal and Libya.7 It encouraged the MNLF to give up their wish for an independent state for the Moros and had them instead focus on working towards “internal autonomy ‘within the framework of Philippine national sovereignty.’”7 This agreement was historical for this intrastate conflict because it went against the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) principle of not interfering into member states internal conflicts.1

The Tripoli Agreement was to create an autonomous region that would consist of thirteen provinces and provide autonomy for Moros in the Southern Philippines. However, the agreement lacked clear regulations and guidelines for its implementation, with terms such as “to be discussed,” “to be fixed later” or “to be determined later” used.1 and 7 Due to this, different interpretations of the agreement emerged and implementation was challenging, which led Philippine President Marcos to implement the agreement separately on his own accord by creating only two autonomous areas.2 and 7 The MNLF rejected this, which in turn led to fighting resuming by the end of 1977, with the MNLF returning back to its demand of establishing an independent state.2

The next twenty years would see low-intensity armed conflict with upsurges in violence, human rights abuses and forced migration.2 While the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and its implementation failed, it remained an important foundation for all future negotiations.10

Jeddah Accords

In 1987, the Jeddah Accords were signed by the MNLF and Philippine government, and were meant to be a continuation and implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, whose hope was to give autonomy to the thirteen provinces by creating the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).10 However, once again, the Philippine government did not live up to its end of the agreement and established only four autonomous regions. The MNLF, seeing this as a violation of the agreement, in turn rejected it and armed conflict resumed.10 The OIC as well rejected this implementation, counseling the Philippine government to keep its commitments and implement the terms of the Tripoli Agreement.10 and 11

1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) (also known as the Jakarta Agreement of 1996)

There was an Interim Ceasefire Agreement, signed in 1993, which allowed for peace talks to begin. During these talks, the Philippines received help from more international actors. The OIC and Indonesia played large roles and were in charge of observing and implementing the ceasefire. Indonesia facilitated the agreement, which was drawn up to help implement the previous 1976 Tripoli Agreement.12 With this new agreement, the MNLF again dropped its goal for an independent state in return for autonomy.12 In addition, the FPA included plans to assimilate MNLF forces into the police force, set up a provisional government that included MNLF members called the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, created the Special Zone of Peace and Development, allowed the members of the MNLF to surrender their arms in exchange for money, and allowed MNLF leaders to run for political offices within many Moro-majority provinces located in the ARMM.12 and 13

However, several issues occurred after the signing of this agreement, which caused its failure. The MNLF leaders elected to office proved to be unsuccessful (for example, the leader of the MNLF who was elected to governor was actually jailed for a failed uprising); the Organic Law that was passed by the Philippine Congress in order to implement the agreement actually weakened the power given to the MNLF; and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) refused to sign the agreement which complicated the peace process.9 and 14

The MILF is a breakaway faction of the MNLF and has become the largest Muslim faction in Mindanao.12, 13 and 14 This if proof of how reconciliation has the potential to create new postwar and competing identities.15 The MILF rejected the FPA because it did not want to compromise its wish for an independent Bangsamoro Islamic State in exchange for autonomy; and it launched its first large offensive attack just after the MNLF and Philippine government signed the agreement.1 Intermittent conflict would be common between the MILF and Philippine government, however from 1997 onward, most peace negotiations would be between the MILF (instead of the MNLF) and the Philippine government. 1, 12, 13 and 14

Peace Talks and 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domains (MOA-AD)

During the time period leading up to the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domains (MOA-AD) many things complicated peace efforts, such as: changes in the Philippine government’s negotiation team; the Moro clans not uniting their goals and perspectives; corruption and criminality flared up between the Moro clans, made worse by century old clan feuds and the Philippine government not giving the peace process its full attention.3

Through 1996-2000 no third party was used for peace talks between the MILF and Philippine government which caused little to be achieved and regular conflict, and which lead to total war being declared on the MILF from 2000-2001 by Philippine President Joseph Estrada.8, 13 and 16 When Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected president in 2001, she declared a ceasefire and began exploratory talks with the help of Malaysia, a member of the OIC, which mediated.16

The Malaysia mediations brought the MILF and Philippine government together, and the parties signed a General Framework for the Resumption of Peace in 2001, which symbolized a turning point for future talks that showed steps were being taken towards peace.17 The agreed upon main focus points to be used as a basis in future talks, which were taken from the Tripoli Peace Agreement, were that of ancestral domain, economic rehabilitation and security.17 and 18

In 2002 both sides signed the Implementing Guidelines of the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Peace Agreement in which: they agreed to adhere to international guidelines pertaining to humanitarian law; the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) was created, giving it “a semiofficial status to coordinate and receive domestic and foreign assistance for Moro areas”;  and the MILF would take the reins in the region and make decisions regarding development projects.17 and 18 In the same year the ARMM’s territory was expanded when Marawi City and Basilan opted to be included in the region through the ruling of a plebiscite.13

Peace talks were briefly placed on hold when the Philippine military launched an attack on a newly established MILF headquarters in February of 2003, only to have the exploratory talks resume the following month.13 and 17 The parties signed a cease-fire agreement that ended current hostilities and implemented the International Monitoring Team (IMT), which was headed by Malaysia and coordinated closely with the MILF and Philippine government, in order to help maintain the cease-fire in Mindanao.15 and 18

Due to intra-clan and extremist groups, violence periodically occurs in Mindanao.15 Lederach says this is normal, however, these “episodic expression of violence” must be overcome in order for long-term peace to be achieved.15 In order to deal with “episodic expression of violence” and help implement the cease fire the grassroots, civil society-led Bantay Ceasefire monitoring group was implemented and was extremely effective, just like the IMT.20 The  Bantay Ceasefire monitoring group conducted its own missions investigating armed conflicts and provided vital data to the joint Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) about impending tensions and intensifying armed confrontation.2 and 20 The CCCH was inclusive of both members of the MILF and Philippine government, just like the Bantay Ceasefire monitoring group, which I believe has contributed to their success as it lends confidence and trust to both sides.20 The CCCH was extremely effectively in de-escalating and preventing armed conflicts, playing an especially pivotal role in 2004.20

Through exploratory talks both sides reached an accord on the issue of self-governance of Bangsamoro, which would be recognized through the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE).4 The issue of ancestral domain was to include “all areas and lands of the Bangsamoro people, including the natural and environmental resources found within, established through occupation, possession and dominion since time immemorial by cultural bond, customary law, historic rights and legal titles.”17 As required by the Philippine Constitution, territories who wish to join the ancestral domain would be determined through a local plebiscite.21

A major contributor to the peace process from 2003-2007 was the USIP (US Institute of Peace - “a non-partisan US peace building and conflict management institute”) which played a pivotal role in facilitating peace talks, helped both sides to resolve the issue of ancestral domain and provided support to Malaysia during the peace process.21 The USIP became involved at the US government’s behest because the US government was worried international terrorists might try to exploit the conflict in Mindanao.3 As well, MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim at the time had written President Bush asking for the US’s help in resolving the Mindanao conflict.15 The US State Department believed “that USIP’s status as a quasi-governmental, ‘track one-and-a-half’ player” would permit it to engage and be more involved with the parties to the conflict than the US government could.3 The USIP set up the Philippines Facilitation Project (PFP) which proved to be extremely beneficial to the peace process as it helped build positive relationships with the MILF and Philippine government, helped both sides imagine creative solutions to the issue of ancestral domain, and helped create a forum for dialogue between the numerous Moro ethnic groups.22

The PFP as well helped the MILF and Philippine government pick three areas of focus for the peace talks.23 The first area of focus was ancestral domain, with a focus on bringing international experience and knowledge to the negotiations.23 The second area of focus was public constituency for peace, paying particular attention on how to promote a positive political atmosphere between the majority Christian Filipinos and the Moro minority, and how to cultivate understanding of the roots of the Mindanao conflict to the majority of the population.23 The PFP believed that if most of the population was not actively working towards a peace settlement, Mindanao would never achieve a long-lasting peace.23 The third area of focus was how to improve intra-Moro problem solving in order to negate “intra-Moro divisions, competition, and poor communication” among the Moro clans that have hampered “effective Moro governances and prevented a more unified Moro stance in negotiations.”23

The PFP played a pivotal role in getting international actors to share the lessons they learned from their similar conflicts; held interfaith dialogues between Christians and Moros; trained members of civil society in conflict management; held dialogues between young Moro leaders; supported training of educators in the Mindanao Moro’s narrative, conflict management and peacebuilding in order to educate the populace on what steps to take “towards interfaith and intercommunal understanding and cooperation”; held workshops for the media about not over sensualizing news; and held workshops on the issue of ancestral domain and for Philippine military officers on negotiation, conflict management, and communication.23

These examples show how relationships were being built, groups were working collaboratively towards constructive change (hopefully seeing the parties move their relationship out of fear towards love) with the help of international actors, and recognizing human rights which are all key to reconciliation, and showed the parties were putting in the effort to transcend the cycles of violence in order to achieve peace.15

These talks led to the signing of The Memorandum of Agreement 2008 (MOA-AD) between the MILF and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and was the basis for a framework for a peace agreement founded on the BJE.21 The MOA-AD was the result of eight years of negotiations, mediated by Malaysia with the support from other international actors, and was a key step forward toward an effective conclusion to the conflict.21 The MOA-AD meant to establish a Moro homeland in Mindanao (the BJE), which would include the ARMM, as well possibly another 735 Muslim majority territories which could join by a plebiscite, and in the next 25 years, the opportunity to join by a plebiscite would be given to an additional 1459 territories.21 Additionally, the MOA-AD would give the BJE far reaching powers and there would be a sharing of resources and authority in the territories while simultaneously working to create a positive relationships between the Philippine government and BJE.21

However, the agreement soon received opposition, especially from Mindanao Christian political elites, and was voted unconstitutional by the Philippine Supreme Court.2, 14 and 21 Due to these spoilers, aggressions once again emerged, the IMT departed, and the Philippine government led a massive offensive against the MILF, which caused the displacement of 500,000 people.2 and 24

2012 Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)

Within a year a ceasefire was established and formal talks began, first by re-establishing the IMT and giving it a “civilian protection component,” as well as allowing Norway, the European Union and Japan to join the IMT.24 Due to the inability to implement the provisions of the MOA-AD, which in turn incited the return of violence, it caused more international actors and new facilitators to the join the peace talks in the hope of finding new creative solutions to the conflict and to help move the peace process forward.24

The HD Centre was critical to the resumption of peace talks after the failed MOA-AD. The HD Centre supported implementing existing peace agreements, had previously helped negotiate between the MNLF and Philippine government, helped to bring international players to the conflict with Malaysia and the MILF for workshops to share their expertise, and helped establish the International Contact Group (ICG) “as a proponent of strength and support.”25

The ICG included “the United Kingdom, Japan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia and four international non-governmental organizations (INGO), Conciliation Resources, the Muhummadiyah, the Asia Foundation (TAF) and the HD Centre.”25 The ICG mobilized support from the international community for the peace process, helped to ease tensions to foster and sustain mutual trust, kept the parties interested, and was influential in helping Malaysia to move peace talks onward and negotiating with the MILF and Philippine government. This helped to lead to the 2012 Framework Agreementon the Bangsamoro (FAB) and in turn the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB).25 “The ICG in Mindanao is ‘the first ever formal hybrid mediation support initiative,’ and Herbolzheimer and Leslie (2013) argue that such an international mix of states and INGO’s was particularly advantageous” to the peace process.26

Since the peace negotiations of 2001, the international actors in Mindanao took on the roles of third-party, outside peace builders such as “involved/implementing monitoring, research and evaluation, technical assistance, workshops, prejudice reduction training, sponsor financial support to implement solutions, think-tanks to come up with suggestions/model to mitigate the issues, and help create a team to help direct implementation of the solutions and oversee them.”27 All of these roles and commitments by international actors have proven beneficial towards resolving the conflict in Mindanao.

The FAB was signed in October 2012 by the Philippine government and the MILF, and was seen as a new chapter in the peace process where the MILF and Philippine government would work as equals in its implemention.1 and 28 The Institutional Development Theory states that peace can be obtained by “establishing stable social/reliable social institutions that guarantee democracy, equity, justice and fair allocations of resources.”11 An example of this is the establishment of the Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute (BLMI) in 2013 which would be given the power to implement the wealth-sharing deal signed between the two parties and training to help create a strong government that would “strengthen governance capacities.”13 and 28

The FAB led to the MILF and Philippine government signing the CAB in 2014 which included the unimplemented provisions of previous agreements dating back to the Tripoli Agreement and which was signed with the hope of creating the autonomous entity called Bangsamoro in replacement of the insufficient ARMM.26 The CAB would guarantee both the rights of Muslims and non-Muslims in the hope of not being found unconstitutional like the MOA-AD; have the Philippine governments be responsible for currency, postal services, external security, and defense; would give Bangsamoro its own executive powers and laws; territories would have the right to vote whether they would be included in Bangsamoro; sharia law and courts planned for Bangsamoro would only apply to Muslims and not non-Muslims; guaranteeing democratic and human rights; and the decommissioning of MILF forces. 2, 14 and 26 “This agreement was the culmination of years of collective international efforts, mediation and facilitation.”29 The Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) needed to be passed into law next in order to implement the provisions of the CAB.1 and 26

The BBL was supposed to be signed in 2015 but there was intermittent conflict from both sides and other armed groups from 2014-2015, including the Mamasapano tragedy, which caused the BBL to lose massive support from the House of Representatives and Senate, which blamed the MILF.1 and 26 In June 2015, as a sign of trust, the MILF retired 145 fighters and surrendered 75 assault weapons.26 Philippine President Duerte, the first President from Mindanao, created the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) in 2016 to create a new draft of the BBL in the hope of getting approval from the bicameral houses.1 The BTC was inclusive of representatives of the government, indigenous peoples, and MILF.1 and 13

Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL)

            The situation in Marawi in 2017 put the peace process on hold.1 Marawi experienced a series of air strikes over a five-month period in retaliation for an attack lead by the Maute Group, which is a terrorist group believed to be supported by ISIS.1 Once again, martial law was declared in Mindanao.1 Determined to get the peace process back on track, Philippine President Duerte signed the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) in July 2018.1 The BOL included amendments submitted by the BTC.1 

The BOL was ratified on January 25, 2019 by the bicameral houses and stated that, dependent upon a regional plebiscite, the new Bangsamoro (BARMM - Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) would be consisted of the current ARMM (Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao Basilan (excluding Isabela City)), and Cotabato City, and depending upon a vote, another 6 municipalities and 39 barangays had the opportunity to join.30 and 31 The BOL as well has an opt-in provision, where a petition of 10% or more would allow adjacent areas to Bangsamoro to be able to join. The law includes a wealth sharing grant of 75-25 among Bangsamoro and the Philippine government, an annual block grant of 5% share of the national internal revenue to be given to the region without any conditions, and a P5-Billion Special Development fund every year for the proceeding 10 years.30 and 31 It as well includes a provision about identity, allowing not only Moros to identify as Bangsamoro but anyone who at the time of Spanish colonization had ancestors who were original inhabitants, non-Moro Settlers or natives of Mindanao, the Sulu archipelago and the adjacent lands to identify as Bangsamoro.30

The BOL provides for Bangsamoro to have a transitional government called the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority (BTA) that will consist of a ceremonial leader, called a Wali, a chief minister, and to be comprised of a parliament composed of 80 members: “50% party representatives, 40% district representatives, and 10% sectoral representatives, including two reserved seats for ‘non-Moro indigenous peoples and settler communities.’”30 and 31 These members of government will be appointed by the Philippine government and will be in power until the transition is over or until the next national elections in 2022.30 After the transitional government, the people of Bangsamoro will be able to elect their members of parliament, who will then in turn elect a Chief Minister and Cabinet.30

The BOL will allow for the application of sharia law to Muslims, but not non-Muslims. However, non-Muslim can opt in to be put in the jurisdiction of sharia courts.31 The BOL states that the military and police forces will still be headed by the Philippine national government, however they will allow for members of the MNLF and MILF to join.31 All in-land bodies of water within Bangsamoro will be seen to by Bangsamoro except for those that produce energy for other regions, which will be co-managed with the Department of Energy.31

This agreement is already seeing some opposition. Isabela City voted no on joining Bangsamoro while Cotabato City voted yes.30 However, this victory for Bangsamoro is already being contested by Cotabato City’s mayor, Cynthia Guiana Sayadi.30 Additionally, a huge spoiler is that the Sulu Governor, Adbusakur “Toto” Tan II, is trying to vote Sulu out of Bangsamoro (they were included because its votes were counted as one entity with the rest of the territories in the ARMM) and has filed a petition with the Supreme Court declaring that the BOL is unconstitutional because the Bangsamoro Parliament violates the Constitution’s “determination of separation of executive and legislative power” by allowing the chief minister and its Cabinet to be chosen by members of parliament.30

Intra-Moro Conflict and Other Conflicts

Besides the conflict between the Moros and the Philippine government, there are many violent conflicts that arise from intra-clan feuds in Mindanao.23 These intra-clan conflicts involve disputes over political positions, personal affairs and lands and often escalate into violent struggles when friends and relatives who get involved in the conflict are affiliated with the MNLF, MILF, local police sponsored militias, or the Philippine army and are able to bring in military resources.20 and 23 These dynamics of clan-violence are known as rido.20 The roots of the intra-clan divisions can be traced back to when there were distinct Muslim sultanates dominated by different ethnic groups.23

The Moro still first and foremost identify themselves by their ethnic group, such as Maranao, Maguindanao, Tausug, etc., and put the interest of their ethnic clan ahead of a united Moro people.3 The clans’ shared religion and history of oppression against colonialists bond them, however, they have not been able to achieve a unified Bangsamoro with clear goals because rivalries among their leaders for political advantage and economic favors from the Philippine have prevented it. 23 These disputes, rivalries and divisions thwart the dream of a united homeland and lead some to believe that a successful peace agreement and good governance may never be achieved.23 In addition, they allow for the Philippine government to corrupt Moro leaders and not deal with the Moro population fairly.23

The MILF and MNLF claim they represent all the Moros of Mindanao; however they are opposed by other “traditional Moro chiefs (datus) and politicians who see these revolutionary organizations as a threat to their political fiefdoms.”32 However, internationalization of peace talks has significantly heightened the MILF’s political legitimacy, and while this may be good, the focus now must be on being able to unite and represent the various Moro clans and consistently involve indigenous leaders in political discussions.2 Further, some indigenous peoples, as a minority group, still fear being marginalize in Bangsamoro.2

Local conflicts in Mindanao have the potential to generate larger scale armed conflicts between the Philippine government and Moro groups, such as the MILF, because they can bring the military resources of rebels and the Philippine government into conflicts.”20 In some cases, the Philippine government and rebel forces use local armed groups for their larger conflict.20 “The interplay of all these armed groups produces an explosive situation and plays a sensitive role in the recurring character of violence in the conflict-prone areas” of Mindanao, which in turn hampers the peace process.20

In order to help bridge the intra-clan conflict, two important things happened. First, the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies sponsored multiple group discussions with senior leaders from Moro clans within the ARMM on the future government of Bangsamoro.33 Secondly, the PFP held a series of seven forums for young Muslim leaders.33 The forums were a success, helping to improve dialogue between the young leaders, creating a “candid exchange of view” about issues faced by the Moros and their shared future, and strengthening the network between these young Moro leaders to inspire collaboration to take place in the future.33 The young Moro leaders discussed “Moro identity and aspirations, problems of constructing Moro nationhood, the peace process and its implications and challenges for Moro leadership, the role of religion in building the Moro future, and Moro relations with the outside world (especially the US).”33 The participants believed these discussions led to creating a foundation for “building further Moro unity and a shared vision of effective leadership.”33

The Christian majority is skeptical of appeasing Moros and granting their demands, such as greater political autonomy, because of the on-going presence in Moro communities of armed criminal and extremist groups such as Abu Sayyaf, the smallest and “most radical of the Islamic separatist groups” in Mindanao with which the Philippine government refuses to have negotiations; the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, which were behind the bombings in Central Mindanao in the summer of 2013; and the New People’s Army, a communist right-wing insurgency group of the Communist Party of the Philippines, which uses guerilla-style warfare to try and overthrow the government, is reported “to be the deadliest in the Philippines”, and is on the US State Department’s Foreign Terrorist List.13, 14 and 32 The Philippine government has engaged in inconsistent peace talks with the New People’s Army over the years, however, nothing substantial has emerged.32

Relations between armed Moro groups and civil society experienced pivotal changes during this protracted peace process with instances of violence.2 Actors in civil society, who in the past lacked a voice in the peace process, were now allowed one, and the MILF has taken considerable efforts to engage with civil society actors, especially through a sequence of community discussions.2

Will Peace Be Obtained?

However, with the BOL being ratified in January 2019 by both Philippine legislative houses, there may be hope. This agreement was more inclusive of all the different parties to the conflict and seems to be heading in the right direction. Or is it? It is already receiving opposition from some parties declaring the agreement as unconstitutional.          

The Mindanao conflict is a complex conflict system in that many independent groups, although doing a better job of being inclusive and working together in more recent times, are still seeking to “advance their own self-interest.”34 The Philippine government and MILF have been working tirelessly toward a common goal of peace, with the MILF’s still working toward their interest of self-autonomy and the Philippine government keeping their interest of remaining the central power. Additionally, some Moro clans are still working towards their goal of an independent state and indigenous people are working to get and/or keep their voices heard. However, intra-clan conflicts and local armed conflicts threaten to spoil the BOL.

The roots of the Mindanao conflict may be found in the basic human need of identity, and I believe the only way to truly achieve a sustainable peace in Mindanao is if the Moro clans unite by changing their conflictive ethos by forming a brand-new inclusive identity no longer associated with violence and instead embracing human coexistence.19 This may be difficult as the Moro clans and indigenous tribes are so engrained in their conflict, that they do not know how to identify themselves without it.35

Lederach states that the “past can be a useful frame of reference for responding to a crisis and moving toward change… understanding the patterns of the present, imagining a desired future and design change processes at various levels.”15 According to Conciliation Resources, the Mindanao peace process has done just that and learned from the mistakes of its past, and in turn has developed “a hybrid facilitation support body (ICG), with both states and international NGOs, and a hybrid monitoring body on the ground, bringing together internationals and locals, civilian and military, states and NGOs”, which will lead to its success.28 This can be seen as the parties are using the Tripoli Agreement as a starting point for all negotiations and agreements, the Philippine government and international actors are listening to the Moros wants and helping to implement them, and the inclusiveness of cease-fire groups.

When I think of the possibility of peace being obtained in Mindanao, I think of Lederach’s four disciplines of the essence of peacebuilding.15 The parties in Mindanao must recognize their centrality of relationships, that is their “interconnectedness and mutuality, practice paradoxical curiosity by rising above the divisions and differences of the groups, providing space for the creative act by allowing time and space for a different and creative future to take form, and all must be able to take the willingness to risk.”15 For decades, some could even argue centuries, the only thing the Moros have known is conflict and violence. Therefore, the Moros need to be willing to step into the unknow, out of their conflictive ethos to be able to create a new peaceful identity, in order for peace to take form and sustain itself.11

I believe the Philippine government, some Mindanao Christians, the MILF and its supporting Moro clans and indigenous tribes recognize their peoples’ “interconnectedness and mutuality”, are working to rise above their differences and divisions and are willing to take the risk towards peace.15 These actions show how these groups have switched to a win-win mindset and one of mutual gain.11 You can see this in the interfaith and interclan workshops, dialogues and forums and local cease-fire groups. I believe the latter agreements and talks have been so successful because they were more inclusive of other Moro factions and indigenous tribes in peace talks and workshops. As well, including the protection of rights for all Muslims and non-Muslims in the BOL proves that these parties are aware of their “interconnectedness and mutuality” to the rest of the Christian Philippines.15 However, I believe that all the Moro clans must be united for sustainable peace to be achieved.

Intergroup contact theory proposes tactics for tearing down hostilities between groups, the necessity to overcome collective emotional traumas and how they must be overcome through “a collective psychologically healing process” through ways such as dialogue groups, intergroup contact, etc.35 One can see these steps being taken in the Mindanao conflict because the MILF and Philippine government are meeting together, along with international actors, to work towards peace. Also, workshops are being conducted with different Moro factions and indigenous tribe leaders to work towards a collaborative peace, helping to create a “psychological shift to release intergenerational traumas” and in the process letting go of group conflict identity.35 As one can see through these examples, the parties are trying to achieve reconciliation through a “collective psychological process.”35

Tschirgi and Wong agree that the local population must be active in the peace process, and Wong goes on to state that they are the only ones who can achieve “sustainable peace and development”.36 and 37 I believe this is true, and we started to see this when negotiations between the MILF and Philippine government were initiated with the facilitation of Malaysia and especially with the PFP workshops, dialogues and interfaith dialogues treating local people as partners and influencers of their growth.38 As well, you can see the local population of Mindanao trying to sustain its peace with the grassroots cease-fire groups (Bantay Ceasefire monitoring group). However, all the locals, that is the Mindanao Christians, indigenous tribes and all Moro clans, must be involved in the peace process to truly achieve a sustainable peace in Mindanao.

Millar states that negotiations and mediations must focus on basic human needs of all the population, including well-being, liberty, identity and safety.35 You can truly see this coming to fruition in the latter workshops, dialogues, forums, peace negotiations and agreements, such as the MOA-AD, CAB and BOL, and they are an example of Arthur and his Minority Rights Group’s four pillars, i.e., “the right to exist, the right to non-discrimination, the right to protection of identity, the right to participation in public affairs.”39

Conciliation Resources states that the Philippine government is following a global trend of “increased decentralization in response to the diverse and multiple identities of its people.”28 Reconciliation demands that the conflictive ethos that is engrained with “alternative beliefs are blocked, censored, rejected or perceived with mistrust and suspicion” must be changed.19 You can see the groups working to change this as they work collaboratively toward “mutual trust and acceptance, and cooperation” with their interfaith dialogues, workshops, inclusive grassroots groups, willingness to work with international actors, etc., proving there is an incentive and openness in the societal climate to find new ways and perspectives regarding the conflict.19 The ethos of peace changes in reconciliation by a cultural, education, political, and social process “involving all the societal institutions and channels of communication.”19

Since the peace talks in the 2000s leading up to the MOA-AD and after, we have seen a change in the psychological infrastructure and some of the eight societal beliefs that are a part of the conflictive ethos.19 “Societal beliefs are defined as society members’ shared cognition on topics and issues that are of specific concern for society and contribute to their sense of uniqueness.”19 Through this reconciliation process we are beginning to see the Philippine government and the MILF and its supporting Moro clans and indigenous tribes working together toward common goals and beliefs, and trying to establish “new relations of peaceful coexistence based on mutual trust and acceptance, cooperation and considerations of each other’s needs by letting go of hatred, prejudice and animosity.”19

Additionally, the Philippine government is showing tolerance for both the minority Moros and indigenous tribes rights where there was once intolerance due to the fact that each group saw the other as a threat to its way of life.40 It is showing political tolerance by supporting civil rights or liberties for religious, political, and cultural boundaries.40 It as well is showing social tolerance for the tribes and Moro clans which are not like the Christian Mindanao majority.40 This is an example of social change that must occur for reconciliation to take place.35 Unfortunately, I believe that while intra-clan dialogue and workshops are helping, there is still intolerance between some clans.40

Lederach state that a group’s identity, its future and survival is formed through finding its “place, voice, and story.”15 I think with the latter agreements and negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine government, the parties have been doing a better job at helping the Moros and indigenous tribes construct their future (one that is combined with Mindanao Christians and the Philippine government), and helping them to find their place and voice. Even more so, I think the work the PFP has done, such as educating the population and school system on the Muslim narrative, has significantly contributed to this.15

In order for reconciliation and peace to take place, the parties must allot it time to do so. Conciliation Resources warns that while there are high expectations for a quick change, structural reform needs to be given time to be truly successful.28 Lederach states that “reconciliation recognizes the need to give time and place to both justice and peace, where redressing the wrong is held together with the envisioning of a common, connected future”, and I believe the Philippine government and the MILF and its supporting clans and indigenous tribes are doing this; however not all Moro clans are.15 

Conclusion

In conclusion, I believe the potentially biggest spoiler of the latest peace agreement in Mindanao, the BOL, is if the Moro clans do not unite. I believe the Philippine government, international actors and the MILF and its supporting Moro clans and indigenous tribes have learned from their failed past agreements and are working together cohesively to try and achieve a sustainable peace in Mindanao, with putting a specific focus on trying to unite the Moro clans and help the people of Bangsamoro to reidentify themselves. However, until the Moro clans step out of their century-old intra-clan conflicts and conflictive ethos in order to reidentify themselves so that they may unite as one people, they have the potential to be the biggest spoiler of the BOL and Bangsamoro. I am unsure if a long-lasting peace will every truly be obtained in Mindanao until then.

Acronyms

ARMM - Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BARMM - Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

BBL - The Bangsamoro Basic Law

BDA - Bangsamoro Development Agency BDA

BJE - Bangsamoro Juridical Entity

BLMI - Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute

BOL - Bangsamoro Organic Law

BTA - Bangsamoro Transitional Authority

BTC - Bangsamoro Transition Commission BTC

CAB - 2014 Comprehensive agreement on the Bangsamoro

CCCH - Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities

FAB - 2012 Agreement on the Bangsamoro

FPA - 1996 Final Peace Agreement

ICG – International Contact Group

IMT - International Monitoring Team

MILF - Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MNLF - Moro National Liberation Front

MOA-AD - 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domains

OIC - The Organization of Islamic Cooperation

PFP - Philippines Facilitation Project

USIP - US Institute of Peace

Endnotes

  1. Cagoco-Guiam, R. (2018, August 10). The Tripoli Agreement of 1976: Lessons, impact on the Mindanao peace process. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Retrieved from: https://pcij.org/stories/the-tripoli-agreement-of-1976-lessons-and-impact-on-the-mindanao-peace-process/
  2. South, A. (2017, August 22). The Mindanao Peace Process and Roles of Civil Society. Oxford Research Group. Retrieved from: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-mindanao-peace-process-and-roles-of-civil-society
  3. Martin, G. E. and Tuminez, A. S. (2008, February). Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines: A Summary and Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003-2007. United States Institute of Peace Special Report. Page 1. Retrieved from: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr202.pdf
  4. Martin, G. E. and Tuminez, A. S. (2008, February). Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines: A Summary and Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003-2007. United States Institute of Peace Special Report. Page 7. Retrieved from: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr202.pdf
  5. Druce, S. (2016, December). Not the “ASEAN Way”: The Southern Philippines Conflict and Its Internationalization. Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia, 45-60. Page 47.
  6. Druce, S. (2016, December). Not the “ASEAN Way”: The Southern Philippines Conflict and Its Internationalization. Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia, 45-60. Page 48.
  7. Druce, S. (2016, December). Not the “ASEAN Way”: The Southern Philippines Conflict and Its Internationalization. Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia, 45-60. Page 49.
  8. Martin, G. E. and Tuminez, A. S. (2008, February). Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines: A Summary and Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003-2007. United States Institute of Peace Special Report. Page 2. Retrieved from: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr202.pdf
  9. Martin, G. E. and Tuminez, A. S. (2008, February). Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines: A Summary and Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003-2007. United States Institute of Peace Special Report. Page 3. Retrieved from: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr202.pdf
  10. Druce, S. (2016, December). Not the “ASEAN Way”: The Southern Philippines Conflict and Its Internationalization. Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia, 45-60. Page 50.
  11. Ricigliano, R. (2012). Making Peace Last: A Toolbox For Sustainable Peacebuilding. Routledge. Page 27.
  12. Druce, S. (2016, December). Not the “ASEAN Way”: The Southern Philippines Conflict and Its Internationalization. Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia, 45-60. Page 51.
  13. Casauay, A. (2015, May 25). The MNLF, MILF and 2 peace agreements. Rappler. Retried from: https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/38547-milf-mnlf-peace-agreements
  14. BBC. (2012, October 8). Conflict In the South Philippines. BBC News. Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17038024
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  17. Druce, S. (2016, December). Not the “ASEAN Way”: The Southern Philippines Conflict and Its Internationalization. Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia, 45-60. Page 53.
  18. Martin, G. E. and Tuminez, A. S. (2008, February). Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines: A Summary and Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003-2007. United States Institute of Peace Special Report. Page 4. Retrieved from: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr202.pdf
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  21. Druce, S. (2016, December). Not the “ASEAN Way”: The Southern Philippines Conflict and Its Internationalization. Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia, 45-60. Page 54.
  22. Martin, G. E. and Tuminez, A. S. (2008, February). Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines: A Summary and Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003-2007. United States Institute of Peace Special Report. Pages 5-6. Retrieved from: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr202.pdf
  23. Martin, G. E. and Tuminez, A. S. (2008, February). Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines: A Summary and Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003-2007. United States Institute of Peace Special Report. Page 9. Retrieved from: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr202.pdf
  24. Druce, S. (2016, December). Not the “ASEAN Way”: The Southern Philippines Conflict and Its Internationalization. Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia, 45-60. Page 55.
  25. Druce, S. (2016, December). Not the “ASEAN Way”: The Southern Philippines Conflict and Its Internationalization. Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia, 45-60. Page 56.
  26. Druce, S. (2016, December). Not the “ASEAN Way”: The Southern Philippines Conflict and Its Internationalization. Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia, 45-60. Page 57.
  27. The Peace Building Initiative Actors. International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research. Retrieved from: http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index702a.html?pageId=1767
  28. Conciliation Resources. (2012, October). Historic agreement paves way for peace. Retrieved from: https://www.c-r.org/news-and-views/news/historic-agreement-paves-way-peace-mindanao-philippines-lead-innovative-ways
  29. Druce, S. (2016, December). Not the “ASEAN Way”: The Southern Philippines Conflict and Its Internationalization. Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia, 45-60. Page 58.
  30. Panti, L. T. (2019, January 22). Fast facts on the provisions of the Bangsamoro Organic Law. GMA News. Retrieved from: https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/specialreports/682349/fast-facts-on-the-provisions-of-the-bangsamoro-organic-law/story/
  31. Ranada, Pia. (2018, July 27). Document: Bangsamoro Organic Law. Rappler. Retrieved from: https://www.rappler.com/nation/208331-document-bangsamoro-organic-law
  32. Martin, G. E. and Tuminez, A. S. (2008, February). Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines: A Summary and Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003-2007. United States Institute of Peace Special Report. Page 13. Retrieved from: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr202.pdf
  33. Martin, G. E. and Tuminez, A. S. (2008, February). Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines: A Summary and Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003-2007. United States Institute of Peace Special Report. Page 10. Retrieved from: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr202.pdf
  34. Burgess & Burgess. Complexity-Oriented Resolution and Reconciliation I. Beyond Intractability. Retrieved from: https://www.beyondintractability.org/premium/747-unit2a
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  38. Anderson, M. et al. (2012, November). Time to Listen. CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.
  39. Arthur, P. (2009). Identities in Transition: Developing Better Transitional Justice Initiatives in Divided Societies. International Center for Transitional Justice. Pages 12-13. Retrieved from: https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/blackboard.learn.xythos.prod/5a30bcf95ea52/5513922?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%2A%3DUTF-8%27%27arthur-ids-in-transition.pdf&response-content-type=application%2Fpdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20190506T000028Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=21599&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIL7WQYDOOHAZJGWQ%2F20190506%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=ca4d528ed27142257fa90c3c4e819f01d8c51854c40052ddf536adaf4a1e57dd
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