Reconciliation in the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

 

By Karen Werner 

          The Holodomor, a genocide inflicted on the Ukrainian people by the Russian communist party in the 1930s,1 and the narratives surrounding it, underlie and complicate reconciliation following the war in eastern Ukraine between Ukraine and Russia and also separatists in the region.  Russia and its separatist supporters have sought to erase, minimize, and manipulate Holodomor in this conflict.  Any effective reconciliation internally among the Ukrainian people or externally with the Russian Federation will acknowledge Holodomor’s place in the country’s history. “To end or resolve a long-term conflict, a relatively stable solution that identifies and deals with the underlying sources of the conflict must be found.”2    Despite the ongoing violence and two failed peace agreements, there are options and mechanisms for greater dialogue, cessation of the violence, and to some degree, reconciliation.  Following sustainable peace, reconciliation is more likely within Ukraine, among the people of the country, but is less likely with Russia.  The conflict can be viewed from the “lens” of the “immediate situation,” “deeper relationship patterns that form the context of the conflict,” and a “framework that holds these together and creates a platform to address the content, the context, and the structure of the relationship.”3

            In terms of relationship patterns, the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine is rooted in violent past relationships between the parties of the Russian Federation and Ukraine.  The ongoing war between Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian military is rooted in violence including that of Holodomor in the 1930s.  Both the war and Holodomor are part of a long series of conflicts, deeply rooted in history, dating back to at least the 1700s and Russian imperial control of areas of Ukraine.4   The Russian perspectives driving the current violence in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea are similar to those of imperial Russia.  In these earlier centuries, Russians believed, “[n]ow that they were united once again with the … Ukrainians, or ‘Little Russians,’ [they] were expected to lose their distinguishing features and become ‘true Russians.’  Until the collapse of the empire, it was government policy to speed this ‘natural’ process along.”5  Similarly, today, “[t]he majority of the Russian political establishment still regards Ukraine as a part of Russia, sharing with it a common history and fate.”6  In this view, the conflict also pertains to the issue of identity for Ukraine or Ukrainians.   The sense of a national Ukrainian identity historically conflicted with Russian aims, and “once the Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire transcended certain limits, it faced an implacable and overwhelming enemy in the tsarist government.”7 

            As in Holodomor, which sought to destroy the Ukrainian people in a Soviet man-made famine and genocide,8 the Russian Federation’s backing of separatists in eastern Ukraine9  is also an attempt to negate the sovereignty of Ukraine as a nation.  Ultimately, the ongoing war in Ukraine is an expression of the Russian narrative that enabled the Holodomor, “that Ukrainians are not worthy of having their own nation or identity.10  Holodomor, a man-made famine, “[wa]s [a] war between the government and the peasants.”11  Holodomor was, like the 2014 invasion and subsequent ongoing violence today, an attack on Ukrainians as a people, since “[o]n 14 December 1932, Stalin and Molotov signed a resolution on state grain deliveries…. Among other things, the document ordered the ‘correct implementation of Ukrainization’ in Ukraine and beyond its borders- that is, in regions that were densely settled by ethnic Ukrainians.”12   “[T]he ‘operation in the countryside’  gradually turned into an ‘operation’ against the entire society of Ukraine, which was slated for total subjugation and then forced to remain silent about the true organizers of the Holodomor.”13 

            Additionally, Holodomor can be viewed as a genocide.  “In 1953, Lemkin wrote “Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine,” in which he distinguished four characteristics:  1) the annihilation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the ‘national brain’ of Ukraine; 2) the liquidation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous church, the ‘national soul’ of Ukraine; 3) the Holodomor of the Ukrainian peasantry, the repository of the tradition, folklore and music, the national language and literature, and the national spirit of Ukraine – between 1932 and 1933, 5 million Ukrainians starved to death; and 4) the fragmentation of the Ukrainian people at once by the addition to Ukraine of foreign peoples and by the dispersion of the Ukrainians throughout Eastern Europe. For Lemkin, this all led to ‘the systematic destruction of the Ukrainian nation, in its progressive absorption within the new Soviet nation.’”14  “The victims of the Ukrainian Famine numbered in the millions.”15  “Attempts were made to prevent the starving from traveling to areas where food was more available.”16  “One may conclude that Stalin’s policy in the villages amounted to deliberately depriving collective-farm workers and independent farmers of access to the grain they had grown in case they failed to fulfill the grain-requisition quota, which led part of the population to die of starvation. This part of the population was destroyed as a result of the conscious policy of the Soviet state.  The death of part of the population thus took place as a result of their knowingly being deprived of access to food products, which constitutes a crime against humanity.  The state policy of grain requisitions applied to all rural areas of the USSR; therefore, this conclusion relates to all those who died of starvation on the territory of the USSR during that period.”17 

            During the same time period, Stalin purged Ukrainian society.  “[I]n the course of two years, 1932 and 1933-the years of the famine- the same Soviet secret police responsible for overseeing the hunger in the countryside would arrest nearly 200,000 people in the republic of Ukraine.”18  Church leaders were “arrested and condemned” and “thousands of churches-three-quarters  of those in the country- ceased to function altogether.19  Also, Kyiv buildings were destroyed in 1935 and art historians and curators were arrested and shot, or exiled.20  The Soviets used “tools of mass murder, deportation, and forced labor, exile, and starvation” against political, religious, and intellectual leaders in Ukraine.21  “Although the Holodomor occurred some eighty years ago, its consequences for Ukraine and Ukrainians are still very much in evidence.”22 Effects included decreased birth rates, increased mortality rates, population losses, economic development, and political culture.23

            To compound the impacts of Holodomor, “Ukrainians not only experienced a genocidal trauma, but in the decades that followed, they were compelled to pretend that it had never happened.- a form of denial that distorted the national mentality and produced or reinforced a variety of post-genocidal syndromes, ranging from historical amnesia to substance dependence to broken families to dysfunctional gender relations.”24   “James Mace concluded that the Holodomor left Ukrainian society in a state of post-genocidal trauma.  To a considerable degree, this remains true today.”25  “In the years that followed the famine, Ukrainians were forbidden to speak about what happened. They were afraid to mourn publicly. Even if they had dared to do so, there were no churches to pray in, no tombstones to decorate with flowers.  When the state destroyed the institutions of the Ukrainian countryside, it struck a blow against public memory as well.”26  They had private memories in diaries and “within their families instead.”27  Russia tried to block preservation of Ukrainian history on Holodomor.  “[T]he Russian leadership wishes to impose on Ukraine and the world its own version of Ukrainian history.  Denying Ukraine the right to its own history is a covert form of denying its right to independence.”28   Given this genocide inflicted on Ukraine by the Soviet Union and the Russian communist party, the current drive for violence by Russia against Ukraine is placed in context of a long-running unbalanced relationship between the two states. 

            In terms of the immediate situation, in a recent speech, U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker summarized the status of the current war in Ukraine.  The conflict is “not an indigenous conflict in Ukraine. It’s not a civil war. It’s not an ethnic conflict. It’s the result of Russia invading and occupying territory in Ukraine,” Volker said.29  “[T]he humanitarian situation facing Ukrainian citizens in the Donbas, on both sides of the line of conflict, is really intolerable….. Over 10,300 people have been killed as a result of the conflict on both sides of the line. Over 24,000 people have been wounded. We have well over a million, probably closer to 2 million, displaced persons.”30  “There are ceasefire violations that take place every night. There’s the use of rockets, snipers, mortars.”31 According to the Armed Conflict Database, [t]he current conflict led to 9,815 fatalities since it began in 2014 and 1.6 million individual displaced persons as of 2015.32  

            According to Volker, “the conflict is driven clearly by Russian forces. There is 100 percent command and control by Russia of the military forces in the east, and also of the political entities…. [s]o [it] is a conflict that Russia has chosen to inflict on this territory….”33  “Russia’s responsibility is important here, because it is a signatory to the Minsk agreements. It is a part of the Normandy process, along with Germany and France and Ukraine, that has talked about a resolution, but in reality, the actions on the ground have undercut the agreements and undercut the diplomatic efforts. [It] is really important that Russia make a serious decision, a concrete decision, a real decision to bring about peace.”34

            The current war arose as a result of activities by internal actors and external actors in Ukraine.35  “[P]rotests … broke out in Kiev’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in late 2013” to force pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to sign an association agreement with the European Union.36  Violence by some radical, armed protestors, followed by violence by the authorities, led to at least 70 civilians killed in two days in February 2014.  More than 500,000 people joined the protests and “the focus … shifted to overthrowing President Viktor Yanukovych’s corrupt, authoritarian regime.”37    After Yanukovych fled, the Ukrainian “parliament took extra-constitutional action and voted on 22 February to remove him and install a new government. This change of regime dramatically shifted the balance of power from the south and east to the west of Ukraine.”38   “Putin and his inner circle appeared to believe” that the situation “resulted at least in part from a Western plot to install a loyal government in Kiev” and threatened Russian bases in Crimea.39    As a result, in February 2014, Putin moved Russian forces into Crimea, with support of “pro-Russian politicians,” “release[ing] latent separatist sentiment among the majority of the population” there, and “[t]wo days later, the Crimean parliament voted to join Russia and in a March 16 “deeply flawed” referendum, “97 percent of voters allegedly supported the proposal to join Russia.”40   Subsequently, violence broke out in eastern Ukraine, and aside from directly backing the separatists, Russia employs “disinformation, corruption, and military force to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty….”41 

            A structural factor42 that may have permitted the eastern part of Ukraine to be vulnerable to Russian influence, is that governments there may not have met “people’s basic human needs,” and may have had “poor structures” that impacted “poverty rates” and “the health of … society’s change mechanisms.”43  Specifically, eastern Ukrainians “regarded the area as previously … a paradise for workers, with tough physical labor but good salaries….”44 “During the Soviet period, it was possible to subsidize this, but when the union collapsed, it was no longer possible….”45   As a result, many people there “associated the appearance of Ukraine with a downturn in their own fortunes and remembered the Soviet period as a golden age.”46    “Putin’s “government exploited [the trauma of the Soviet collapse], using fear of political unrest to quash opposition, equating patriotism with support for Putin, and using a simplified narrative of the Second World War to imply Russia must unite once again against a foreign threat.”47 

            Another area of structure in eastern Ukraine that contributed to the conflict pertains to “media/civil society.”48  Aside from the conflict on the ground, there is a dispute over Ukraine’s narrative and identity.   Since the invasion, Russia and its supporters have attacked Ukraine’s history including that of Holomodor.  “As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine intensified, attacks on the history and historiography also worsened.  In August 2015, Russian-backed separatists deliberately destroyed a monument to the victims of the famine in the occupied eastern Ukrainian town of Szizhne….”49  Similarly, in August 2015, a Russian propaganda outlet, Sputnik News “published an article as Russian propaganda called “Holodomor Hoax.”50 Similarly, even before 2014, “the first thing [pro-Russian] Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich did after his Feb. 25 inauguration was delete the link to the Holodomor on the president’s official Web site.”51 

            In terms of a framework to resolve the conflict, to date, at least two peace agreements have failed to bring an end to the violence.  Currently, a number of countries and groups are trying to stop the violence.  One group, the “Normandy Four,” consists of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine.52  Additionally, a “Trilateral Contact Group” made up of “representatives from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia and Ukraine are tasked with implementing the existing Minsk peace agreement. Minsk provided for a “detailed roadmap for resolving the conflict” with a “13 point-plan,” including “a ceasefire and … withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front lines, to be monitored by the [OSCE]; [a] prisoner exchange, local elections, and amnesty for fighters,” with “safe delivery of humanitarian aid and work toward the socio-economic reintegration of the separatist-held territories.”53   In exchange, Ukraine “promise[d] to implement constitutional changes to provide for “decentralization” of the region, and “in exchange, all ‘foreign armed formations’ [would]be withdrawn and Ukraine [would] regain control of its state borders.” 54

            Recent areas of discussion have included “security, the release of prisoners, the protection of civilians and populated areas, and the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula,’” a concept first supported in “2015 by Germany’s then-foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, for settling the conflict in Donbas” through “local elections … under the supervision of the OSCE, to ensure that the process adheres to international voting standards.”55  By this approach, [a]fter elections, “legislation confirming Donbas’s ‘special status’ (de facto autonomy) would take effect.”56  Also, in 2017, the Trilateral Contact Group’s Humanitarian Working Group agreed to the exchange of nearly “400 detainees between Ukraine and the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics.”57  D  Lastly, at the same time as these discussion, countries have moved to sanction Russia. For example, in spring 2017, the European Union and the United States extended sanctions against Russia.58 

            While a full reconciliation with Russia is not realistic, there are steps that can be taken to end the violence.  One idea to address the conflict is to “deploy a United Nations peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine.”59  On 9 September, the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN submitted a draft resolution on the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Donbas to the UN Security Council (UNSC).60    From October to December 2017, “the Ukrainian parliament adopted two laws on the situation in the Donbas on 6 October: a one-year extension of the September 2014 law on local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, followed by a law on the restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty over the ‘temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.’61    “The latter outlined necessary conditions for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force in eastern Ukraine.”62 

            Currently, OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) cannot access the full area of the war in eastern Ukraine.  Specifically, the monitors have “limited access to the Petrivske, Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas. On several occasions, the OSCE reported that SMM passage was prevented by pro-Russian separatists.”63  “The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission is tasked to “monitor the disengagement process as foreseen in the Trilateral Contact Group Framework Decision of 21 December 2016.64   

            Both the United States and Ukraine support putting in place a United Nations peacekeeping force.  One factor that could promote reconciliation, pertains to “external supportive conditions, such as a peaceful international climate [achieved through] pressure from influential allies.”65  This type of international force could be brought to bear to move the process forward toward a more lasting peace. According to Volker, “a UN-mandated peacekeeping … would be on the basis of voluntary national contributions, but … it would be able to assure security in the territory that is now occupied by Russia.”66  This, in turn, “would create the conditions for holding local elections, which is part of the Minsk agreements; it would maintain security while a special status for this territory under Ukraine’s constitution is implemented, while amnesty is implemented for people who committed crimes as part of the conflict, so that all of the aspects of the Minsk agreements would be implemented. And at the end of that, you would see the territory restored to Ukraine’s control.”67

            The Ukrainian president also supports a UN peacekeeping force in his country.  “It is very important for everyone to understand that the road to the implementation of the Minsk agreements runs through the deployment of a genuine full-fledged UN peacekeeping operation, in accordance with the decision of the UN Security Council, deployment in the occupied Donbas.” 68 According to him, this peacekeeping mission should cover the entire occupied territory, including the temporarily uncontrolled section of the Ukrainian-Russian border.”69  “I have no doubt that as soon as we establish control over the border, peace will immediately return to this land in a matter of weeks. And that is what Russia is afraid of,” the President said.70  Russia’s actions in arming and training the separatists is that of a “spoiler”71  and this mechanism of a peacekeeping force could curtail that activity.

            Certain steps are needed to get peace in eastern Ukraine and would include: “[p]oint one; ceasefire. It is necessary to note that it is at this stage that attempts to return peace to eastern Ukraine have failed, this very basic and first requirement not just of Minsk….. It is also necessary to note that ceasefire violations from the two sides are not equivalent: the Ukrainian armed forces are defending their land and the Russian led forces are attacking. That is not equivalent, neither legally nor morally.”72   Part of this would be for heavy weapons to pull back.73   After that, “the granting of full and complete access to the area” to the OSCE monitors, “and a guarantee of safe passage to its members for monitoring purposes” is needed.  Lastly, it is necessary to “dismant[le] … the Russian-installed occupation authorities – they are not indigenous, they certainly do not represent the locals, and they have no legitimacy.”74   If Russia failed to adhere to the ceasefire, then “there will be even more sanctions applied by an international community fed up of dealing with the bellicose Kremlin.”75   An additional step could be, once there is a cease fire, to put in place an “international temporary governing structure… prior to restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty.”76  “Additionally, [s]ome kind of reconciliation council should be created, [and] this is the place to address questions like an amnesty.77   

            One potential spoiler to any path to peace and reconciliation is that the United States in December 2017 agreed to provide anti-tank weapons to Ukraine.78   This can also be viewed as “escalatory,” as a “factor” that “tends to make things worse or to lower the level of peace.”79  Specifically, “[t]he United States Congress approved a bill on 8 November authorizing the allocation of US $350 million for military aid and lethal weapons to Ukraine in 2018.”80    The Ukrainian president expressed gratitude for the weapons, which would be a “powerful deterrent to Russia.”81  In another sign of potential escalation in the conflict, “[o]n 19 December, Russian soldiers withdrew from the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC), … a joint initiative created by Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE in September 2014 [to] oversee the implementation of ceasefires and the stabilization of the Line of Contact in the Donbas.  According to the Russian foreign ministry, the reason for the withdrawal was the ‘tense moral and psychological situation’ and ‘disrespectful attitude of Ukrainian servicemen.’ Ukrainian partners, the US, the United Kingdom, France and Germany expressed concern over the decision, stating that it may adversely affect the security situation in eastern Ukraine.”82

            After a peace agreement halts the violence and an interim government is put in place, there are at least two levels of longer term reconciliation, one between Ukrainians who sided with Russians in eastern Ukraine and other groups in the country, and another between Ukraine and Russia in the current ongoing war in that region.   On the Russia-Ukraine reconciliation question, one potential way to motivate Russia toward cessation of violence and reconciliation is to increase the cost of the conflict to its economy and economic national interests.  According to Boulding, as the cost of a conflict increases, there is a motivation to find ways to resolve the conflict.83    However, threats or the use of sanctions are not sufficient and could actually negatively impact the situation in the longer term, since threat power destroys  “integrative power,” which would be needed to bring the offending country, Russia, back into the world community.84  While sanctions have detrimentally affected Russia’s economy,85 Putin has perpetuated a narrative that Russia must unite against a western threat to the country86  indicating that there is an existential threat to its existence.  In the long term, one way to motivate change from the bottom up87   to provide an alternative to the narrative, would be to create a sustainable platform of dialogue between Ukrainians and Russians “that [eventually] generates processes that produce solutions.”88  “Lederach suggests that the multiple processes that are required to create and sustain ongoing change can be built by supporting the constructive engagement of people who have been historically divided. These relational platforms are more important than any individual solutions that are created.”89  This type of Ukraine-Russia reconciliation is not an immediately expected outcome, but that does not mean that the potential for this development should be discarded.

            Another level of reconciliation pertains to groups of people within Ukraine, such as separatists in the eastern part of the country who are fighting on Russia’s side and other Ukrainians who are fighting on the side of the Ukrainian national government.  Further discussion of this issue is noted below, but as an overview, there are structural factors, including Russian-supported institutions and organizations that now operate in eastern Ukraine to provide for the needs of the population there. The government there is a “Russia-backed quasi state,”90  that does not allow dissent, as it bans “critical journalists” and people who speak “out against the regime end…up in basements.”91    By contrast, the Ukrainian government provides services and governance in the remainder of Ukraine.  Additionally, as noted below, there are attitudinal factors and varying narratives among Ukrainians about the future direction of their nation.

            Ultimately, when the violence stops and any lines of territory are drawn, Ukrainians would need to internally reconcile with separatists or former separatists in the eastern part of the country.  “Reconciliation is badly needed if Ukraine is to achieve internal stabilization.  However, the goal of reconciliation is hardly compatible with the demands of the Maidan- de-Sovietization, lustration of the state apparatus, and punishment of officials responsible for the bloodshed in Kyiv in February 2014.”92   “[E]ven if a political solution for the Donbas conflict … [is] found, an ideological reconciliation between Kyiv and the current leadership of Donetsk and Luhansk ‘republics’ embracing Russian nationalism and neo-Stalinism is difficult to imagine.”93  Ultimately, reconciliation will be broader in scope than simply a consideration of these ideologies. 

            On one level, Ukrainians continue to heal from Holodomor, and on another, they now also face the need to reconcile with eastern separatists once the war ends.  For the long term, Ukrainians could engage in dialogue on the different narratives discussed below, as part of an ongoing process of transformation within its society.94  For the short term, to transform the conflict, there is a need to “[u]nderstand and address root causes of violent conflict; promote nonviolent mechanisms; minimize violence; [and] foster structures that meet basic human needs and maximize public participation” in eastern Ukraine but also throughout the country, in light of the past unacknowledged trauma and recent ongoing violence.95   Through free and fair and monitored elections, the region could decide whether to re-join Ukraine under the constitution that would now provide for autonomy within the auspices of the Ukrainian national government and its institutions such as the Rada.  However, there would need to be some intermediate and local process to assure the people in the eastern region that their “social grievances” would be addressed effectively and support for there would be support for the creation of,” and “participation in critical structures.”96  Also, following through on an effort to re-integrate the areas of eastern Ukraine into the country with an emphasis on autonomy of the region could also create a sustainable, and “proactive process that is capable of regenerating itself over time- a spiral of peace and development instead of a spiral of violence and destruction.”97   Providing for and implementing a system of autonomous but also integrated government in the eastern region could begin to serve as “a conflict-transformation platform” that is “short-term responsive and long-term strategic” in nature to deal with conflict in a more peaceful manner.98

            On the longer term wounds of Holodomor, “although the wounds are still there, millions of Ukrainians are, for the first time since 1933, finally trying to heal them.”99  “Even three generations later, many of contemporary Ukraine’s political problems, including widespread distrust of the state, weak national institutions, and a corrupt political class, can be traced directly back to…” effects of Holodomor.100  In the 1970s, some healing began, as there were “underground” publications about experiences during collectivization and the famine.101  In the 1980s, “Ukrainian diaspora groups across North America” commemorated the 50th anniversary of the Holodomor and a “Ukrainian Famine Research Committee began to film interviews with famine survivors and witnesses across Europe and North America.”102   Also in the 1980s, “the Ukrainian chapter of Memorial, the Soviet society for the commemoration of Stalin’s victims, began openly collecting testimony and memoirs for the first time.”103  Ukrainians publicly commemorated the famine in 1993 for the first time, after its country became an independent nation in 1991 with ceremonies and public gatherings in Kyiv.104 “Children … now study it at school; scholars … piece together the full narrative in archives.  “Monuments … [have been] built and books … [have been] written.”105  Unlike for much of the twentieth century, “[t]he famine is now represented in school textbooks, and the Ukrainian parliament … by a bare majority- has recognized it as an act of genocide based on the United Nations definition of that term outlined in 1948, as an attempt to eliminate all or part of a population or nationality group.106   A Holodomor Monument opened in 2008, overlooking the Dnipor River in Kyiv.107  

            There are, however, differences within Ukraine on Holodomor, between the far eastern part of the country and the rest of Ukraine.  For example, southeastern Ukraine still has street names honoring “Stalinists,” and “displays statues of the Soviet dictator, and retains its Soviet era identity as a Russian-speaking enclave with an authoritarian political culture.”108  Per Lederach, “[m]emories are part of each party‘s socially constructed understanding of the situation, shaped by culture and learning, and discourse and belief. The way groups remember and construct their past is often central to the mobilization for conflict, and thus a crucial matter to address in reconciliation and cultural traditions work.”109  Any reconciliation between the eastern region and the rest of Ukraine will also need to take into account any differing views of Holodomor. 

            Reconciliation includes “four critical components identified by John Paul Lederach -- truth, justice, mercy, and peace.”110  Much of achieving the element of truth in any internal reconciliation will pertain to Holodomor and narratives111  within the Ukrainian people.  In terms of the Russian version of truth, Russian officials “have actively opposed international recognition of the Ukrainian Holodomor as the crime of genocide.”112  “This is not surprising, given that the principal organizer of the crime, Stalin, is regarded today by Russia’s ruling elite as a ‘strong politician’ and ‘successful manager.’ “In fact, the real insult to the memory of those victims is …  the glorification of the person most responsible for the crimes of the communist regime.”113   “The Russian political establishment’s hysterical reaction to historical truth can be easily explained. The revelation about the causes of the Holodomor and its consequences undermines the position of anti-Ukrainian elements in both Ukraine and abroad, and calls for action aimed at strengthening national statehood, developing democratic institutions, and moving further towards Ukraine’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.”114

            Any potential reconciliation between Russia and Ukraine is challenged by the long-suppressed trauma of Holodomor.  “Any attempt to reconstruct a national Ukrainian narrative must take a stand on a trauma of such proportions-especially since all Soviet historians, propagandists, and officials assidulously ignored the famine or dismissed it [in the past] as an émigré delusion for decades.”115  The first “scholarly study” of Holodomor was Robert Conquest’s The Harvest of Sorrow,” viewing it as “a weapon of Stalin’s terror.”116  The view of Holodomor as a genocide “challenged the nature of Soviet reality,” “it became the centerpiece of Yushchenko’s nation-building project after the Orange Revolution,” and “undermined Russia’s hegemony over Ukraine.”117   “A handout for students recently produced by the Ukrainian Genocide Famine Foundation states that ‘Russia and the Soviet Union wished to eradicate the Ukrainian people as a separate ethno-cultural entity.’”118  

            Any potential reconciliation with Russia is also challenged by the question of responsibility and justice for Holodomor victims.  In terms of the element of justice from Holodomor.119 “criminal court case against seven deceased men found to have ‘deliberately organized the genocide of part of the Ukrainian national group by creating conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction through the planned Holodomor of 1932-33, which resulted in the destruction of 3,941,000 people….’”120 Who is responsible?121   “From a legal point of view, this responsibility rests with the USSR as the Party state, and with all persons who participated in organizing and committing this crime, regardless of their position, status, or ethnic origin.”  “[T]he Russian Federation, contrary to international law, has declared itself to be the ‘state-continuator of the USSR.’”122  However, the leaders inflicting the Holodomor are dead and some individuals participating in it were later “eliminated during Stalin’s purges.”123  “In political terms, responsibility for the Holodomor-genocide in Ukraine and the extermination of peasants by famine elsewhere in the USSR should rest with Stalin’s communist regime.”124

             There are conflicting viewpoints on the responsibility of the Russian Federation for the Holodomor.  “[In past years,] Ukraine has repeatedly stated that it does not link recognition of the Holodomor as genocide with the international responsibility of the Russian Federation.  Ukraine will therefore make no claims in that regard.  Of course, this does not preclude individuals-the descendants of Holodomor victims-from claiming against the Russian Federation, as it considers itself the state continuator of the USSR.  However, in practical terms the successful realization of such claims would be problematic.”125 “Pyotr Romanov (2008) shared the view of many Russians when he wrote ‘[i]nstead of blaming the Russian nation, Kiev ought to condemn Marxism and Stalinism.’  Indeed, there are texts which seek to implicate Russia in genocide.”126 

            Similarly, justice will play a role in any end to the war in eastern Ukraine.  Justice in this context can be of several types, “restorative, retributive, procedural, and distributive.”127  The Ukrainian government and society would need to determine the amount of emphasis it would place on justice overall, compared to other elements needed for long term peace, and what type of justice to employ.  In order to reconcile with the eastern region leaders, a retributive justice or prosecutions of every day separatist fighters, would appear to be counter-productive.  Instead, there is a need for a “process of trying to balance the pursuit of truth; common version of events; pursuit of justice, to hold people accountable who did wrong things; peace, the end of hostilities, and mercy, the granting of forgiveness of wrongs.”128  Also, [t]o achieve reconciliation, the element of justice is likely to be de-emphasized in the international context and some territory gained by Russia from Ukraine may remain in Russian hands.129  

            One aspect of reconciliation within Ukraine itself pertains to identity.  As in the United States and its civil war monuments, Ukraine is removing monuments and re-naming places pertaining to the Soviet era.  A Ukrainian law “decreed that all statues glorifying Communist leaders had to go, and all Soviet street names and town names, of which there were thousands, also had to change.”130  In light of this, an issue that will also pertain to reconciliation within Ukraine is “contestation between national narratives,” in a scenario that “reinforces ‘black and white’ thinking and results in an absence of inter-community and government dialogue; the search for enemies and zero-sum approaches to Ukraine’s national identity characterize the competition among different groups.”131  According to one commentator, “attempts to create one common history or establish one common set of values and beliefs will only exacerbate existing conflicts and further divides between ethnic or ideological groups.”132  Instead, “[a]cceptance of Ukraine as multiethnic with different cultural vectors of development will create a foundation for a peaceful shared society.”133  By one perspective,  “[i]f the national democrats were right to say that the Holodomor was genocide, then Stalin, Communism, and the Soviet Union were to blame, and the construction of a democratic and pro-Western Ukrainian identity must necessarily entail rejection of all three as comparable in their evil to Hitler and Nazi Germany.134 

            “National narratives,” or views on “national identity in Ukraine” held more in the east were excluded from statements of the interim national government after the revolution in Ukraine in 2014.135  The narrative “encourages close relations with Russia and support of Russian culture in Ukraine and prescribes policies of equal status to both Ukrainian and Russian language and culture.”136  “Despite the call for democracy and national unity, the interim government represented only two narratives, while all other narratives were excluded.  This omission of other narratives provoked negative reaction in the East and South of the country that later were used as a justification for insurgency by local radicals, criminal elements, and Russian forces.”137 

            “The activists and supporters of Euromaidan were represented by three main narratives:  Fight for Ukrainian Identity, Acceptance of Ukrainian Identity, and Civic-Multicultural narrative.”138  “[T]he major differences between the Fight for Ukrainian Ethnic Identity and Recognition of Ukrainian Ethnic Identity narrative on one side and the Dual Identity and Pro-Soviet narratives on the other side, include views on the balance of power between Russians and Ukrainians, perspectives on the position of Russians in Ukraine and relations with Russia and the West, an assessment of the Soviet past, and the perception of Ukraine as a multi-cultural state.”139   The Russian narrative relates to Stalin’s “fear of ‘losing Ukraine’ expressed in an Aug. 11, 1932 letter to Kaganovich.140  A survey in 2009 revealed that “83 percent of Ukrainians in the west, 58 percent in the center, 28 percent in the south, and 15 percent in the east, accepted the genocide thesis.”141  Yuschenko “founded the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory” to research the Holodomor.142  

            As a complicating matter, in one view, Russia is “an exporter of alternative identities to Ukraine.”143  “While denying Ukraine’s distinctive national identity, Russia suggested alternative identities instead.  These are largely based on the concept of the Russkiy mir (the Russian world) which made a rapid career from a marginal intellectual discourse to a new state ideology supported by the Russian authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church during the 2000’s.”144    “Russkiy mir refers to a supranational community united by the Russian language and culture, by a specific historical memory and related values….”145  “As a Russian soft power project, Russkiy mir is ‘strongly associated with discourses of a shared past and with the common values, culture, and history that arise from it.’”146  “With the annexation of Crimea, the concept of the Russkiy mir was reduced to ethnic Russian nationalism which bluntly equates Russians and Russian speakers and denies the very existence of Ukraine, at least to the east of the Dnieper [River].”147  Russians view some areas of Ukraine, including Crimea, as part of the “imagined homeland of most Russian citizens.”148  Also, “the Kremlin created a number of ‘grass roots’ youth movements…with the aim of mobilizing popular support for its ‘anti-fascist’ agenda in the former Soviet space.”149  “After the Orange Revolution, Moscow increased its support for pro-Russian groups and organizations in Ukraine, especially for those who defended the rights of Russian speakers against ‘Ukrainization’ and actively opposed the pro-Western course of the Ukrainian government.”150  The “alternative nation-building project is underway, with its own formal state structures, such as the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ legitimized by ‘elections;’ its own collective mythology, heroes and martyrs; ….”151 

            In another view on identity, “[p]aradoxically, Russian President Putin has greatly contributed to national consolidation in Ukraine by providing the perfect embodiment of an external enemy.”152  “In sum, the Maidan protests, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the military conflict in Donbas have consolidated the pro-Ukrainian majority and at the same time have further polarized Ukrainian society.”153 

            Ultimately, the conflict in Ukraine will require “transformation.”154   “Transformation focuses on changing relationships and the images that people have of each other and of their shared dilemmas.”  “A transformational approach begins with two pro-active foundations:  1) a positive orientation toward conflict, and 2) a willingness to engage in the conflict in an effort to produce constructive change or growth.”155  Once the violence stops and the separatist regions are afforded autonomy within the current Ukrainian governmental system, it would be possible for the sub-groups of Ukrainians to attain more positive views of the conflict, embrace differences156 and engage each other in dialogue to “produce constructive change” in Ukrainian society.157  In Ukraine, “[t]o insure the success of reconciliation processes and the creation of a shared society, …[any] new government should include representatives of all narratives and establish dialogue among them.  Only through systemic dialogue can common ground be established and a cohesive national identity developed….”158  Additionally, the cessation of violence will give Ukraine and its people space to heal from the past genocide, the war with Russia, and further define its identity159 as a nation.     

End Notes

1.  Bill Bowring.  “The Russian Language in Ukraine:  Complicit in Genocide, or Victim of State Building?”  In The Russian Language Outside the Nation, ed. Lara Ryazanova-Clarke, citing Lemkin 1953 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 68 www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt9qds27.7

2. Video 5, Unit 1, CONF 747, Reconciliation, Spring 2018.

3. Video 5. Unit 1, CONF 747, Reconciliation, Spring 2018.

4. Orest Subtelny, Ukraine:  A History, 4th ed., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 202-203. 

5. Subtelny, Ukraine:  A History, 203.

6.  Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl. The Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook on the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine, citing Volodymyr Vasylenko, “The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-33 as a Crime of Genocide:  A Legal Assessment.” (Kyiv:  Olena Teliha Publishing House, 2009); (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2012), 91.

7.  Subtelny, Ukraine:  A History, 242.

8. Bowring, “The Russian Language in Ukraine, citing Lemkin, 68.

9. Video 5, Unit 1, CONF 747, Reconciliation, Spring 2018.

10.   Yuri Shapoval and Marta D. Olynyk.  “The Holodomor:  A Prologue to Repressions and Terror in Soviet Ukraine.” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 30, no. 1-4, “After the Holodomor:  The Enduring Impact of the Great Famine on Ukraine.” 2008:  Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.  99-121, 107.  www.jstor.org/stable/23611468

11. Shapoval, 107.

12. Shapoval, 107.

13. Shapoval, 118.

14. Bowring, The Russian Language in Ukraine, citing Lemkin, 1953; 68.

15. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, “Kyiv Court of Appeal Ruling of 13 January 2010 on the Famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine,” 67. http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/947003.

16. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, “Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Findings.” Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933 (1988), vi-viii; 68.

17. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, Yevhen Zazkharov. “Opinion:  Legal Classification of the Holodomor of 1932-33 in Ukraine and in the Kuban as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide.”  http://khpg.org.ua/en/index.php?id-1221299499; 94.

18. Anne Applebaum, Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine.  (New York:  Doubleday, 2017), 217.

19. Applebaum, Red Famine, 218. 

20. Applebaum, Red Famine, 219. 

21.  Klid, The Holodomor Reader, xxix, xxx.

22. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, xlv. 

23. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, xlv.

24. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, xlv.

25. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, citing Volodymyr Vasylenko, The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-33 as a Crime of Genocide:  A Legal Assessment.” (Kyiv: Olena Teliha Publishing House, 2009), 92. 

26. Applebaum, Red Famine, 320.

27. Applebaum, Red Famine, 320.

28. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, citing Volodymyr Vasylenko, The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-33 as a Crime of Genocide:  A Legal Assessment.” Kyiv:  Olena Teliha Publishing House, 2009); 91. 

29. Ambassador Kurt Volker, “Latest Developments on Ukraine Negotiations,” U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, U.S. Department of State, The Washington Foreign Press Center, Washington, DC, April 13, 2018, https://fpc.state.gov/280441.htm.

30. Volker, “Latest Developments on Ukraine Negotiations.”

31. Volker, “Latest Developments on Ukraine Negotiations.”

32.  Armed Conflict Database. Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

33. Volker, “Latest Developments on Ukraine Negotiations.”

34. Volker, “Latest Developments on Ukraine Negotiations.”

35. Peacebuilding Initiative.  “Actors.”  International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research.  2007.  www.beyondintractability.org.

36. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

37. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

38. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

39. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

40. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

41. Applebaum, Red Famine, 359.

42. Robert Ricigliano, Making Peace Last:  A Toolbox for Sustainable Peacebuilding, (New York: Routledge 2012), 91.

43. Ricigliano, Making Peace Last, 91.

44. Shaun Walker, The Long Hangover:  Putin’s New Russia and The Ghosts of the Past, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2018), 239-240.

45. Walker, The Long Hangover, 239-240.

46. Walker, The Long Hangover, 239-240.

47. Walker, The Long Hangover, 253.

48. Ricigliano, Making Peace Last, 93. 

49. Applebaum, Red Famine, 355. 

50. Applebaum, Red Famine, 355

51. Alexander J. Motyl, “Deleting the Holodomor:  Ukraine Unmakes Itself.” World Affairs 173, no. 3 (Sept/Oct 2010): 25. www.jstor.org/stable/27870299.

52. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

53. - N.S., “The Economist Explains:  What are the Minsk Agreements?”  Economist.  Sept 14, 2016.  https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/09/economist-exp....

54. N.S., “The Economist Explains.

55. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

56. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

57. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

58. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

59. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&archived=False&page=2.

60.   Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

61. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

62. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

63. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

64. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a....

65. Daniel Bar-Tal, “From Intractable Conflict to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis.”  Political Psychology 21, no. 2, 2000.

66. Ambassador Kurt Volker, “Latest Developments on Ukraine Negotiations,” U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, U.S. Department of State, The Washington Foreign Press Center, Washington, DC, April 13, 2018, https://fpc.state.gov/280441.htm.

67. Ambassador Kurt Volker, “Latest Developments on Ukraine Negotiations,” U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, U.S. Department of State, The Washington Foreign Press Center, Washington, DC, April 13, 2018, https://fpc.state.gov/280441.htm.

68. Statement of the President of Ukraine, “President: The road to the implementation of the Minsk agreements runs through the deployment of a full-fledged UN peacekeeping operation in the occupied part of the Donbas,” April 12, 2018, http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/shlyah-do-implementaciyi-minskih-dom....

69. Statement of the President of Ukraine, http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/shlyah-do-implementaciyi-minskih-dom....

70. Statement of the President of Ukraine, http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/shlyah-do-implementaciyi-minskih-dom....

71. Video 5, Unit 1, CONF 747, Reconciliation, Spring 2018.

72.  Paul Niland, “The Prospects for Minsk III,” April 10, 2018,  http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/shlyah-do-implementaciyi-minskih-dom....

73. Niland, “The Prospects for Minsk III.”

74. Niland, “The Prospects for Minsk III.”

75. Niland, “The Prospects for Minsk III.”

76. Niland, “The Prospects for Minsk III.”

77. Niland, “The Prospects for Minsk III.”

78. Josh Rogin. “Opinion:  Trump Administration Approves Lethal Arms Sales to Ukraine.”  Washington Post, Dec. 20, 2017.  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2017/12/20/trump-admin...

79. Ricigliano, Making Peace Last, 94. 

80. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a...

81. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a...

82. Armed Conflict Database.   Regions and Conflict.  “Ukraine.”  https://acd-iiss-org.mutex.gmu.edu/member/conflicts.aspx?id=346&type=2&a...

83. Kenneth Boulding, Three Faces of Power, “The Pathologies of Power.” (Newbury Park:  Sage Publications, 1990), 76.

84. Boulding, Three Faces of Power, 249.

85. Walker, 247.

86. Walker, 253.

87. Video and PowerPoint, Unit 5, CONF 747, Spring 2018.

88.  John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination:  The Art and Soul of Building Peace, “On Peace Accords,” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 49. 2005.

89. Michelle Maiese, Summary of The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace,”  Beyond Intractability, p4. , Conflict Research Consortium Note, by John Paul Lederach, 4,

https://www.beyondintractability.org/bksum/lederach-imagination 2/11

90. Walker, The Long Hangover, 240-241.

91. Walker, The Long Hangover, 243.

92. Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “A Divided Nation?  Reconsidering the Role of Identity Politics in the Ukraine Crisis.”  Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlagwww.jstor.org/stable/24868495, 265.  

93. Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “A Divided Nation?, 265.

94. John Paul Lederach, Building Peace:  Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997; 75.

95. Video 5, Unit 1, CONF 747, Reconciliation, Spring 2018.

96. Ricigliano, Making Peace Last, 43.

97.  Lederach, Building Peace, 75.

98. Video 5, Unit 1, CONF 747, Reconciliation, Spring 2018.

99. Applebaum, Red Famine, 360.  

100. Applebaum, Red Famine, 356.  

101. Applebaum, Red Famine, 336. 

102. Applebaum, Red Famine, 334. 

103. Applebaum, Red Famine, 343. 

104. Applebaum, Red Famine, 345.  

105. Applebaum, Red Famine, 345. 

106. David R. Marples, “Ethnic Issues in the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies, 61, no. 3 (May 2009): 505-518, citing Serbyn. www.jstor.org/stable/27752256; 506.

107. Walker, The Long Hangover, 119; Roman Adrian Cybriwsky, “Historical Memory,” in Kyiv, Ukraine: The City of Domes and Demons from the Collapse of Socialism to the Mass Uprising of 2013-2014, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016), 142. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1b9x2zb.9 

108. Alexander J. Motyl, “Deleting the Holodomor,” 26.

109.  Hugh Miall,  “Conflict Transformation:  A Multi-Dimensional Task.” Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. 6; 7.

110. Hauss, Charles.  “Reconciliation.”  Sept. 2003. www.beyondintractability.org 

111. Karina V. Korostelina, “Conflict of National Narratives of Ukraine:  Euromaidan and Beyond.  Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, www.jstor.org/stable/24868496.

112. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, Volodymyr Vasylenko, The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-33 as a Crime of Genocide:  A Legal Assessment.” Kyiv:  Olena Teliha Publishing House, 2009); 91.

113. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, Volodymyr Vasylenko, The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-33 as a Crime of Genocide:  A Legal Assessment.” Kyiv:  Olena Teliha Publishing House, 2009); 91.

114. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, Volodymyr Vasylenko, The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-33 as a Crime of Genocide:  A Legal Assessment.” Kyiv:  Olena Teliha Publishing House, 2009); 91.

115. Motyl, Alexander J. “Deleting the Holodomor,” 27.

116. Motyl, Alexander J. “Deleting the Holodomor,” 28. 

117. Motyl, Alexander J. “Deleting the Holodomor,” 29.

118. Bowring, “The Russian Language in Ukraine,” 69.

119. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, citing “Kyiv Court of Appeal Ruling of 13 January 2010 on the Famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine.” http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/947003, 77-78.

120. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, citing “Kyiv Court of Appeal Ruling of 13 January 2010 on the Famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine.” http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/947003, 78-79. 

121. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, citing Volodymyr Vasylenko, The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-33 as a Crime of Genocide:  A Legal Assessment.” Kyiv:  Olena Teliha Publishing House, 2009), 90.

122. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, citing Volodymyr Vasylenko, The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-33 as a Crime of Genocide:  A Legal Assessment.” Kyiv:  Olena Teliha Publishing House, 2009), 90.

123. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, citing Volodymyr Vasylenko, The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-33 as a Crime of Genocide:  A Legal Assessment.” Kyiv:  Olena Teliha Publishing House, 2009), 91. 

124. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, citing Volodymyr Vasylenko, The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-33 as a Crime of Genocide:  A Legal Assessment.” Kyiv:  Olena Teliha Publishing House, 2009), 91.  

125. Klid, The Holodomor Reader, citing Volodymyr Vasylenko, The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-33 as a Crime of Genocide:  A Legal Assessment.” Kyiv:  Olena Teliha Publishing House, 2009), 90. 

126. Bowring, “The Russian Language in Ukraine,” 69.

127. Video, Unit 3, CONF 747, Reconciliation.  Spring 2018.

128. Video, Unit 3, CONF 747, Reconciliation.  Spring 2018.

129. Werner Response, Unit 4, CONF 747, Reconciliation, Spring 2018.  

130. Walker, The Long Hangover, 235.

131. Karina V. Korostelina, “Conflict of National Narratives of Ukraine:  Euromaidan and Beyond, Die Friedens-Warte 89, no. 1-2 (2014): 284.  www.jstor.org/stable/24868496

132. Korostelina, “Conflict of National Narratives of Ukraine,” 285. 

133. Korostelina, Conflict of National Narratives of Ukraine, 285. 

134. Motyl, “Deleting the Holodomor,” 29-30.

135. Korostelina, “Conflict of National Narratives of Ukraine,” 271. 

136. Korostelina, “Conflict of National Narratives of Ukraine,” 272. 

137. Korostelina, “Conflict of National Narratives of Ukraine,” 271.

138. Korostelina, “Conflict of National Narratives of Ukraine,” 274.

139. Korostelina, “Conflict of National Narratives of Ukraine,” 282. 

140. Marples, “Ethnic Issues in the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine,” 506. 

141. Motyl, Alexander J. “Deleting the Holodomor,” 30.

142. Motyl, Alexander J. “Deleting the Holodomor,” 30.

143. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana.  “A Divided Nation?, 256. 

144. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana.  “A Divided Nation?, 258.

145. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana.  “A Divided Nation?, 258-259.

146. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana.  “A Divided Nation?  citing Bogomolov, Lytvynenko 2012, 3, 259.    

147. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana.  “A Divided Nation?, 260. 

148. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana.  “A Divided Nation?, 257.

149. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana.  “A Divided Nation?, 257. 

150. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana.  “A Divided Nation?, 258. 

151. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana.  “A Divided Nation?, 260.

152. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana.  “A Divided Nation?, 263.

153. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana.  “A Divided Nation?, 263.         

154. Video 5. Unit 1. CONF 747, Reconciliation.  Spring 2018.

155. Video 5. Unit 1. CONF 747, Reconciliation.  Spring 2018.

156. Video 5. Unit 1. CONF 747, Reconciliation.  Spring 2018.

157. Video 5. Unit 1. CONF 747, Reconciliation.  Spring 2018.

158.  Korostelina, “Conflict of National Narratives of Ukraine,” citing Little, Adrian.  “Rhetorics of Reconciliation:  Shifting Conflict Paradigms in Northern Ireland.  In:  Alexander Hirsch (ed.):  Theorizing Post-Conflict Reconciliation:  Agonism, Restitution, and Repair.  London:  Routledge, 65-78; 75; 285.

159. Korostelina, “Conflict of National Narratives of Ukraine,” 285.

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