Revisiting the "Fiddling While Rome Burns" Question - Part 1

Newsletter #430 — March 2, 2026

Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess
In March of last year, we published a newsletter responding to David Beckemeyer's question of whether we (as bridge builders) were "fiddling while Rome burns." After Alex Pretti and Renee Good were killed by ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) in Minneapolis in January of 2026, David wrote us again, saying he was revisiting that question, and he posed a number of related questions. He later posed those same questions — with answers — in a blog post entitled What Bridge-Building Owes Democracy.
Heidi spent a lot of time responding to David, because his questions were important, and we had been struggling with similar questions ourselves. In addition to responding directly to David, we got his permission to include his questions, along with our answers. We also wanted to add in related ideas from an essay written by Braver Angels co-founder, Bill Doherty, and a brief note about Harry Boyte's comments on Bill's ideas, gleaned from our conversation with Harry, which we already wrote about in Newsletter 424.
All of this ended up being so long, that we have divided it into three different posts. In Part One, we address the assumptions that David says underlie bridge building, which, he fears, are no longer true. These are critically important questions that go to the core of what our field should be trying to accomplish in this turbulent time.
Bridge Building's Underlying Assumptions
1. Do We All Still Want a Pluralistic Democracy?
David started out by saying that bridging rests on several assumptions, which he no longer thinks are valid. First is the assumption that Americans still see a functioning pluralistic democracy as a shared ideal. He says that he is "increasingly skeptical" of that assumption.
We agree, many people probably don't share that ideal, though we haven't seen poll numbers to that effect. Polls, however, do show that people on both sides think our system of governance has broken down and institutions that they used to depend on no longer work. Many are coming to the conclusion that the problem is with "democracy." itself.
But most people, it seems from our observations, don't really have much of an image of what "democracy" is (or could be), or just how terrible the alternatives to democracy really are. We are, for example, horrified by the numbers of people who seem to think that the way Hamas rules Gaza is superior to democracy, and who have remained silent as, apparently, tens of thousands died in the government crackdown in Iran. Similar things can be said about the brutality of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese suppression of the Uighurs, or the latest unfolding horror in Darfur.
However, watching the public response to ICE's operation in Minnesota in January, it seems pretty clear that Americans are not ready to accept violent (and, often, gratuitously cruel) enforcement of contested "law" here in the United States, even if they are willing to ignore it or even applaud vastly more cruel tactics in far away places that they know little about. This is why we continue to write about the virtues of liberal democracy, trying to explain how and why it is "humanity's best defense against what we call 'I'll fight you for it rules.'" It is also why we argue that the solution to democracy's many problems is a widespread civic effort to encourage democracy live up to its ideals — not a rejection of its core principles.
We certainly agree that our democracy — even before Trump took office — needed (and still needs) vast improvements. It did not work effectively, efficiently, or fairly for everyone — ever. But that doesn't mean that authoritarianism would work better. Just look at history — authoritarianism has never been good for the majority of its citizens. Rather, it inevitably leads to what Kenneth Boulding called "Matthew's Law," drawn from the Biblical Book of Matthew:
“For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.” -- Matthew 13:12 (KJV)
Or, to put it simply, "He who has lots, gets more." And this leads to Lord Acton's Law: "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." And from that you get the most terrible and dystopian forms of tyranny, which is only good for the tyrant(s).
So, while Americans may increasingly be questioning the value democracy, we still see it as the best foundation upon which to build a society capable of meeting the challenges of 21st-century. We are trying as best we can to show people why they should see it that way too.
2. Can Civic Education "Rescue Us?"
David next questions the assumption that "civic education can rescue us." He writes:
Civic education presumes an epistemic environment in which people believe facts exist, legitimacy matters, and institutions deserve continuity. But those suppositions are precisely what’s under contest. When political actors can demand loyalty to untruths as a test of belonging, the issue isn’t that citizens don’t know how a bill becomes a law. The issue is whether truth is even allowed to constrain power.
That is certainly a huge problem. But let's break it down.
2a. Facts:
Clearly, people know facts exist. I think most of us still believe in the fact that gravity is holding us down on this earth, and the earth rotates around the sun, causing night and day and the seasons. A few people might still challenge that, but the vast majority of us believe in some pretty basic facts about the way things work.
The problem is that it is very hard to find out what is true and what is not when one is looking at any remotely contested topic. Few of us have direct experience with anything, and even when we do, our eyes can deceive us. (Consider the research that shows how eyewitness testimony about crimes is often inconsistent.) Consider, also, the apparently contradictory videos coming out of Minneapolis regarding both Renee Good and Alex Pretti. Not only do those videos lead outside observers to come to different conclusions; they also show that people who were there, witnessing the event, were very likely to see different things.
For most news events, and most political topics, there is so much noise in the information and media system, and perhaps so much disinformation, that we don't know (and are hard pressed to find out) what to believe. (I write "perhaps so much disinformation" because I listened to this podcast a few days ago.) Now, ironically, I don't know whether or not to believe the speakers in that podcast who say there is actually very little disinformation floating around on social media. But they did a much more extensive study of this topic than I have, so I am inclined to think it is possible they are correct.
The bottom line, it seems to us, is that we need to get a much better handle on the information environment we are all swimming in. That doesn't necessarily mean censorship (it almost certainly does NOT mean censorship). But if we at least knew who was speaking, it would help us judge whether to believe what we are reading/watching/hearing. That said, we do believe that there is a place for genuinely bipartisan, joint efforts to identify, expose, and curtail the most flagrant and malicious forms of disinformation — strategies, for example, that build on the Russian "firehose of falsehood" propaganda strategy.
Before we leave the topic of facts and the media, there are good strategies available for sorting through facts and getting a story that is credible — that has legitimacy. Such strategies, which have been around for a long time include joint fact finding, neutral fact finding, and data mediation. But all of those take time and money. Quite a few researchers have been investigating (and teaching people about) how to control disinformation and how individual media consumers can make more reliable judgments about kinds of information sources that are more (and less) likely to be reliable. Beyond Intractability has what a lot of information on this topic in our new Constructive Conflict Guide in the sections on "Resolve Fact-Based Sources of Conflict," "Limit the Influence of "Fake Facts," Expert Trust and Trustworthiness: The Gap between Experts and the Public, and Fact-Finding Amid Irreducible Uncertainties.
2b. Legitimacy and institutions
David is absolutely right when he says that our institutions are suffering from very low levels of legitimacy. The one area in which this is less true is local government — local government approval ratings are generally much higher than the ratings of the Federal government. This may be, in part, because local governments actually are doing better. They are closer to their constituents and, if they do something that adversely affects those constituents, they are likely to hear about it — quickly. Local candidates also tend to have a better sense of what their constituents want. This may account for the fact that Congress is very unpopular, even though people generally rate their particular Congressional representative more highly. It may, of course, also be true that people simply don't know about what their local government is doing (because of the death of local news). But at least they don't have the constant horror stories they are getting about the Federal government. Overall, though, the legitimacy of most of our institutions is terrible.
So what to do? We can say that our institutions are hopeless and go about dismantling them, as Trump has done in some cases. Or, we can remake them according to one side's political preferences (again, as Trump is often doing). Or, we can try to replace them entirely wherever possible, as parents have done with the educational system, when they choose to home school, and people (parents and otherwise) have done with the medical system when they rely on untested folk therapies to cure diseases, shunning well-tested therapies (such as vaccines) to prevent illness. The "defund the police" and "decriminalize all drugs" movements are other examples. The assumption was that the law enforcement and judicial systems were ineffectual and corrupt, so, to the maximum extent possible, they should just be eliminated and replaced with psychologists, social workers, and other people in the "helping professions." This was done to varying degrees in Oregon, Washington, and California, with mixed success. (Early reports suggested surging crime rates, but more recent reports suggest rising crime rates were due to other factors--see this, this, this and this.)
A better solution to the lack of credibility of these institutions, we think, is to take an honest look at why they have lost the public trust, and to start repairing them in ways that will enable them to regain that trust through good behavior. Rather than relying on outside experts or political operatives to undertake such reform processes on their own, we would recommend some kind of blue ribbon committee that would be made up of insiders from the institutions (both those who believe in the current mission and processes and those who have criticized either or both), outside experts, and clients/users of the institution's services. These people should be convened to examine current processes, what insiders and outsiders think is working well and what isn't and why. Then the same group can begin to develop reform ideas that might be implemented to make the institution more effective and more responsive to the public. That, then, is likely to be a path towards rebuilding legitimacy of these institutions, and ultimately democracy, of which they are a part.
3. Misperception and Mistrust
A third "truism" that David questions is whether
...both sides are still operating within democratic rules but trapped in misperception and mistrust. That has been the dominant theory of polarization for a decade or more: if we could fix media diets, reduce affective hatred, increase empathy, and encourage contact, the system would revert to pluralistic equilibrium. But I don’t think we’re in that world anymore. We’re in a live authoritarian contest, where one faction is actively degrading checks and balances, politicizing institutions, normalizing disinformation, and quashing dissent.
Bridging frameworks not only struggle to address this; many were designed not to acknowledge it.
We originally responded to David as follows:
Yes, as you said, "we’re in a live authoritarian contest, where one side is actively degrading checks and balances, politicizing institutions, normalizing disinformation, and quashing dissent, while still operating inside formal electoral democracy."
But we actually think we are worse off than that, because both sides have been actively working to subvert democratic checks and balances in the pursuit of policies that serve the interests of their most vocal constituents. The big difference is one of style and, of course, the constituents being served. Donald Trump likes to be a brash, insulting, and a constant presence on the news. Democrats, by contrast, prefer to "fly under the radar" with policies and programs that get big results, but nowhere near the attention. These articles, one from the center left and one from the center-right ,highlight the scope of the problem. It's also true that increasing presidential power Is also the result of Congress' inability or unwillingness to deal with many tough and controversial issues (perhaps preferring not to have to cast a vote that would inevitably make many of their constituents angry) — a topic that Justice Gorsuch sought to address in his opinion on the recent tariff case.
President Trump's many assertions of extraordinary executive power have continued to dominate the news with respect to issues like tariffs, ICE, the seizure of President Maduro in Venezuela, prosecution of political opponents, and threats to seize Greenland. While these, and other similar actions, are arguably much more serious than anything that the Democrats have done, there are many who disagree. They cite the way in which Democrats politicized institutions both within and outside of government by insisting that all follow strict DEI guidelines. Dissent about that was routinely quashed, as was dissent about the causes or appropriate responses to COVID, and appropriate treatment of gender dysphoria (among many other things).
The Democrats have also contributed to the the degradation of the system of checks and balances, by, for instance relying on executive orders to enact rules that could not get through Congress (such as Biden's forgiveness of student loans, or Obama's DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) program that prevented deportation of undocumented immigrants who were brought into the country by their parents when they were children.
We agree that Trump has done far worse with his dismantling of government infrastructure and programs, his refusing to spend Congressionally-allocated funds, and at times, outright violating court orders. And his corruption is unmatched. But the assumption that autocracy is solely the domain of Trump, and if we just get rid of Trump and put the Democrats back in power, democracy will be "fixed," is not true. We will just have a different form of "democratic erosion" — one that many on the right view as as serious as the way in which those of the left view Trump.
David agrees in his blog post that the Dems have done some "illiberal things" too, but he says that is making a false equivalence: "One," he says, "is a failure of liberal temperament. The other is systematic dismantling of accountability and rule of law." We'll take up that issue in Part 2.
Please Contribute Your Ideas To This Discussion!
In order to prevent bots, spammers, and other malicious content, we are asking contributors to send their contributions to us directly. If your idea is short, with simple formatting, you can put it directly in the contact box. However, the contact form does not allow attachments. So if you are contributing a longer article, with formatting beyond simple paragraphs, just send us a note using the contact box, and we'll respond via an email to which you can reply with your attachment. This is a bit of a hassle, we know, but it has kept our site (and our inbox) clean. And if you are wondering, we do publish essays that disagree with or are critical of us. We want a robust exchange of views.
About the MBI Newsletters
Two or three times a week, Guy and Heidi Burgess, the BI Directors, share some of our thoughts on political hyper-polarization and related topics. We also share essays from our colleagues and other contributors, and every week or so, we devote one newsletter to annotated links to outside readings that we found particularly useful relating to U.S. hyper-polarization, threats to peace (and actual violence) in other countries, and related topics of interest. Each Newsletter is posted on BI, and sent out by email through Substack to subscribers. You can sign up to receive your copy here and find the latest newsletter here or on our BI Newsletter page, which also provides access to all the past newsletters, going back to 2017.
NOTE! If you signed up for this Newsletter and don't see it in your inbox, it might be going to one of your other emails folder (such as promotions, social, or spam). Check there or search for beyondintractability@substack.com and if you still can't find it, first go to our Substack help page, and if that doesn't help, please contact us.
If you like what you read here, please ....







