Abstract
This article aims to examine the effect and causes of politicized ethnicity and conflict that has bedeviled Burundi since its independence and to suggest a peaceful mechanism to prevent relapse to further disputes and ethnic group marginalization through a Sovereign National Conference (SNC). This paper argues that the conflict in Burundi is the outcome of a political power tussle and the instrumentalization of ethnicity by politicians for personal gains and ambition. We posit that the expression of ethnicity and democracy are not mutually exclusive and do not always result in conflict. But it can become a harbinger of social violence if it is hegemonic and exclusive.
Keywords: Burundi, Tutsi, Hutu, ethnic conflict, politicized ethnicity, culture and conflict resolution, colonial power, social violence.
Introduction
Burundi is a country synonymous with ethnic conflict. This is because the country has been plagued by conflict since independence. The eve of independence ushered in political uncertainty and ethnic polarization, greed, and violence that diminished people’s expectations and prospects for democracy and economic development. The political architecture of Burundi was weak from the beginning and could not hold the country’s unity due to the politicization of ethnicity. Wherever ethnicity is politicized, the country will be polarized, ethnic conflict becomes inevitable, and democratization becomes a mirage. This view is supported by Ake, who submits that “it is the elite who politicize ethnicity in their quest for power and political support. Leaders also gain a second advantage from exploiting ethnicity. Having willed ethnicity-based conflict; they then use the threat of such conflict to justify authoritarianism” (Ake, 1991, p. 34).
The political situation in post-conflict Burundi is still very dire. It represents a good example of a country that has failed to harness the strength of the phenomenon of ethnicity for mutual national interest and nation-building. We argue that the expression of ethnicity and democracy are not mutually exclusive and do not always result in conflict. But it can become a harbinger of social violence if it is hegemonic and exclusive. How Burundi transcends its ethnicity and channels it to the path of national unity is daunting. Since independence, the country has yet to find an effective model of governance that would address issues such as inequality and ethnic marginalization which were the triggers of conflict. The Arendt Lijphart’s (1969) consociational model of democracy proposed at the Arusha Peace Accord of 2002, based on power sharing failed in preventing the instrumentalization of ethnicity and conflict (Li. 2022. http://doi.org/10.2991/978-2-494069-31-2.339/) and was subsequently abandoned by the elite partly because of power greediness and ethnicity channeled to a destructive end. The consociationalism model provides a means to homogenize the political segments in Burundi and create a coalition to foster cooperation between different ethnic groups and stakeholders.
This paper recognizes that conflict in Burundi involves not only ethnic division but also other actors and organizations and suggests that convening a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) (Clark, 1994, PP. 304-335) will empower Burundians to transcend their ethnic differences and focus on building a prosperous and democratic nation. In literature, the sovereign national conference is a widely used mechanism for reconciling communities and providing hope where there is hopelessness and marginalization (Nwajiaku 1994, pp. 429-447). In view of the delicate nature of the process parties will have to feel safe to dialogue and decern a new way forward for Burundi in the face of growing complaint of ethnic marginalization and threats of survival in the new democratic dispensation.
This article begins with a general overview of the concept of ethnicity and politics. We describe the ethnic reality of Burundi from independence and how ethnicity has been politicized and channeled to a very destructive path of conflict. Finally, we analyze, the difficulties and challenges Burundi was facing on its pathway towards a new democratic beginning, and the relevance of the sovereign national conference for national unity in Burundi.
Understanding Ethnicity
The research on ethnicity has become very heterogeneous and dynamic, and scholars have been trying to conceptualize it from different perspectives. Nevertheless, despite these attempts the concept has remained slippery or fluid. This is partly because of both terminological confusion and an inadequate knowledge of the details and background of specific cases (Eller, 1999).
Before we move further, it is pertinent to explain what ethnic group, a derivative of ethnicity means. Anderson (1983) described ethnic groups as “imagined communities”. It possesses a “character and quality” (Mare, 1993, pp. 6–7). According to other scholars, ethnic groups are people with common descent who share language and culture, common history, religion, and place of residence (Gur and Harff, 1997, p. 83). Ethnic groups constitute an identity as defined by outsiders who do not belong to the group but identify it as different from their groups and by “insiders” who belong to the same group. This therefore becomes the basis of mobilizing the group’s consciousness and solidarity and which in certain situation result in political activities (Kasfir, 1977).
It is important to remember that ethnic group’s power to mobilize would have been useless without competition for resources in modernizing society that creates conditions for ethnic rivalry and exploitation (Irobi, 2005). In Africa, the issue of competition, power, and inequality is part of a broad analysis. The post-colonial African states for example experienced an intense struggle for scarce resources like those of jobs, government positions, educational enrolments, etc. This conscious behavior of a group in competition to capture political power and control the state is called ethnicity (Osaghae, 1991, pp. 237–240). However, Osaghae has cautioned that “even though ethnicity is a derivative of ethnic pluralism, ethnic pluralism by itself does not lead to ethnicity” (Ibid., p. 237).
Ethnicity as a social construct (Mare, 1993) is situational and more active for political objectives especially when it combines with the invocation of cultural traits like kinship, religion, race, language, and place of origin. Its salience in African politics cannot be overemphasized. In Africa ethnicity is not only a complex phenomenon but it also differs from one country to the other, depending on their history and class structures. Politicized ethnicity takes place in an area of tension, and violent competition for resources and prejudice during groups contact. This type of power rivalry is always inflamed when it combines with uncontrollable emotions of common descent and self-esteem that politicians need for the mobilization of their people for action against the other opposing groups in competition.
Many scholars studying this phenomenon believed that ethnicity was something “obsolete” and “destined to be dissolved and transcended by the inevitable cosmopolitan, enlightened, scientific values of modernity” (Rothschild, 1981, p. 20). Unfortunately, the recent conflicts in Africa, such as in Rwanda, Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya, and Burundi have shown that modernization is not even the panacea. Instead, ethnicity has become an ideological instrument used consciously by the political elite to achieve their ambitions. According to Sklar “tribalism has become a mask for class privilege” (Sklar, 1967, p. 6). It is therefore the instrumentalization and politicization of ethnicity that explains the dynamics and sources of ethnic conflicts in Africa.
Brief History of Interethnic Competition for Political Power in Burundi
In 1961 barely a year before Burundian independence, the fear of many observers became prophetic and real, when centrifugal forces in connivance with the irresponsible Tutsi political elites shook the fragile architecture of the new nation by assassinating a popular leader Prince Louis Rwagasore of the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) party in October (Ndikumana, 2022). The prime minister did not live to realize his dream of building a virile nation that would be inclusive of all ethnic groups. The prince was assassinated in October 1961 leading to a military takeover that declared a one-party state under the cover of UPRONA which has become a Tutsi-dominated party.
This unexpected and mostly shocking incident dried up the little hope and expectation of many citizens and weakened the ground on which Burundians were to construct a strong independent nation. Although Belgium did not relent in handing over responsibility to Burundian elites, one thing remained clear in the hearts of many analysts, the colonial system that arbitrarily created boundaries and merged incompatible groups without their consent was a seed of ethnic conflict sown to bedeck Burundi for a long time.
Fragile national unity, inequality (Mokena, 2010), and insecurity were superimposed over 8 million citizens; the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa (Pigmies), though they speak the same language Kirundi and unlike elsewhere in the continent share common values.
Social anthropologists who visited Burundi earlier before independence recounted the economic and social interdependence between the Hutu farmers (85%), the Tutsi pastoralists (15%), and the Twa craftsmen (1%), which was well established (Lemarchand,1990, p. 4). Other observers recalled the growing Hutu Tutsi intermarriage that in a way helped to build confidence in the society. Recently some tourists have described this nation as the “Switzerland of Africa”, because of its beautiful landscapes and scenery.
Most Burundians are Roman Catholic Christians (62%), Protestants (5%), the rest are Muslims (10%), and indigenous beliefs 2.3% (US Gov, 2022).
It’s worth stating that one of the mistakes of the Belgians was a failure to integrate or unify these people within the colony before granting political independence. In Burundi, the absence of national consciousness had made tribal affiliation far more important than the new state, and often ethnic groups compete against each other for scarce resources and power.
In Burundi like elsewhere in Africa, the Belgians (Ndura, 2003.p.153) encouraged the politicization of ethnicity by making citizens think ethnic in relationships with each other. This also gives credence to the opinion that colonial rule is characterized by the ‘bifurcated state’, racial dualism anchored in politically enforced ethnic pluralism. Thus, the fragmentation in Burundi was made more perfect by ethnic associations which have divided the state along the lines of local authorities.
Ethnicity thus is invariably connected with division. Thus, at independence in 1962, with the overarching bond of opposition to colonial oppression removed, inter-tribal and intra-party conflicts emerged. One divisive issue was who captures the state resources and power in government. The ownership of the state means the ability to influence decision-making and personal profit. Burundians who expected their nationalist elites to ‘detribalize’ and lead them out of despair and underdevelopment into a brighter future, were quickly disappointed by the type of politics of bitterness and ethnicity that was introduced by the government. (Namakula,2019). The Tutsi-supported President simultaneously institutionalized ethnicity and ethnic identity in Burundi by making them a basis for economic and political participation in various regions. Captain Micombero came to power with a different agenda and wanted to rule by marginalizing the Hutu who were supposed to present a prime Minister. Hutu anger led to an unsuccessful military coup attempt trying to unseat the president in 1965. The consequence was total expulsion of Hutu officers from the army and security forces in Burundi. Ethnicity served the objective interests of the ruling elite. The prevailing political atmosphere in the new state was that of a parochial leadership that attracted the following of many citizens from the Tutsi minority group notably those in the armed forces and small businesses.
It was the increasing opposition to the regime within the Hutu that inspired in 1972 another Hutu revolt against the regime that resulted in more than 1,000 Tutsi dead. The Tutsi-led junta responded with selective genocide, targeting and killing wealthy Hutu merchants, educated elites, and political leaders who opposed it. The cost of this massacre or “ethnocide” (Lemarchand, 1995, pp. 89–105), was 200,000 Hutu killed, and more than 100,000 exiled to neighboring countries for safety. During these years in power, the junta tried to suppress all political opposition and ruled Burundi with decrees. The hallmark of this military regime was systematic discrimination and marginalization of Hutu people. A move strategically designed to reinforce the Tutsi superiority over all other ethnic groups and capture the state.
The social unrest and political instability in the country retarded any plans to improve the lives of the citizens. The clamp-down on the Hutu has disjointed families and created an atmosphere of distrust and fear of uncertainty in the country’s future. The little progress the economy was making immediately after independence frizzled away because of a lack of investment confidence and human capital. The only sector of the economy that was flourishing at the expense of the others was the military sector. The junta following the advice of Tutsi military officers increased military spending in procurement of small arms and bombs which were used against its people.
Between 1970 and 1974 the armed forces of Burundi had become a politically powerful entity and ethnically biased institution of national security. Instead of becoming the vanguard of national and human security of all citizens, it exhibited weakness by transforming itself into an ‘ethnic army’ dominated by mainly Tutsi officers. Furthermore, in later years it has become clear that the personal ambitions of the military officers were to stick relentlessly to power and accumulate as much wealth as possible to maintain patronage networks. To maintain power, the rulers continually invoked the idea of common descent and kinship of the Tutsi people to mobilize public support for their ambitious gains.
In 1976, Jean Baptiste Bagaza, another Tutsi officer staged a bloodless coup to reconcile ethnic differences that sparked off the pogrom of Hutu. The various political reforms that the government introduced were described as merely “cosmetic” because it did not go far to address the structural issues and basic needs of all ethnic groups in the country. Summarizing the reign at this time, a prominent historian Lemarchand, laments: “Seldom have human rights been violated on a more massive scale and with more brutal consistency and where else on a continent” (Lemarchand, 1995, p. 46). Burundi once the incarnation of brotherhood has degenerated into a shameful place on earth where shattered lives, oppression and fear of the future and existence will become a legacy for the children of Burundi as they succumb to the weight of conflict between minority ruling Tutsi and majority Hutu.
Burundi has become a country of “coups and countercoups” often plotted by officers who thirsted for power but had no specific development plan for their country. In 1987 President Bagaza was overthrown by his cousin, Major Pierre Buyoya of the Tutsi UPRONA party. The new regime tried to woo back the Hutu from exile and integrate them back into representative politics in Burundi after so many years of exclusion. Observers welcomed this initiative as a right step though it did not heal the wounds of ethnic hatred and the loss of thousands of innocent lives. What the Burundians wanted was a sustainable process of political transformation that will ensure physical, food, health, and economic security of the citizens in a participatory multiparty democracy.
Analysis of the politics of Burundi since 1964 depicts the alienation of Hutu who have found themselves trapped and marginalized by a succession of self-appointed military rulers who manipulated the national constitution for their selfish ambitions. From another perspective, one could see some Burundians made to be sycophants of the ruling party or regime to enjoy social benefits and government appointments.
The Period of Ethnic Conflict in Burundi
Burundi to some outside observers might look like a “country where the devil has wished good night” and bedeviled with atrocities. Closely examining the historical events of this country and the destruction as reflected by human carnage of 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, 1991, and 1993 and to the present, (Mokena, 2010) one will have no reason to doubt that this country is bedeviled by conflict from birth. The seeds of these conflicts were planted by the colonial power that ruled the countries for decades. No ancient hatred was the reason for the human carnage, but something closer to what Benedict Anderson (1991) calls “imagined communities” lies behind the litany of horrors (Lemarchand, 1996, p. xi). Those who studied this type of phenomenon informed us that the Belgians constructed and framed these people motivated by racial aesthetics and ensuring a ‘divide and rule’ system of administration. The Belgians viewed the Tutsi as superior to both the Hutu and Twa (Pigmies) because of their Caucasian resemblance: sleek tall, (Webster, 1966, pp. 44–54) aristocratic and athletic pointed pointed-nosed individuals. The Burundian Hutu is a short, fat docile farmer and hard-working citizen.
Experiences from many parts of Africa confirm that people’s tribal or ethnic differences do not spark conflict. Rather it could only cause conflicts when politicians try to politicize ethnicity as an instrument of group mobilization in competition for scarce resources, or for other petty objectives. In Burundi, the political leaders and military dictators manipulated ethnicity as a divisive strategy to mobilize political support. Ethnic conflict therefore means a struggle between rival ethnic groups to gain state power. This better explains the scenario in Burundi.
President Buyoya’s countercoup in 1987, did not relieve the social burden of the Hutu who were still being treated as second-class citizens. Most Tutsi through government discriminating policies denied Hutu the promotion to leadership positions. Many have been denied farming land, loans, and other economic incentives for better living because of their ethnic background. Democratic struggle in the country degenerated into violent rivalry for the control of the state and its resources among the minority Tutsi and majority Hutu populations. The politicization of ethnicity made it difficult for non-Tutsi to enjoy the goods of modernity such as education and infrastructure. But in the aftermath of the massacre of 20,000 Hutu by Tutsi soldiers in August 1988, international pressure started mounting for democratic reforms that would accommodate all citizens. President Buyoya bulged and decided to organize a constitution drafting commission that drafted and approved the country’s new constitution in 1992 that led to a multiparty election in June 1993.
Nevertheless, the electoral competition turned out to be ethnic. Since ethnicity had become politicized all the political actors well instrumentalized it for their benefit. This election was almost marred by ethnic violence in the capital Bujumbura, and in the villages. The outcome eventually brought into office a charismatic Hutu leader Melchoir Ndadaye to office as the first democratically elected president of Burundi. Ndadaye the leader of the Front for Democracy party defeated the incumbent Buyoya during the election. The Hutu president immediately became unpopular among the Tutsi especially the top military officers who saw the intending reform of the defense apparatus as a design to snatch away their power base and give to Hutu. The mutual distrust and misperception in Burundi were not a conducive environment for democratization. Barely five months into his political reform to stop ethnic violence in the country, Ndadaye was assassinated by Tutsi paratroopers command on October 21, 1993. His death was a blow to reforms that also left a political vacuum in Burundi (Reyntjens, 2000). As a result of the assassination, Hutu youths unleashed revenge attacks on Tutsi villages instigating the use of force by soldiers and police to contain the fight. In such a divided society, when force is needed to stop violence, it is used by police and soldiers recruited almost exclusively from the dominant group who often view themselves as “ethnic soldiers”.
The consequences of politicized ethnicity were experienced in the military. In this important institution, security forces have always played a key role in safeguarding the power in Tutsi’s hands (Lemarchand, 2009, pp. 146–147). It is well-trained and equipped with military hardware supplied by Belgium and France. However, the assassination unfortunately sparked off the ethnic conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu that left more than 100,000 civilians from both ethnic group’s dead. Reportedly, more than 350,000 citizens sought refuge in neighboring countries of Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Tanzania. This huge human displacement not only created a regional connection to the situation, but also incubated the birth of new political actors and organizations known as the Frodebu, FNL, and CNDD-FDD, which later became a mobilizing platform for the Hutu youths (Ibid.).
In April 1994 another tragedy struck when another Hutu President Cyprien Ntarryamira appointed to replace Ndadaye died accidentally in a plane crash that killed Rwandan President Habyarimana and sparked the planned genocide in Rwanda. Back in Burundi both the Hutu and Tutsi militias intensified the conflict killing and displacing families some of whom fled as refugees to neighboring Republics of Congo and Tanzania for safety. According to Lemarchand (1995, p. xi-xii), “the reciprocal demonization of the other can best be seen as a social construct rooted in the impending threat of genocide”. Amidst high death tolls, desperation, economic hardship, and disease because of ethnic conflict in the country, the former Tutsi President Buyoya staged a come-back coup backed by his colleagues of the Paratrooper section of the army ousting Sylvester Ntibantunganya (Hutu) the elected coalition government leader. Buyoya this time increased the number of the Burundians in the military by incorporating the Tutsi youth militia into the defense force and its strength grew from 17,500 to well above 60,000 soldiers which however raises among other questions the readiness of the army to defend all groups in the country and its standard of discipline. Additionally, the military budget during this period increased from $46 million in 1995 to $60 million in 1997 (UNDP Report, 2004, pp. 149–150). This increase in the military sector where the Tutsi dominated raised concern among experts who feared the use of the security apparatus against its citizens.
Shared deprivation and discrimination have combined to radicalize the Hutu and strengthen identification with militant leaders who were pitching battles within and across the borders as the only feasible strategy for ending Hutu marginalization and oppression in the hands of militarized Tutsi. At the same time, the Burundian conflict has affected many fragile states in the Great Lake region of Africa like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Tanzania, almost threatening regional security.
A destructive ethnic conflict emerged on top of excruciating economic difficulties and inequality in the 1990s. Behind the murders of political opponents in the country was also reportedly the “systematic ethnic cleansing” of urban and rural districts of Burundi (Lemarchand, 1995, p. xii). This was partly because of the socioeconomic consequences of the conflict which brought about sharp drops in the prices of coffee and tea, major foreign exchange sources for the beleaguered nation of Central Africa. Poverty was widespread, increasing the sufferings of the masses living below $2 a day. According to reports the country’s Gross Domestic Product fell from $180 to $110 per capita during the period (UNDP Report, 2004, p.149). However, the pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) demanded structural and institutional reforms as conditionality for external lending and further support.
As a bid towards political liberalization and reconciliation President Buyoya however, reflected and appointed a Hutu Domitien Ndayizeye as his vice-president, as a move to calm and reassure the Hutu of their rights, thereby opening a new chapter for eventual peaceful reconciliation in Burundi.
The Peace Process to End Conflict
In a bid to avert a spill-over of the ethnic conflict to neighboring states and another genocide reminiscent of the event in neighboring Rwanda, the United Nations Security Council convened a special session on Burundi on January 12, 2000, that was well attended by prominent African leaders including Nelson Mandela (Bentley, 2005, p. 10). Maintaining sanctions that were placed against Burundi, the UN supported regional efforts to end the conflict. Peace talks shifted to Arusha Tanzania where Julius Nyerere the former Tanzanian president and Nelson Mandela of South Africa brokered a peace agreement signed by President Buyoya and the leader of the main rebel Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) Pierre Nkurunziza, a Hutu (see: The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000). The FDD was a severe opponent of the military regime and was mostly funded and armed by former Zaire president Mobutu in Uvira in the Democratic Republic of Congo from where they operated guerrilla warfare against the Burundian government. The other radical rebel groups of Hutu extraction such as the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) and The National Liberation Front (FROLINA) were not invited to the talks because they refused to attend earlier talks in Bujumbura. Eventually, the agreement was later signed by the FNL and CNDD-FDD with the transitional government in 2003.
For the first time in the history of this conflict-ridden country, light has shown up inside the tunnel for an end to the conflict as moderate sides from all ethnic groups wanted to take advantage of this opportunity to advance the country to a better future. In keeping with the spirit of the new constitution president Buyoya resigned in 2003 and passed over the mantle of power to his vice-president Ndayizeye from the Hutu ethnic group.
This move was met with protest and dismay from the Tutsi who viewed this resignation as a sell-out by a Tutsi leader. Tutsi have equated the return to democracy and a Hutu to the presidency, with the annihilation of the Tutsi. In an emotionally charged and polarized Burundi, this perception further escalated the conflict, creating cohesion and unity among the Tutsi ethnic group against the imagined threat from the new dispensation. Fundamentally, the Tutsi elite were afraid of losing their grip on power and were bent on maintaining ethnic dominance and their status. Hence the instrumentalization of ethnicity brings all their members together to resist the new democratic dispensation.
New Democratic Beginning
Concerned about the growing chaos and violence in Burundi, and the spill-over effects the conflict was having across borders, the UN ordered the deployment of about 5,000 troops (Lemarchand, 2009, pp.167–68) in the country to enforce the fragile peace in Burundi while the country prepared for next general election. The election in 2005 was a bold step towards the politics of power-sharing in Burundi. The parliamentary election was organized with the participation of the former rebel group FDD which earlier renounced violence (Ibid., pp.167–69). Although the other rebel group Front for National Liberation (FNL) boycotted the exercise and continued fighting. The electoral arithmetic was in favor of the leader of the Hutu’s FDD Pierre Nkurunziza and was sworn into office. Relative peace returned to Burundi, but the country was still facing enormous social and economic challenges compounded by sporadic rebel attacks in Bujumbura through 2009 to disrupt the democratic process beginning to take shape.
President Nkurunziza with the support of the regional and international organizations opened a kind of national dialogue through his numerous political and economic reforms to reconcile parties in the conflict and secure the borders of the country from infiltration by rebel forces. His radical but gradual institutional reform, especially in the military, was aimed at weeding the force of all extremist officers who might become spoilers in the democratic dispensation. Many police officers who were involved in extra-judiciary executions were punished and relieved of their jobs.
The political reforms and the legitimacy the government had internally, and from the international community became the political capital that returned Nkurunziza in a presidential election held in 2010. Winning an election does not mean the conflict is over until people’s grievances are adequately resolved. Some leaders in Africa have used regular elections to legitimize terror against their citizens.
Nevertheless, in the case of Burundi where ethnic conflict has ravaged the country for decades, the leadership will require commitment and political will from all sides to build an inclusive nation for all. Unfortunately, this did not happen because the state was “ineffectual” and lacked the elements of good and inclusive governance.
The weakness and inefficiency of the state were profitable to the ruling party which lacked the political will to accommodate the former rebel groups from the post-war power arrangement. In a polarized country like Burundi, conflict will not end until the basic human needs of all groups are met. These needs include security, participation, equality, freedom, autonomy, and recognition. Wherever these needs are denied there must be conflict (Irobi, 2009, pp. 235– 236). Apparent political uncertainty in the country, patrimonialism, a high level of governmental inefficiency, and the resort to impunity and violation of citizens' human rights generated a high level of discontent and internal struggle in the country. The political situation in Burundi was exacerbated when Nkurunziza announced his candidacy for the 2015 presidential election, which angry citizens later forced him to withdraw. However, the election took place, but Nkurunziza did not live to hand over power to his successor, Evariste Ndayishimiye. Nkurunziza suddenly died of a heart attack on June 8, 2020. His absence created a new dawn and a new political beginning in Burundi after political, and economic hardship citizens of the country had gone through for well over 15 years of his administration.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Today, Burundi is in a post-conflict stage after decades of useless competitive ambition of leaders of Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups to capture the state and its resources. The experience from other countries involved in ethnic conflict suggests caution concerning the prevailing situation in the country. The “negative peace” that the country enjoys now might not last forever because of the citizens' traumas and unattended basic human needs that triggered the cycle of conflict. The possibility of the country relapsing back to conflict is real if nothing is done to transition away from authoritarian rule, which opens the opportunity for all Burundians to participate equally in addressing national issues. This would be a very bold distinctive step from the previous administration.
The new president and his administration should distance themselves from the ugly legacy of repression, ethnic marginalization, corruption, and violence of the past administration and concentrate on constructive nation-building and reconciliation. This country has had enough ethnic conflict and the time is ripe for the government to harness the potential of its diversity and channel it to national unity and economic growth.
In addition, more efforts should be made to reform the security forces, making them efficient and capable of protecting all citizens irrespective of their ethnic belonging. This will be seen as a departure from the former ‘mono-ethnic” military dominated by Tutsi since independence. In general members of the public feel the national security apparatus is corrupt and are not fulfilling their role of protecting them because the soldiers and police alike lacked professionalism and adequate deployment capability in times of violence and attacks from rebel militias.
More than anything else, the Burundians would like to be reassured about their food security and employment. This requires economic reform in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Some areas such as Bujumbura, Makamba, Ngozi, and Bururi are risk areas and could relapse to violence if the economy is not growing. The war has affected food production which accounts for 48% of the country's GDP and is set to absorb more than 200,000 returning refugees from the DRC and Tanzania (UNHCR, 2022). In this respect, economic reform prioritizing structural land reform will be a good peace-building measure. Land scarcity is a significant issue in Burundi. Disputes over land ownership, especially in areas of return for refugees create tension. Returnees and host communities compete for limited land resources, exacerbating existing ethnic division (Burundi Crisis Response Plan 2024-2026).
Economic integration of ex-combatants and child soldiers should be given priority to avoid further violence. Reportedly many of the former soldiers have not laid down their arms and might be using the weapons they have to terrorize innocent citizens in the provinces. Some of these fighters should be empowered economically with some incentives to become useful in society.
Most importantly, conflict resolution education should be extended to schools as a social reconstruction effort. It must prepare students to function effectively in a multiethnic environment and learn how to forgive and respect each other since virtually all groups in Burundi speak the same language Kirundi and share the same values. By acknowledging some of their commonalities Burundians demonstrate their willingness to transcend ethnicity and embrace a more inclusive and diverse perspective necessary for the new democratic beginning.
The Burundians should not be ashamed to take responsibility for what happened to their country instead of blaming all on colonial rule. The elites took advantage of colonial ethnic stratification and channeled it to a destructive path of conflict and social backwardness. As was earlier argued, politicized ethnicity was the precursor or harbinger of the conflict. According to Sithole (1995, p. 155) “many African leaders have recognized the problem of ethnicity and have sought to address it in the past …. Yet this seems to have failed”. Another scholar Okwudiba Nnoli concurs, “The persistence of ethnic politics and conflict in various African countries attest to the unsuccessfulness of remedies that have been applied to the problem. Central to these remedies are policies which are variously referred to as “ethnic arithmetic,” and “ethnic proportionality principle.” Underlying these policies is the principle of affirmative action for underprivileged ethnic groups” (Nnoli, 1989, p. 5, cited in Sithole, 1995, p. 156).
Undoubtedly, addressing Burundi’s conflict is not only daunting for President Evariste Ndayishimiye but also complex and requires a ‘soul searching” approach that considers historical context, political dynamics, and land dispute. The way forward for a democratic new beginning and ethnic harmony lies in an inclusive and collective effort of all Burundians for a home-grown solution.
The Relevance of Sovereign National Conference
The new President’s call, “time for dialogue with the opposition groups” (Nantulya. 2020. https://africacenter.org.) has come and should be capitalized. Hence, a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) is needed as a remedy to discuss how to build a nation for all Burundians and most importantly resolve issues of ethnic inequality, restitution, and land reform to ensure peace in the country.
National conference phenomenon offers a neutral platform for discussing vital issues affecting people from all ethnic groups. Nearly every traditional culture in Africa has some conflict resolution mechanism within the societies, “and for many Africans, the national conference is compatible with the traditional consensual methods of solving problems” (Clarke, 1994, p. 313-4, Hellbrunn, 1994, pp. 575-610). The National Conference is a widely used mechanism for reconciling communities and providing hope where there is misery and despair after intractable conflicts. During the process participants will have to show willingness to engage in self-reflection regarding their contribution to the estranged relationship that led to hatred and would be prepared to learn more about each other.
Although this approach to conflict resolution can be challenging as elsewhere in Africa (Robinson 1994) and might not be easily accepted by some leading elites in Burundi, the National Conference has the potential to renew broken communication links among former adversaries which is a prerequisite for restoring relationships and transcending ethnic differences. For so many years there was a breakdown in inter-ethnic communication between the Hutu and Tutsi. These major stakeholders avoided each other by creating both physical and psychological distance. This behavior, further exacerbated by absolutely no chance of listening attentively to one another’s view about how to stabilize events threatening the country’s unity and democracy.
What aggrieved parties in the conflict need most is their need for equal participation in decision-making to be recognized, as well as issues of inequitable distribution of resources properly addressed to move forward. In literature, the national sovereign conference was successful in some Franco-phone West African countries, like Gabon and Benin Republic, where it paved the way for a political transition to a democratic dispensation in the early 1990s. Impactfully, the national conference led to positive changes in government in Benin, the Republic of Congo, and Niger and exerted significant political pressure on the leadership in Zaire (the Democratic Republic of Congo and Togo(Robert, 1994; Clark, 1994, Nwajiaku, 1994: pp.429-447). Elsewhere such as Nigeria the National Sovereign Conference was initiated following the sudden death of President Abacha in June 1998 to resolve deep-rooted ethnic conflict in Nigeria.
Convincingly, this mechanism or approach will be effective in Burundi if applied. Commitment to the process will not only motivate ethnic groups and political parties to “bury their hatchets,” for peaceful ethnic group coexistence, but pertinently will help Burundians build national consensus and foster social cohesion.
An unfettered National Sovereign Conference (NSC) process will also be a template for learning and creativity that citizens and the government of Burundi should capitalize on. This conference might generate useful suggestions to rebuild old administrative structures and institutions of governance in Burundi that caused the ethnic conflict. Characteristically, the NSC is sovereign, and the decisions and options generated during the meeting will be organic and constructively adjusted to address some divisive issues of power and resource distribution that will be acceptable to all citizens.
The conference, if convened, would reveal to the participants that what was once a functional and understandable means of administration has now become dysfunctional and needs to be constructively addressed for the sake of ethnic co-existence and unity of the country. The absence of good governance and politicized ethnicity in the past gave way to unnecessary negativity and aggression that led to the development of cognitive distortions (Kelman, 1999; Holt and Siverstein, 1989) about the other, limiting the chance for learning more about themselves and the conflict.
Nevertheless, NSC demands a bold and courageous step from the presidency in Burundi if he has the unity and stability of the country at heart. The credibility of any problem-solving process will depend on the wider participation and commitment of all stakeholders, aggrieved communities, their leaders, and members of civil societies in the country. Marginalizing any groups or associations might not augur well for the conference, instead would offer an opportunity for rebel groups to mobilize their constituencies to continue fighting. In the spirit of constructive dialogue and peacebuilding, Burundians are therefore reminded to heed a Kirundi adage “An exposed stone does not damage the hoe,” accepting the fact that they share in the responsibility for both the inter-ethnic conflict and its management.
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