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Disputants and outside observers often assume that one or both sides are basically homogeneous. If a few vocal people on the opposition are outrageous, threatening, or seemingly dangerous, there is a tendency to believe that all members of the opposition are like that. Enemy images are developed that assume the worst of everyone on the otherside, and strategies for dealing with the opponents are based on these worst-case assumptions. [1] [2]
In most cases, however, when the opposition is a group, organization, or nation-state, there is considerably divergence in views among the members of the opposing groups. While some might be characterized as "hardliners," and might deserve at least some of the negative stereotypes often attributed to them, many others are likely to be less extreme. Such "moderates" form what Louis Kriesberg calls "constituencies for de-escalation."[3] These people can often be better reached with conciliatory gestures or confidence building measures, rather than confrontational or escalatory moves.
Louis Kriesberg describes the complexity of conflicts, explaining that many people are interacting in many different ways and every individual CAN make a difference.
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Another way to differentiate among opponents and by-standers is to divide them into four groups:
- persuadables,
- reluctant persuadables,
- traders, and
- hardliners.
Persuadables are people who can fairly easily be persuaded that you are right. With a little bit of reason or a moral or emotional appeal, they are likely to join your side or support you in the conflict.
Reluctant persuadables are people who also might be persuaded that you are right, but it will take more effort. You will have to work harder to convince them of your views, describing those views, as much as possible, in a way that is consistent with their belief systems, which may well be different from yours.
Traders are people who may not be persuaded that you are right, but they are willing to negotiate with you anyway. If you can give them something they want, they are likely to give you what you want, even if they do not necessarily believe in your reasons for wanting it.
Hardliners are people who are not going to change their beliefs or behavior, no matter what. Persuasion won't work, nor will negotiation, as they refuse to negotiate regardless of what you offer. Some hardliners might be "conflict profiteers," people who are benefiting or profiting from the continuation of the conflict. These may be the leaders, who gain their reputation and power from being "tough" and standing up to the other side, military leaders whose reputation has been (or is being) earned by battle victories, or even low-level military personnel who have no other way of making a living. Other conflict profiteers are arms dealers who make money by selling weapons, sometimes to both sides at once.
Other hardliners are the extremists who hold extreme religious, nationalistic, or prejudicial beliefs that say they are superior, and the opponent inferior, even non-human and deserving extinction. Such beliefs lead to what Guy Burgess has called "into-the-sea" framing, in which the goal is to figuratively -- or almost literally -- drive the opponents into the sea.[4] (The term originally referred to the Palestinian's stated desire to destroy the state of Israel, leaving the Israelis nowhere to go, but into the sea. But the term is equally relevant to any genocidal situation, where people are not drowned, but killed in any other way.)
Since the extremists and other hardliners usually gain the most press coverage, it is easy to come to the conclusion that everyone on the other side feels that way. This leads to extremely hostile tactics, as extremists are not worth trying to persuade or negotiate with. But if one has a more accurate image of the differences on the other side, sometimes persuasion or negotiation is possible. Eventually the extremists will still have to be dealt with, but if one has developed a large number of allies on the other side, that job will be considerably easier to do.
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[1] Paul Wehr, "Misperceptions" in the Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict, Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess, Eds., Available online at http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/wehr7486.htm.
[2] Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflict, Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefiled. 2003. pp. 142-143.
[3] Kriesberg, p. 294.
[4] Guy Burgess "Into the Sea Framing" Online Training Program on Intractable Conflicts, available online at http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/problem/intosea.htm.
Use the following to cite this article:
Burgess, Heidi. "Within-Party Differences." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/within_party_differences/>.
Sources of Additional, In-depth Information on this Topic
Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts:
Offline (Print) Sources
Kriesberg, Louis. "Adopting Conflict Strategies." In Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, April 1, 1998. Pages: 123-150.
This chapter discusses the numerous factors that play into what strategy an adversarial party adopts as its apporach to dealing with a conflict. The four primary factors that affect a group's conflict strategy are: 1) its goals; (2) the characteristics of each adversary; (3) the relations between the adversaries; and (4) their environment. Click here for more info.
Lewicki, Roy J., David Saunders and John Minton. "Multiparty Negotiations: Coalitions and Groups." In Negotiation, 3rd Edition. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin-McGraw Hill, 1999. Pages: 315-335.
The first part of this chapter focuses on how parties may ally into coalitions in order to achieve their own individual objectives. It includes several different definitions of coalition, a look at various types of coalitions, research findings on the dynamics of coalition formation and successful coalitions, as well as practical advice on how to form coalitions. Part of forming a coalition is inevitably negotiating differences between the coalitions consituent individuals and/or groups. Click here for more info.
Siqueira, Kevin. "Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organizations ." Journal Of Conflict Resolution 49:2, 2005.
Abstract: A model is developed to provide a basis for investigating the nature of faction behavior and the interrelationships between factions and between factions and their supporters under conditions of competition and cooperation. A general finding of the study illustrates the fact that when factions act competitively and independently of one another, the results do not necessarily lead to increased dissident activity and violence when compared to the case when factions act jointly and coordinate their actions. For example, when faction activities generate positive externalities and are strategic complements, competition and the independent behavior of factions lead to decreased levels of dissident activity. The model can also be used to derive implications for various types of counterterrorism policies when a government faces independently acting groups within a dissident movement.
Susskind, Lawrence and Jeffrey Cruikshank. "Representation in Consensual Processes." In Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes. New York: Basic Books, January 1, 1987. Pages: 101-108.
This section of Breaking the Impasse specifically discuss issues surrounding stakeholder representation in consensus building processes. The authors discuss the necessity of making sure all relevant stakeholders are represented at the negotiating table. In addition, they consider various strategies for choosing appropriate spokespeople to represent the interested stakeholder groups. Click here for more info.
Stedman, Stephen John. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." International Security 22:2, January 1, 1997.
This article discusses the important issue of spoilers, or extreme parties that purposely do whatever they can to disrupt peacemaking processes for fear of losing power. This study begins to develop a typological theory of spoiler management. The goal is to identify strategies that spoilers may potentially use. In addition, the research intends to outline strategies that policymakers and negotiators can use to diagnose the type of spoiler and effectively deal with them in order to keep peace processes on track.
Gray, Barbara. "Stakeholder Legitimacy." In Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989. Pages: 66-70.
This section of Collaborating looks at the process of identifying legitimate stakeholders to include in a collaborative decision making process. The author discusses disputes over legitimacy and the problem of keeping the negotiating group at a manageable size, which demands the careful selection of stakeholder representatives. There is also a section on the issue of representatives maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents. Click here for more info.
Ould Abdallah, Ahmedou. "Stakeholders and Owners." In Peacebuilding: A Field Guide. Edited by Reychler, Luc and Thania Paffenholz, eds. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, January 1, 2001.
The discussion in this chapter concentrates on strategies for resolving situations of violent civil conflict. The author emphasizes the importance of involving the most powerful leaders or representatives of stakeholder groups in peacebuilding decision-making processes, including extremists.
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Examples Illustrating this Topic:
Offline (Print) Sources
Laws, David. "Representation of Stakeholding Interests." In The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement. Edited by Susskind, Lawrence, Sarah McKearnan and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, eds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999.
This article analyzes the issue of ensuring proper representation of stakeholder interests in consensus building processes. Using a theoretical frame as well as practical examples to demonstrate his points, the author focuses heavily on the tension between the demands of the negotiating table and those of adhering to the wishes of the constituency that representatives must deal with.
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Audiovisual Materials on this Topic:
Offline (Print) Sources
A. Philip Randolph: For Jobs and Freedom . Directed and/or Produced by: James, Dante. California Newsreel. 1996.
This film documents what transpired during the U.S. civil rights movement. It focuses on a moderate civil rights leader who helped to bridge party differences in the quest for equal access to education, jobs, and other important resources. Click here for more info.
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