by Austin Langdon

May 19,.2020

Introduction

Out of the twenty-six ongoing conflicts included in the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Global Conflict Tracker, extremist groups are major participants in seventeen. The CFR’s list leaves out major examples of extremist conflict including extremist campaigns by states, such as China’s persecution of the Uighurs and communal tensions within states like India. Extremists are active and major participants in many intractable conflicts worldwide. Many countries have been experiencing extremist violence for a very long time. Relying on military approaches to resolve these conflicts has led to endless wars, humanitarian crises, lost development, deteriorated social relationships, and the erosion of democratic norms. Reconciliation within extremist conflicts is necessary but difficult. This is because extremists are defined by their uncompromising commitment to hostility and violence in their relationships with outgroups.[1] The qualities that effective reconciliation processes are rooted in, like empathy and moral imagination, are cognitively inaccessible to extremists. Transforming these societies and healing their divides will require complex interventions that approach extremism with conceptual clarity and a platform capable of promoting and sustaining long-term reconciliation within societies deeply affected by extremism.

The point of this paper is to imagine what is and is not possible in terms of responsible engagement with extremists during different stages of reconciliation. This paper aims to use the literature on reconciliation and on extremism to take stock of what options are available and best suited for reconciliation within societies where extremists are major participants in conflict. Just as important is the identification of the options which are unavailable, limited, or counterproductive. Extremists, as conceived through a social-identity framework, differ from non-extremists in several ways that are fundamentally important to the concept of reconciliation. It is argued that in many of these conflicts, purely coercive measures of engagement, in the long-term, are not sufficient and can often be counterproductive. Force and management measures like arrests, containment, revocation of citizenship, and social media action, should be seen as short-term options which should work in conjunction with reconciliatory measures to make constructive change sustainable. Envisioning transformation in extremist conflicts means embracing the complex multi-level nature of social conflict in a way that makes the dual tasks of society wide reconciliation and the prevention and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE) compatible and mutually reinforcing. With extremists, coercive measures may be necessary in the short term, but for the type of long-term constructive change that extremist conflict requires, reconciliation is an invaluable process.

Defining Extremism – J.M. Berger

This paper follows the definition of extremism provided by J.M. Berger in his book Extremism which defines it as: “the belief that an in-group’s success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group.”¹ Extremism is not defined through ideological content. An individual can be hateful, bigoted, and even violent without being an extremist. Rather than its ideological content, it is the structure of an ideological system which defines it as extremist. As Berger notes, “the content of different extremist ideologies are wildly inconsistent. Pro-Muslim and anti-Muslim extremists, for example, are diametrically opposed with respect to the content of their beliefs, yet they are remarkably similar with respect to the structure of what they believe and how they justify their views.” Extremist structures consist “of two symbiotic notions… First, formulaic in-group and out-group definitions flesh out identities, and second, a crisis solution construct prescribes action based on those identity definitions.”¹ For non-extremists, a crisis could refer to access to a valuable resource and the solution could be a form of limited warfare designed to induce concessions from out-groups with access to that resource. In this case, a mix of integrative and exchange power can promote reconciliation. For extremists, the crisis is the outgroup, which is seen as a threat to the ingroup which necessitates a hostile or violent solution. The real crisis that frames these processes may be unrelated to any particular group, but what matters is the perception by the ingroup that the outgroup is itself the source of the crisis and that only by dealing with them through hostility or violence can there be a solution. Perceptions of the Other as an implacable threat to the ingroup are so entrenched that extremists are unreceptive to reconciliation as a concept. Thus, the typical tools of reconciliation do not apply to them. In these cases, only coercive power is viable, at least in the short-term.

Where Reconciliation and Extremism Meet

Reconciliation seeks to cultivate “right relationships” making it a primarily social process. It is only possible when “progress is made in solving the substantive problems” underlying the conflict.[2] Reconciliation therefore centers around public policy changes and socio-psychological programs, similar to the content which constitutes P/CVE initiatives. This is how conflict transformation takes place. It involves the “building of right relationships and social structures through a radical respect for human rights, and non-violence as a way of life.”[3] Extremism is also a social phenomenon. It is defined by how members of an ingroup perceive and interact with members of an outgroup. Berger’s definition allows us to delineate the qualities intrinsic to extremists that complicate reconciliation or make it inviable while highlighting the areas deradicalization should prioritize to promote reconciliation and conflict transformation. For instance: developing moral imagination, eroding narratives of threat totalization and zero-sum frames, and cultivating a sense of belonging. These spaces are where the wider reconciliation process and deradicalization can meet and work in tandem by promoting constructive change among potential spoilers and those that pose a disproportionate threat to positive peace and social progress. Literature on disengagement and reintegration stresses the need for this type of hybrid approach. “Neither demobilization nor individual level deradicalization will be sufficient” one USIP study notes. “Rehabilitation and reintegration operate at a level of social complexity that demands a peacebuilding approach, and effective responses require hybrid interventions.”[4] Despite the limitations on reconciliation posed by extremist frameworks, the previously mentioned spaces leave room for constructive engagement through identity transformation and wider changes in the socio-political climate from which extremism, as a social phenomenon, emerges and sustains itself. If reconciliation can affect long-term change in either of these areas, it will have advanced P/CVE considerably within those communities.

Approaching Extremism Through Reconciliation

Extremism poses unique dilemmas for reconciliation and requires special attention. It poses many limitations to traditional reconciliation, but constructive engagement with extremists through reconciliation, while difficult, is possible. The literature on reconciliation has accounted for individuals and groups who are not receptive to reconciliation. Burgess describes four categories of persons in relation to reconciliation. The first three can be brought into reconciliation through a tailored use of different types of power. The most receptive is the category of persuadables. Alongside them are reluctant persuadables, who may require a small amount of coercion to make them receptive to reconciliation. Traders make up another category of persons, who through the deployment of exchange power can be drawn into reconciliation processes.[5] The vast majority of people can be split into one of these three categories. The last category, who Burgess refers to as incorrigibles, consist of dogmatic persons unwilling to listen to the Other or alternative narratives. The literature recommends a predominantly coercive approach for dealing with members of this category.⁵ Extremists belong to the last category. They may in fact be the only types of people who truly belong in it and the literature on extremism, and particularly P/CVE, can shine a light on how reconcilers can constructively engage with them. While active extremists leave few options outside coercion, social processes can influence extremist groups as a social and political force within society.⁴ The categories of people, as Burgess describes them, are also not immutable categories. They are fluid and people can move from one category to the other. Processes that encourage disengagement and deradicalization can open valuable space to pursue non-coercive and constructive engagement with extremists by transforming them from incorrigibles into reluctant persuadables. At that point, they would cease to be extremists, permitting their necessary reintegration into a reconciled community.

This type of transformation, either of the socio-political climate or at the level of identity, within extremist conflicts is very difficult, however. By relating the literature on reconciliation to the literature on extremism, we can better understand the limitations and possibilities for engagement that extremists pose for reconciliation processes. Some options that are essential to reconciliation that are available for use with non-extremists are not available with extremists. Extremist participation in reconciliation activities like dialogue and problem-solving workshops would do more harm than good as visions of a shared future with the outgroup are cognitively inaccessible for extremists. Their inclusion could hinder the ability of the process to reconcile other parties to the conflict that may be more central to the violence. Extremists should participate in these types of activities under the purview of deradicalization, not reconciliation. The concept of massively parallel reconciliation which embraces the complexity of conflict and reconciliation, depends on participants working in parallel with each other.[6] Extremists cannot work in parallel with their adversaries as they are partly defined by their recognition of hostility or violence as the only legitimate means of interaction with the outgroup.¹

However, there are options for constructive engagement available, through deradicalization and beyond it. All non-coercive options for engaging with extremists are medium and long-term approaches that emerge from a common transformational platform. In the short term, responsible coercion can be employed to disrupt retaliatory actions, to stop violence, to diminish arms levels, and to provide space for reconstruction and cooperation to begin. Medium and long-term efforts require different methods to grow the “sense of identity and common interests” that is needed for the cultivation of a security community.³ The main options available to reconcilers consist of priming extremists for reconciliation and transforming the socio-political climate using the transformational platform that reconciliation process structures are shaped by, but success will rest on the process structure that directs the reconciliation process.

Transformational Platforms and Process Structures

The potential for reconciliation processes and P/CVE to empower each-other is best expressed through the framework of conflict transformation outlined by John Paul Lederach. In Lederach’s Little Book of Conflict Transformation, he describes the process of transforming societies in conflict as beginning with the creation of a map for conflict transformation and the construction of transformational platforms to carry it out.³ Lederach’s conflict transformation map is structured around three interrelated inquiries that inform processes of cyclical change in relationships.

• Inquiry One – The Presenting Situation: the presenting situation contains both the conflict content and context of the current situation, its issues, and the relationships between groups. Inquiry one assesses the relational and historical patterns in which conflict is rooted.
• Inquiry Two – The Horizon of the Future: the horizon of the future represents the image of what reconcilers hope to create. It is not a model of linear change. It points towards possibilities and represents a social energy that informs orientation. Forms of engagement with extremists not rooted in coercion begin here. Reconciliation processes, whether engaging with extremists directly through deradicalization or indirectly through social change will be empowered and made sustainable by fostering constructive social energy that informs their engagement with extremists.
• Inquiry Three – Change Processes: this inquiry consists of the change processes that link the presenting situation to the horizon of the future by resolving immediate problems and creating platforms for promoting long-term social change by addressing deeper relational and structural patterns.³

These inquiries inform the construction of transformational platforms that should structure the reconciliation process, and deradicalization, as a component of the wider reconciliation process. Reconciliation processes do traditionally aim to rehumanize the enemy, but they do not typically conceive of a role for deradicalization or envision P/CVE as a matter under its purview. However, conceiving of reconciliation and P/CVE strategy under the same transformative vision and through the same process structure has the potential to empower the ability of both to promote constructive and sustainable change while mutually reinforcing each other.

Lederach defines a transformational platform as “the building of an on-going and adaptive base at the epicenter of conflict from which it is possible to generate processes that create solutions to short-term needs and provide capacity to work on strategic long-term constructive change in systemic relational content.” A transformational platform needs a process structure, which can “support and sustain a platform with a capacity to adapt and generate on-going desired change while at the same time responding creatively to immediate needs.”³ Process structures are made up of two interdependent characteristics, adaptability and purpose. They are both linear and circular and operate through feedback loops with a clear trajectory. The task of integrating P/CVE into wider reconciliation processes rests on positive feedback loops between the two distinct but connected processes of reconciliation and deradicalization.

In transformational process structures the “growth of something often ‘nourishes’ itself from its own process and dynamic” and that growth then “nourishes” growth in another area.³ This type of process structure can be visualized as a spiral, made up of multidirectional internal patterns that create a common overall movement through cyclical motion. They are built from transformational platforms. These types of structures see presenting issues as a window for change. They look past the immediate issues to explore “the relational context and the underlying causes of conflict” by understanding the difference between the content of a conflict and “its emotional and relational context.”³ Orienting change processes and process structures around this emotional and relational context opens spaces for promoting cognitive changes within extremist belief systems and priming them for reconciliation through identity transformation. These spaces can be used to pose conflict problems as dilemmas by shifting from an either/or frame to a both/and frame and to embrace complexity by developing a “capacity to hear and engage the voice of identity and relationship” through honesty, iterative learning, and appropriate exchange.³ From this transformational platform and process structure, options and space for non-coercive means of engagement emerge in the long-term vision of reconciliation. The horizon of the future envisions the task of priming extremists for reconciliation and establishes intent to transform the socio-political climate to reduce the number of extremists and their influence.

Briefly applying this transformational vision to an ongoing conflict can help us visualize what kind of contribution this type of platform could offer. U.S. policy in Yemen and Saudi-led military intervention have contributed to the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world while strengthening al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).[7] [8] Continuing on the same course, with the same approach will be unsustainable and counterproductive. President Joe Biden has signaled “a renewed commitment to the UN-led peace process” in Yemen. He has revoked the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization and appointed Timothy Lenderking, an experienced diplomat with extensive experience in the region, as the US envoy to Yemen.[9] If these steps and those Biden is currently being pressured to make (pushing for an end to the Saudi blockade for example) can open space for constructive dialogue between key stakeholders, this will create opportunities for transformational processes and reconciliation to take root within Yemen as violent conflict de-escalates. Insider reconciles among tribes in Yemen have demonstrated potential for successfully mediating with AQAP and encouraging disengagement.[10] Insider reconcilers have tried to mediate between the government of Yemen and the Houthis on several occasions and have shown a tangible and positive impact in the short term. Medium and long-term success, which requires greater moral imagination, has been elusive.[11] The type of transformational platform detailed above is not capable of overcoming all the differences between all stakeholders in this conflict. However, it can affect constructive change in the socio-political climate within Yemen and among Extremist combatants and the communities that interact with them, making a resolution of the conflict more likely.

If insider reconcilers can be empowered to promote disengagement and reintegration with AQAP within a context of national dialogue and conflict de-escalation, then platforms for constructive engagement with extremists can start to be built. The immediate needs of security and social services can be addressed by employing communities in their own self-defense and forging stronger relationships between the government and tribal areas. In line with the forward but circular motion of process structures, this growth can ‘nourish’ the growth of community-based reconciliation and reintegration programs by “offering pragmatic support to people disengaging from violent extremism and building resilience in communities affected by them.”⁴ These programs could resemble something like those employed by the Sabaoon Rehabilitation center in Pakistan’s Swat Valley, which provides psychosocial support for the rehabilitation of militant male youths in Pakistan while emphasizing pro-social activities and skill acquisition.⁴ This is where the link between the presenting situation and the horizon of the future begins to emerge as agents begin integrating the embers of reconciliation and P/CVE. The wider context of reconciliation within Yemen, assuming space for national dialogue can be opened in the near future, will feedback into these processes, empowering them and the wider reconciliation process.

This will diminish the appeal of extremism, its power as a social force within society, and its capacity to damage potential or existing reconciliation processes, but it is not a recipe for wholesale conflict resolution. It represents the required first steps in constructing a transformative platform that has the potential to contribute to long-term constructive change. The construction and stability of this platform is threatened by more than just the influence of extremists. Steps taken by other actors are necessary to render the security, social, and humanitarian environment of Yemen more hospitable to reconciliation. It is not uncommon for non-extremists to expect fundamental change from extremists before they themselves take steps to reimagine and repair relationships. This is not an attitude conducive to reconciliation or peace. The limitations posed by extremism are still significant barriers to this transformational process, however. What’s important is identifying the areas in which contributions can be made through constructive engagement with extremists and the socio-political climate they exist within and taking the steps to open up space to foster that engagement. Other considerations beyond engagement with extremists like AQAP in Yemen will have equal or greater influence over the prospects for society-wide reconciliation in the country. Ineffective diplomacy, domestic political pressures in the U.S. or Gulf countries, and regional rivalries among other factors, could all spoil the prospects for positive peace. Engagement with extremists is simply one part of the puzzle, which has its own limitations and complexities.

Limitations for Reconciliation

Incorrigibles are people who “have their heels stuck in the sand and refuse to be persuaded or compromise.”⁵ Extremists, being defined by their uncompromising belief that hostility or violence is necessary for in-group survival or success are prime examples. As such,  extremists are resistant to reconciliation and without disengagement and deradicalization, reconciliation is off the table. The social and psychological attributes that lead to reconciliation are cognitively inaccessible to extremists without fundamental identity transformation.¹ Reconciliation requires mercy, an embrace of complexity, the abandonment of zero-sum frames, collaborative problem-solving, empathy, and the erosion of simplistic dualisms. Extremists express a totalized threat-logic and a high degree of angst, which frames mercy as a threat to group survival and entrenches zero-sum thinking.[12] Extremists express a low level of axiological balance and a high level of collective generality which fosters simplicity over complexity, rules out collaborative problem-solving, obstructs empathy, and promotes narratives rooted in moral dualisms.¹² Massively parallel reconciliation, which embraces the complexity of conflict and reconciliation but rests on the potential for parallel movement between groups in conflict is beyond the capacity of extremist interaction with out-groups.

Most importantly, extremists lack moral imagination. As John Paul Lederach writes, “transcending violence is forged by the capacity to generate, mobilize, and build the moral imagination.”[13] Moral Imagination consists of the ability to “imagine ourselves in a web of relationships that includes our enemies; the ability to sustain a paradoxical curiosity that embraces complexity without reliance on dualistic polarity; the fundamental belief in and pursuit of the creative act; and the acceptance of the inherent risk of stepping into the mystery of the unknown that lies beyond the far too familiar landscape of violence.”¹³ Many participants in violent conflict lack the requisite moral imagination, not just extremists. However, non-extremists can develop and mobilize the moral imagination without becoming something else entirely. Extremists on the other hand must deradicalize before moral imagination is within reach. Extremist groups like al-Qaeda would have to cease to be al-Qaeda for the development and mobilization of the moral imagination to take place. Extremists cannot include their enemies, they cannot accept complex conceptualizations of ‘us’ and ‘them’ without reducing groups to moral dualisms, and they cannot accept the risk associated with uncertainty. Extremists cannot accept risk, because their struggle is an existential one and their survival is on the line. The acceptance of risk, because of the existential stakes of the conflict, might mean the end of their group. Coercion and management measures in this case, are the best short-term means of engagement with extremists. This poses a limitation to the viability of reconciliation with extremists but also the grounds for including deradicalization as an essential component and/or pre-requisite of reconciliation.

Overcoming Limitations

Extremists are incorrigibles, but this category of persons is not static. Envisioning disengagement and deradicalization as a component and form of reconciliation allows interventions to visualize the trajectory of extremists throughout long-term reconciliation processes, beginning with their categorization as incorrigibles through to their movement into what are referred to by Burgess as reluctant persuadables. As members of the latter category, the potential for constructive change, reintegration, and relationship building is opened. An emphasis on individual and group deradicalization through cultural/attitudinal change and social consensus can represent a means to overcome the barriers to reconciliation in extremist conflicts.[14] Reconcilers can approach P/CVE with reconciliation in mind, priming extremists for entry into the process and wider society. When relevant, deradicalization should be made a component of the wider reconciliation process which carries on despite progress in deradicalization but is nevertheless connected to it and empowered by its successes.

It is just as necessary for reconcilers to expand their imagination on ways to influence extremism as a social force within and beyond their communities without the inclusion of extremists within the process. There are powerful options available to reconcilers to diminish their influence and capacity to harm the reconciliation process. Reconciliation processes can be designed to affect the socio-political climate from which extremists emerge in a number of ways. They can reduce the number and influence of extremists as well as the appeal of their narratives. This can be done through public policy change and constructive change within the social ecosystems vulnerable to extremism by directly engaging with people within them. Change in the society itself through reconciliation can also affect the influence of extremism organically. Extremism is as much a product of conflict as it can be a cause. Long-term reconciliation, through its effect on conflict dynamics should lead to organic deradicalization as an outgrowth of reconciliation itself. The reconcilers’ job is to use this dynamic to empower reconciliation and deradicalization to make them compatible and sustainable, so the emerging environment remains unconducive to conflict resurgence and radicalization. Making these two processes compatible is key to creating constructive feedback loops where reconciliation feeds into constructive change in extremist spaces which in turn feeds back into the reconciliation process, empowering its capacity for constructive change. This is key to improving perceptions of outgroups, relationships, and the social ecosystem in which reconciliation occurs, helping make reconciliation sustainable and to provide exit paths from cycles of radicalization and conflict.

Priming Extremists for Reconciliation

Emerging from the same transformational platform as the reconciliation process and under the same vision, extremists can be primed for reconciliation and reintegration. This is primarily about deradicalization. To prime extremists for reconciliation, they must undergo a fundamental transformation in their identity. The social dimension of reconciliation facilitates this through its effect on the wider socio-political climate, as does public policy changes, but active deradicalization can be a means to involve extremists in reconciliation to empower both processes and pave a sustainable path towards reintegration. As mentioned previously, coercion is a predominant means of engagement with incorrigibles, but those categories of persons are fluid. Deradicalization from extremism can be seen as a process to prime extremists for reconciliation by moving them from the incorrigibles category to the reluctant persuadable category. It should also be envisioned as an integral part of the wider reconciliation process for conflicts moderately or heavily influenced by extremists. Reconciliation also offers the potential to marginalize extremism socially, weakening its influence and the power of social consensus to radicalize individuals. Putting deradicalization within the framework of reconciliation is not about rethinking the content of either process but about empowering each process through their mutually reinforcing relationship rooted in a transformational process structure.

Some reconciliation processes may collapse under the weight and complications of extremist reintegration. That is why it needs to be envisioned as part of the reconciliation process itself and the future the reconcilers aim to work toward. It is an inevitability and necessity to prioritize repatriation and reintegration of extremists. Without the repatriation and reintegration of Salafi-Jihadist foreign fighters for instance, their capacity to incite and prolong transnational violence and conflict will persist.[15] This will not be possible without reconciliation processes sensitive to extremism as a social phenomenon and without priming them for reconciliation.

Transforming the Socio-Political Climate

Both reconciliation and extremism are social phenomenon. The social ecosystems behind reconciliation and extremism in conflict are therefore central to the study of both as individual concepts and in respect to their relationship within a conflict. The change processes that link the inquiries of conflict transformation and orient the reconciliation process should be sensitive to the logic of extremism to empower simultaneous efforts at reconciliation and P/CVE. Burgess compares conflict to a “breaking wave” where interventions “have to deal with all stages simultaneously” in the interest of forging exit paths from cycles of conflict.⁶ Transforming societies stricken by extremist conflict requires this type of approach where reconciliation and P/CVE are envisioned as simultaneous interventions with one informing the other. P/CVE sensitive reconciliation can better marginalize extremism from mainstream politics and undermine the strength of their appeal and the feelings of angst, existential threat, and alienation among radicalized individuals and groups.  This will help the sustainability of the reconciliation process by promoting long-term attitudinal change. The potential for self-perpetuating deradicalization alongside small levels of attitudinal change emerges from the role of social consensus in perpetuating extremist beliefs. Social consensus largely affects the appeal and staying power of extremist beliefs.¹⁴ Change in the socio-political climate of this kind should lay the conditions for diminishing the number of extremists and their social influence, which should be a priority of reconciliation within extremist conflicts.

Placing all the blame for conflict on extremists during the reconciliation process will not facilitate the type of long-term constructive change needed to tackle extremism as a social phenomenon. The understanding of extremism as a social phenomenon should be what guides the reconciliation processes approach to extremism.  That is why it is essential that reconciliation processes are sensitive to extremism even without directly reconciling with the extremists themselves. Confronting extremism solely with force or by separating it from the process of reconciliation risks prolonging violent conflict and leaving underlying causes unaddressed. Only by imagining reconciliation and P/CVE through the same transformative vision can whole of society reconciliation take place within extremist conflicts and only then will constructive change be sustainable.

Bibliography

[1] Berger, J.M. (2018) Extremism. MIT Press

[2] Hauss, Charles and Pentikäinen, Antti, (2021) What is Reconciliation. Beyond Intractability

[3] Lederach, John Paul. (2003) The Little Book of Conflict Transformation. Good Books

[4] Bosley, Chris,. (2020). Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reconciliation: A Peacebuilding Approach. United States Institute of Peace

[5] Burgess, Heidi. (2020) The Power Strategy Matrix. Beyond Intractability                                

[6] Burgess, Heidi and Burgess, Guy. (2021) Complexity-Oriented, Massively Parallel Reconciliation. Beyond Intractability

[7] Bayoumy, Yara, Browning, Noah, and Ghobari, Mohammed (2016) How Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger – and richer. Reuters

[8] Niarchos, Nicolas. (2018) How the U.S. Is Making the War in Yemen Worse. The New Yorker

[9] Cok, Corrado. (2021) Biden’s Policy Shift on Yemen Rings Alarm Bells in Riyadh. Fair Observer

[10] al-Jumaily, Mohammed and Ray, Edward. (2020) Eroding Transparency US counterterrorism actions in Yemen under President Donald Trump. Airwars

[11] Palik, Julia and Rustad, Siri Aas. (2019) Mediation in the Yemeni Civil War: Actors, outcomes, and lessons learned. Peace Research Institute Oslo

[12] Korostelina, Karina (2007) Identity, Morality, and Threat: Studies in Violent Conflict. Lexington books

[13] Lederach, John Paul. (2010) The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace Paperback. Oxford University Press

[14] Hamid, Nafees., Et. al (2019). Neuroimaging ‘will to fight’ for sacred values: an empirical case study with supporters of an Al Qaeda associate. The Royal Society

[15] Paul, Amanda, Ian Acheson,. (2020) Marching home? Why repatriating foreign terrorist fighters is a pan-European priority. European Policy Center