TRACK ONE–TRACK TWO COOPERATION

A Symposium at the United States Institute of Peace
November 24, 2003

Organizers:
Alliance for Conflict Transformation
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution
United States Institute of Peace

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INTRODUCTION

For many years, the field of international conflict management seemed largely synonymous with official "Track One" diplomacy. In the past few decades, however, the number of unofficial, "Track Two" professionals explicitly working to prevent and resolve complex conflicts has grown dramatically, raising important issues about the relationships between the tracks. Both Track One and Track Two professionals increasingly recognize the importance of effective communication, cooperation, and coordination among official and unofficial actors working to resolve complex conflicts and to build sustainable peace and security.

To address this important issue, four organizations active in conflict management—the Alliance for Conflict Transformation (ACT), the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution (AICPR)—convened a Symposium on Track One–Track Two Cooperation at the U.S. Institute of Peace on November 24, 2003.

The symposium was an invitation-only event, attended by senior leaders from the Departments of State and Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, Foreign Service Institute, National Defense University, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, U.S. Institute of Peace, Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution (AICPR), leading NGOs, including many members of AICPR, the media, and universities with programs specializing in international conflict prevention and resolution. Under-secretary of State Paula Dobriansky gave the keynote address, introduced by USIP President Richard Solomon, and Swedish Ambassador to the United States Jan Eliasson gave the luncheon address, introduced by USIP Chairman of the Board Chester Crocker. ACT Director Susan Allen Nan and FMCS Commissioner Andrea Strimling gave opening and closing remarks on behalf of the Symposium Planning Team. With attendance exceeding 90 people, the day provided official and unofficial conflict management professionals an opportunity to discuss what has worked, what has not worked, and how the two tracks can cooperate more effectively in the future.

In addition to plenary panel presentations and discussions, the symposium included afternoon working group sessions on Afghanistan, Sudan, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Speakers and moderators, in order of the agenda, included: Ms. Pamela Aall, USIP; Ambassador Robert Frowick; Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Andrea Bartoli, Center for International Conflict Resolution, Columbia University; Ambassador Harold Saunders, Institute for Sustained Dialogue; Dr. Paula Green, Karuna Center for Peacebuilding; Dr. Antonia Chayes, Tufts University; Mr. S. Tjip Walker, U.S. Agency for International Development; Dr. Paula Gutlove, Institute for Resource and Security Studies; Dr. Joyce Neu, Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice; Dr. Donna Hicks, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Mr. William Stuebner, Alliance; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Collins; Dr. Aaron Miller, Seeds of Peace; Ambassador Michael Rannenberger, U.S. Department of State; Dr. Charles Lawson, U.S. Department of State; Ambassador John McDonald, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy; and Dr. Joseph

Montville, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The feedback was excellent. Throughout the day, speakers and participants emphasized the importance of Track One–Track Two cooperation for the U.S. government and the conflict resolution field and congratulated the sponsoring organizations for the program. In his formal remarks at the end of the day, former Ambassador John McDonald called the symposium an historic event. Many participants cited the working sessions as highlights of the day. Many also said that one day was too short a time to address these issues and recommended a number of follow-up initiatives, some of which the sponsoring organizations will work to develop in the future.

The Symposium was made possible by programmatic, financial, and in-kind support from the Catalyst Fund, through Peace Discovery Initiatives; the Compton Foundation; the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation; the Intractable Conflicts Knowledge Base Project; the Alliance for Conflict Transformation; the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution; the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service; and the U.S. Institute of Peace. Proceedings are being posted by the Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base Project at www.beyondintractability.org.

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OPENING REMARKS

----------Speakers:
Richard Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace
Pamela Aall, Director, Education Program, United States Institute of Peace

Solomon wished the participants good morning and stated his appreciation for everyone's attendance.

Aall rose and thanked everyone for being at the symposium early in the morning on Thanksgiving week. She then discussed how Richard Solomon has built an institution out of the United States Institute of Peace, and how USIP really is a demonstration of collaboration between Track One and Track Two.

Dr. Solomon: Thank you, Pamela. As we all know, this morning's effort is focused on the issue of Track One–Track Two collaboration, and improving collaboration between government agencies and private sector groups in managing conflict situations. A decade ago, concepts of international relations were that nation-states were undifferentiated entities, and the notion that the private sector could contribute didn't come into people's minds. It's really only been since the 1990s, the end of Cold War, that there's been a notion that Track Two can play a role. Before that, Track Two was seen as marginal. That world has totally changed, and Track Two involvement in conflict affairs is a manifestation of that.

Our work today is based on the collaboration of three organizations that I'd like to introduce.

Solomon then introduced the Alliance for Conflict Transformation (ACT) and Susan Allen Nan, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and Andrea Strimling, and the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution (AICPR) and Bill Stuebner.

Dr. Solomon: What we're trying to do here is figure out better ways to strengthen interaction between NGOs and the private sector and government practitioners. This is something that represents the transformation in the ways in which individuals are involved in public affairs. Unless you can build public support, you can't take government agreements very far. But in the landmine agreement, there is public involvement on a scale that government is not behind, so now things are happening because of the public. Again, a decade ago, this wasn't a part of international affairs.

Solomon recognized Andrea Bartoli, saying that the day's events are cutting-edge activity, and the organizers were pleased that Dr. Bartoli could attend.

Solomon then introduced Under Secretary Dobriansky.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

----------Speaker:
Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary, Global Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Under Secretary Dobriansky: Good morning and thank you. I'm delighted to be here. I really appreciate the opportunity to speak about cooperation between public and private sectors. Private–public partnerships are an increasingly common tool we use to increase our goals. Private groups can fulfill tasks that government can't. We seek to capitalize on them to advance our partnerships. There are thousands of groups—too numerous to recount—but I will share some examples. Even though your focus is on peacekeeping, what public–private partnerships exist, even during peace time, matter as they inform activities during peace and conflict.

When I was head of World Conference, we agreed that, to be sustainable, development must address economic issues, environmental issues, and social development. Also, resources must come from all sectors of society. We must work together in partnership to meet our development goals. Public–private partnerships are the bedrock of our development strategies.

Dobriansky then gave a number of examples of public projects that are being supported by private groups. In Guatemala, a Centers for Disease Control project proved that in-home treatment of water can reduce cases of diarrhea by 40%; it was supported by Proctor and Gamble. Now the U.S. State Department has partnered with Johns Hopkins University, Proctor and Gamble, and other nongovernmental organizations to determine how to purify more water in the home. Other examples were given.

Under Secretary Dobriansky: But there are also public–private partnerships in regions that have been through conflict, like Afghanistan. Presidents Bush and Karzai envisioned a strong partnership with the United States. An example of this is the Afghan Women's Council . . . the Council has mobilized public support to assist Afghan women in partnership with women's resource centers across the country. Time-Warner has donated $60,000 to support these women's resource centers, which will be established in about 32 provinces. Women use the centers to meet, learn to read, and learn to use computers. They help remedy the educational gap between women and men, among many other things.

Dobriansky gave other examples of similar partnerships, in Barcelona, and where Daimler/Chrysler is supporting microfinance.

Under Secretary Dobriansky: The possibilities for public–private partnerships are limitless. Secretary of State Colin Powell said economic growth is the best way to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom across the globe. But there is a precondition: the need for rule of law and the creation of an environment where corruption is discouraged. The United States led the

world by enacting the foreign corrupt practices act. Other countries have followed suit, and we encourage others to do the same.

In addition to penalizing corruption, governments can work with private groups to highlight good corporate citizenship. The United States does this by making awards for corporate excellence. Most companies also partner with local governments in developing local activities. Chevron/Texaco won the award this year for poverty alleviation in the Niger Delta. U.S. Steel Corporation received the same award for the Slovak Republic.

Other awards were discussed, including in Guatemala, which receives health support from Merck.

Under Secretary Dobriansky: By rewarding good business and penalizing others, a good climate is created for employment and wealth—the best environment for sustainable development.

Public–private partnerships have the potential to harness the best of both sectors: they are truly a tool for achieving the State Department's foreign aid goals. I can't think of an issue that affects my area more than this one. All issues are transnational, and none are without NGO support.

Dobriansky congratulated the conveners and thanked them for organizing this timely gathering.

Solomon thanked Undersecretary Dobriansky and introduced Commissioner Andrea Strimling.

BACKGROUND TO SYMPOSIUM

----------Speaker:
Andrea Strimling, Commissioner, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services

Strimling welcomed everyone to the program. She thanked Richard Solomon and Under Secretary Dobriansky, noting it is good to have someone in a high position in government who cares about these issues. She thanked people within the four groups that made the program possible: the United States Institute of Peace, the Alliance for Conflict Transformation, the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution, and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Strimling also thanked funders of this initiative, including the Catalyst Fund, the Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base, and The Compton Foundation.

Commissioner Strimling: This program builds on a related program one year ago at the State Department's Open Forum. U.S. Under Secretary Marc Grossman opened that program, and he said, "This issue matters to my department, and this work is important to the country. We can change lives and change the way our country practices diplomacy in the 21st century." Today's event takes up that challenge, and hopefully will take the relationship between public–private partnerships a step further.

We all know it's challenging. This day is to look at not just the *why,* but also the *how*. If we can find ways to improve cooperation, we can dramatically increase the long term benefits of our work. And it's got to be effective cooperation. We know close interaction in

conflict situations may sometimes be inappropriate or irresponsible—so we are talking about *effective* cooperation when it serves the goals of better peace and security.

The diversity of groups represented here showcases our efforts. We have in attendance federal groups, nongovernmental groups, scholars, for-profit companies, and the media.

I'd like to highlight two networks here today that were created to advance public–private partnerships: Interaction, and the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution. The latter was created to support this type of activity specifically, and representatives from a number of Alliance member organizations are here today.

This is a large group. We hoped to have a more intimate discussion, but the response to our invitation has been tremendous. That created a slight challenge for the space and for having an intimate discussion, but it was a wonderful endorsement of how important this topic is.

I also want to acknowledge those who are absent today: the people whose lives we are trying to improve by managing conflict, and our many local partners. In the future, we would hope to engage more local partners and potential local partners in this discussion.

We also acknowledge the support of those who have been working for decades to support public–private partnerships, or Track One–Track Two cooperation. I will highlight here just three, though there are many more: Joseph Montville, who coined the terms "Track One" and "Track Two"; and Louise Diamond and John McDonald, who presented a model of multi-track diplomacy.

Strimling then mentioned the "coordination bibliography," compiled by ACT intern Rebecca Roehrich, which is a partial list of everything written on this topic. She asked that participants bring to her attention any pieces written on this topic and not included in the bibliography.

Commissioner Strimling: For today: I propose this as an opportunity to engage in a different type of dialogue, to build relationships and understanding to know when, with whom, and how to cooperate. We need to recognize that we all use different language. Often we use terms without explaining. "Track Two" is often used to refer to interveners, but sometimes refers to parties, sometimes to process. We need to be specific. Today should help explain our terms. We also need to be explicit about underlying assumptions. Every model has strengths and limitations. "Track One–Track Two" implies two parallel tracks that never meet: this is not and should never be the case. We would like to encourage a spirit of challenging assumptions.

Finally, I believe it's as important to ask wise questions as it is to answer. So today, we need to craft creative and challenging questions about how to work together.

Strimling then introduced Susan Allen Nan.

SYMPOSIUM FRAMEWORK

----------Speaker:
Susan Allen Nan, Director, Alliance for Conflict Transformation

Dr. Nan thanked everyone for participating and expressed her pleasure at being part of this gathering.

Dr. Nan: Often people assume that we should do Track One–Track Two better. But today, we are open to challenges to that assumption. There can be several approaches to working together across the official/unofficial divide.

Thanks were then given to people and groups: USIP for supporting Dr. Nan's dissertation research on these issues, Christopher Mitchell for supervising Dr. Nan's dissertation at George Mason University, Ronald Fisher, Lorelei Keashley, Paula Garb, Louis Kriesberg, Cynthia Chataway, Herb Kelman, Robert Ricigliano, many of the speakers today, and others who address conflicts or publish works related to official/unofficial work.

Dr. Nan: Many of these people enriched the planning of this event, and many of the speakers have relevant background. In preparation for this event, interviews were done with official and unofficial people. These meetings shed light on how we can do better and why we want to do so, and they also confirmed some of our expectations.

We learned that there is little consensus on how to do better, or about who is the 'we'—but there *is* agreement that we should do better. At the same time, a range of potential cooperative actions come up in response to questions. We would like to find a little more consensus today.

With the "how," we found there are so many models that not one stands out . . . but one may be more relevant. There are questions regarding what works best in field vs. what works best in headquarters. With the "we," we found there are many views regarding what strengths are brought to conflict prevention and resolution by different groups.

But, in general, we found there are four main ways of cooperation: communication, coordination, cooperation, collaboration. There were also some discussions of more integrated approaches.

With the "how" to do better, people were really energized by being able to reflect. The themes that arose related to how we do what we do—its efficiency, appropriateness, and effectiveness; that the whole is larger than the sum; that there is need for trust and professionalism; and that we must do no harm. There was a lot of confidence that we can do better. There is great willingness here, too.

But why? There is shared acknowledgement that Track One and Track Two each have strengths to bring to the table, but there is not widespread consensus about what those strengths are. So that's an area where we need open communication with each other.

Nan then said she had some working hypotheses of how to do better at coordination in general, and she chose the three most important for Track One–Track Two coordination specifically. They are that cooperation requires:

- trust, long term relationships, personal relationships;
- careful selection of appropriate forms of information sharing, resource sharing, and synchronizing; and
- clearly defined, separate roles that are understood and agreed to by each collaborator. This last is a difficult, key issue.

Dr. Nan: We hope to develop today a clear consensus on these issues. We are trying to safeguard discussions, so we hope you will all be active participants in this forum. We hope to stimulate productive ideas for follow-up. Finally, logistically—please fill out our feedback form and check your contact information on the form on the literature table at the back of the room.

Nan then introduced the upcoming panels and sessions, and briefly summarized the rest of the day.

LOOKING BACK ON EXPERIENCE

----------Moderator:
Pamela Aall, Director, Education Program, United States Institute of Peace

----------Panelists:
Ambassador Robert Frowick, Former Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office
Ambassador Teresita Shaffer, Director, South Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Andrea Bartoli, Director, Center for International Conflict Resolution, Columbia University

Ms. Aall: Welcome to the first panel for today's program on Track One–Track Two cooperation . . . looking back on the past to get some lessons from these experiences.

We often lose people when saying "Track One" and "Track Two." These terms mean nothing to people not familiar with them . . . we might talk about how to define these terms.

There's a lot of history of non-cooperation and mutual avoidance by the tracks. There was little opportunity for Track Two to be active in the area, to respond to conflict, and if there were, they were minimal. Since the end of Cold War, the two tracks have been built up enormously. Sometimes they run parallel, and sometimes they run into each other. We need to work on making them work together. We do have a lot to learn from the last 15 years.

Aall then introduced the panelists and outlined their backgrounds.

Ms. Aall: We're looking forward to looking back and learning from the lessons of the last 15 years.

Ambassador Frowick: Thank you to everyone who's put this together. In my experience, this area needs a lot of work.

Frowick noted the USIP sign and its mention of conflict management, resolution, and prevention.

Ambassador Frowick: Of the three experiences I've had in Macedonia, my organization has had experience in all three of those aspects. The first assignment in 1960 was in Romania, and something keeps bringing me back to Balkans. In 1992 there was a suggestion to do preventive work in Macedonia. September 1992. The first thing we did was create a little coordinating group and try to establish delegations of labor and be effective as a small team in Skopje. It was only 11 officers, with a small budget, minimal NGO's, four used cars. We were told to make it high profile . . . to take rented cars to visit officials, make media appearances, take teams and make our presence known. In the fall of 1992 we had difficulty in getting beyond the name Macedonia. We met a couple of crises effectively—riots in Skopje, the Kosovo border incident, relations between Macedonians and Albanians. It was a vulnerable country . . . the Greeks had closed the border. Militarily it only had a few thousand people trained for partisan warfare; it was not recognized internationally. The coordinated effort was helpful to give Macedonia time to survive and get up on its feet.

My second time, John Marks, the president of Search for Common Ground, asked me to go back and set up a conflict intervention program. I met some of the people here . . . the "track stars." We worked together in this Search project. Marks had a vision of a practical NGO . . . to invigorate those ethnic relations centers established. In that instance, I was Track Two looking inward. We had rather a good relationship with local Western embassies that were beginning to come on board at that time. The diplomatic presence was slow to develop in that time. We achieved what Marks proposed.

Frowick referred to his third effort in the Balkans, attempting to bring ethnic Albanians and Macedonians together.

Ambassador Frowick: In 2001 it spilled over. Ethnic Albanians were joining an insurrection against the Macedonians. There were three approaches to dealing with the fighting and turning it to a political solution. One was the creation of a steering group of two main Macedonian and Albanian groups. Then when some of them wanted to move forward from a steering group to a political government, the idea was not supported by the European Union and the U.S. ambassador, but it went through. Three, we established a way to allow Albanians to have their needs met. We thought we made a breakthrough, but political leadership rejected it vehemently, saying they were terrorists and had to be taken over militarily. We told Albanians not to sign a treaty—but they did and it inflamed the situation, and I left. My advice: Do what you think is right, pull it together, and let the chips fall where they may.

Ambassador Schaffer: The two conflicts I know best are in South Asia, but they are both cases in which there is no Track One–Track Two cooperation. I can give you an idea of how each works and what gets left out. Let me define the terms as I use them and start with a plea that you remember that each conflict is unique. I use the terms Track One to mean

government, normal conventional government-to-government or back channel. Track Two is nonofficial, with at least two flavors. 2a is a laboratory for governments, meetings to decide what they'd like to see work and then go back to try to influence their governments. 2b is people-to-people oriented, changing the ideas of the people and hoping it will spread regardless of the government.

Sri Lanka is a stubborn conflict. There is no effective Track Two of the 2a variety and much too little 2b (changing people's ideas in the political variety). In 1995 and 2001, there was a brave beginning with an attention-grabbing event. In 1995, there was a president who ran on a peace platform, in spite of her advisors, and began negotiations. In 2001, LTTE[1] declared a cease fire.

The problems: In 1995, LTTE was not really committed to the process . . . it was trying it on for size. The government was amateurish and too much in a hurry to get to writing a constitution and ineffective in persuading the LTTE to discuss these issues. Now, the government has made efforts to learn from mistakes, and LTTE was affected by having lost many in military interventions. Skilled mediators from Norway tried to put more pressure on negotiators, but the government did not start by putting a proposal on the table . . . this was wise because there is a divided government. The president and prime minister represent different groups of people that hate each other. They haven't worked out recent developments . . . there is a power move by current president. Divided government is the key issue on the government side. On the LTTE side, the killer problem is that they have goals that politicians don't want. LTTE, not seeing enough progress to suit them, has knocked those proposals off . . . they have a separatist's vision of the future. Not much Track Two; former official style and too little people to people. There is nothing to coordinate.

In Kashmir, there was a lot of 2a Track Two and not much 2b. There was not much Track One except for a back channel effort in the late 1990s. Indians, Pakistanis, and Kashmiris all define the problem differently. In Track Two, there were meetings by former officials…large groups of former officials, under their auspices or different ones . . . they are intelligent and judicious and develop splendid reports on the various issues but what they have not done is influence their governments' policies. This Track Two has had an impact on the participants, but very little beyond that. There have been few efforts on people-to-people efforts, but they have not impacted much beyond that either.

Schaffer noted John McDonald's efforts as a positive move in this area.

Ambassador Schaffer: There was a series of exchange visits by Pakistani parties, doing the typical politician thing of kissing babies…it got great coverage, but it was not helpful. It was so minor as not to be consequential. Everyone finds the current situation undesirable, but no one finds it awful enough to change government. The peace constituency has dwindled and been silenced.

In closing, let me make one final comment: we might work not so much in defining what strengths each brings to the tables, but in defining what jobs each can do. There are some jobs only one can do, and some that overlap. Thank you.

[1] *Ed.*: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Dr. Bartoli: Well, I have a Power Point presentation with 54 slides but only eight minutes to speak . . . that's not going to work. I'm very happy to talk about this. Happy to hear ideas about how to do it better. But we also need to be careful to think that collaboration is necessarily good and especially in a world with a very demanding pace. . . I need to be quick and move on.

Why should we engage in Track One–Track Two cooperation? There are many Track One–Track Two initiatives going on in Mozambique. Effectiveness cannot only be through U.S. foreign policy being implemented through Track Two, but Track One needs to be more responsive to the needs of the world and develop. Both need to learn from the other.

If a relationship is based on irrelevance, disrespect…dependence can become a humble, painful, begging situation. Both should strive for what is relevant and what is right. Collaboration should be started from that goal, and then it will follow naturally.

Bartoli commented on how the world, and particularly the United Nations, is growing, and that there is a responsibility to bring about the world we want in the future.

Dr. Bartoli: Mozambique is a case of a country left on its own that created something on its own. It focused on results, and it achieved success . . . Out of this desperation comes this idea that in order to solve their conflict in the middle of Cold War, what they could do was ask an Italian NGO to mediate so they could have a country supported by the United Nations and recognized involved. It was in the interest of the United States to have a process that was moving forward without having the U.S. involved. The interests of the United States are served better by having Track Two efforts involved. We could do certain things that were otherwise impossible.

It needs to be a collective effort to build a world in which it is safe to live, worthy to live. The multi-dimensional effort should be shared by both.

Bartoli then gave some examples of civil society participation in conflict prevention.

Dr. Bartoli: We are making the world as it should be. As we were doing Mozambique in 1975, 1978, long before the agreement, so we are doing prevention in a way that we can not foresee.

The panelists then accepted questions.

Question (Paula Gutlove, Institute for Research and Security Studies): I have a question and a comment to Ambassador Frowick. Bob has been the embodiment of Track One–Track Two cooperation, walking with clarity and communication. I want to share a quick story on how he's done that for me and close with a comment and question.

Gutlove spoke about past experiences with Ambassador Frowick vis-à-vis Track One–Track Two.

Question, cont.: . . . .There are clear boundaries between the tracks, and being clear about these boundaries and goals is very important. The key is building trust between the two groups

so this could be ongoing. So my question is this: how do you define those boundaries in such a way that you can walk in them successfully without losing clarity about who you are in different contexts?

Ambassador Frowick: There are so many sophisticated definitions of Track One–Track Two. As a simple Midwesterner, Track One involves official diplomacy; Track Two is the NGO world. How do you set out, then, with clear boundaries . . . First establish the goals, establish strategies for meeting the goals, will and determination to work through the goals, never give up until you get there. Though the goals may be the same, the strategies and tactics may be different. International teamwork is essential for success . . . it's not too hard to sit down and hammer out goals.

Ambassador Schaffer: Certain jobs have to be done by officials, and other jobs are easier done by non-officials. When you're getting down to discussing strategies and tactics, there is an area where you could have a strategy in common . . . when it is possible, it makes the roles clear, when it's not, just roll with it.

Dr. Bartoli made some comments about past experiences.

Dr. Bartoli: You've got to recognize who you are and who's funding you and who you represent in the moment honestly and openly.

Ambassador Frowick: I also think that OSCE is a special case . . . it is a kind of UN for Europe. It includes all countries of Europe, the United States, Canada—and it includes NGOs. I believe that as we enter the Balkans, we'll have a major problem at the end of the interim period in Kosovo, and it's incumbent that we think about what we want to do. We better have our ducks in order by the time we get to that point. They look to be going to have a referendum for independence. The United States must take decisive decisions in close concert with our allies. Decisions made will have an impact on surrounding areas, but not much thought is being given to this area. The model of Bosnia, with a steering group, should be used as a model for others . . . let Track One–Track Two people get involved.

Question (Rob Ricigliano, Peace Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee): I was interested in the panel's reflection on Track 1½: the back channel dialogues with officials, but convened from the Track Two side. I'm interested in your thoughts on what makes the difference between when it works well and when it doesn't. I'd also like to hear any thoughts you have on when Track Two actors can play a useful role in Track One dialogues and link them back.

Ambassador Schaffer: When officials are looking for an excuse to have a dialogue but when they are tied up in protocol.

Question, continued: But the Track One–Track Two link? What makes them work or not work?

Dr. Bartoli: It's wrong to say that Track Two is getting in the way. Track One gets in the way. Take the example of Cambodia. The dynamics within Track One is very powerful. The idea that government is unified is quite wrong. There is significant dynamic within the government. Track Two can be a servant of a government that doesn't know how to

engage, a faithful keeper of the peace through the ups and downs of Track One not being able to keep the process going. Track Two keeps the process going even when Track One doesn't.

Ambassador Schaffer: Exception to the idea that Track One is in the way. There are key issues in international conflict that the government has to resolve . . . not always well, but they have to.

Dr. Bartoli: Getting in the way is not Track One but within Track One. Look at the problems between the Department of State and Department of Defense, between the United States and France, etc.

Ambassador Frowick: There needs to be an international body that is respected that serves as the unifier and venue for efforts. It worked best when we had a small group of us, then over the years more NGOs showed up, and embassies came over and never pulled together per se as a Track One–Track Two effort . . . The OSCE has the most broadly based coordinating effort. Kosovo is a different case, the UN special representative . . . it took us a while to get it right, but eventually we pulled it together. That's a good example of something that worked.

Question (Shamil Idriss, Search for Common Ground): I have two comments and one question. No one has commented on the benefits of Track Two engagements. Track One cannot engage with certain groups because of the danger of giving combatants legitimacy, but Track Two can in many cases. Another case is the difference between Mozambique, where the international community abandoned it . . . we're not seeking cooperation for cooperation's sake. There is a need for clarity on our roles. I'm interested in how it worked—is there a way that that could have been done better? Would more interaction with embassies have been better? That has to happen and has to happen regularly. Can you talk about places where it has happened well and where it hasn't?

Ambassador Schaffer: I'd like to respond to your comment about unofficials being able to more readily meet with rebel groups without legitimizing. That's true, but it can be a problem. I'll give the example of when a group met with LTTE, and the LTTE responded, "We don't want your small unofficial dialogues, we are just as official as the government and we want them to understand that."

Dr. Bartoli: Intervention is political. We can't escape politics and the accountability of politics.

Ambassador Frowick: I recall how everything failed to work in 2001, when coalition government was agreed in Macedonia. We had a caucus with the European Union and the United States, and they asked me to go and talk with the Albanians because I knew them. I had a balanced connection with the Macedonian and Albanian sides, so I agreed that I'd take the lead. I persuaded them to join . . . I had a mandate to deliver it . . . I thought it was a breakthrough and gave it to the President. But he was surrounded by hawkish people and went from there to brief EU ambassadors and U.S. ambassadors. When the peace offer was given, I said it all looked good except for one point: you say there needs to be a joint statement by Macedonian and Albanian leadership—I said it's not acceptable. It was so volatile that everything blew up when they signed. I was isolated because the political

leadership had rejected it, and the president didn't have power to hold it back. The EU issued a statement condemning that and aligning themselves with the militant Macedonian side, and the United States aligned with the EU. I left. I had kept people fully informed..., but that was a failure within Track One.

Question (Chris Mitchell, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution): I have a question for everyone and not just for panel. I think there's another problem that we, Track Two, have to deal with, and that is cooperation between Track Two. This was brought home to me when Dr. Bartoli said he was working in Columbia . . . good luck. It took us a long time to figure out who is doing what, and we still don't know all of them. We've put together an electronic list. It's not Track One–Track Two cooperation only; it's also Track Two cooperation. How do we best achieve this? How does Track Two avoid being co-opted?

LOOKING FORWARD TO POSSIBILITIES

----------Moderator:
Harold Saunders, Director of International Affairs, Kettering Foundation; Chairman and President, International Institute of Sustained Dialogue

----------Panelists:
Paula Green, Director, Karuna Center for Peacebuilding
Antonia Chayes, Senior Advisor and Vice Chair, Conflict Management Group
Tjip Walker, Senior Advisor, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID

Strimling introduced the moderator, Ambassador Hal Saunders.

Ambassador Saunders: Thank you very much. Warm words are always welcome. I'm privileged to share the panel with these distinguished individuals. I will allow them time to speak but may comment later if necessary.

Saunders introduced the panelists, outlining their backgrounds.

Paula Green opened the panel. She said she is working in a world focused on Track 2b; she focused her remarks on the conflict in Sri Lanka with examples from other regions. One lesson from current events in Sri Lanka is that Track Two has done little to influence Track One processes.

Dr. Green: In Kosovo, Track One decisions are imposed momentarily to halt violence. Participants are not engaged as stakeholders in the conflict, and military interventions are carried out more readily than nonviolent ones.

The issues of power and information flows are real problems. It is naïve to assume a common direction where there are divergent approaches—but this presents an opportunity to improve communication. The goal of the USIP program is to mentor highly skilled actors from Sri Lanka in order to build joint initiatives with NGO staff and educators with experience in peace building. This process involves consultation and evaluation, and the question is how might Track One association help this process? Track

One actors can utilize their connections to disseminate ideas to a broader audience—which is necessary at the individual and social level. This is particularly important as a Track One role because social education is too unwieldy for Track Two actors to manage. According to a recent survey from Sri Lanka, local political and religious leaders are the most trusted and hence, working with these actors could contain violence and prevent escalation, particularly because Track Two cannot provide the necessary resources. As the peace processes in Oslo and North Ireland illustrate, substantial will and resources are necessary.

On the contributions of Track One to Track Two, Green said that Track One can and should provide logistical aid—for security, visa assistance (particularly for participants in Track Two processes), and, most importantly, support for follow-up due to the insufficiency of short-term projects. Additionally, partnerships with Track One can reduce overall constraints on Track Two. Green gave an example: in Dharamsala, the Tibetan Centre for Conflict Resolution met with representatives of the Tibetans in exile and, in turn, increased the reach of the Tibetan NGO in order to possibly influence policy.

Dr. Green: Track One can help mold the program in the visioning stage. They can provide access to information, access to otherwise closed areas, and access to official government representatives. The result is stronger, more relevant programs and increased likelihood of follow-through.

Green ended with an image from Bosnia, speaking about the flawed efforts to rebuild the Ottoman bridge in Mostar while society is still frayed.

Dr. Green: What is needed is an invigorated Track One process in addition to Track Two processes, in order to build human bridges that complement the stones.

Dr. Chayes: Ambassador Schaffer was explicit about the assumption that neither Track One nor Track Two has succeeded in bringing peace or sustaining peace. This failure is grounded first in unrealistic expectations, including unrealistic timeframes that are frequently too short as funders, government actors, and NGOs move on. The danger is that expectations are unrelated to on-the-ground reality.

Secondly, their efforts are unconnected to real political processes between states—thereby causing conflict perpetuation where cooperation between tracks is most important.

Chayes also echoed the dichotomy within Track Two highlighted by Ambassador Shaffer as both Track 2a and Track 2b, assuming a trickle up effect, and that efforts will spread outward to society. However, Chayes said that neither is factual, so cooperation is necessary because coordination will not happen automatically.

The challenge is how to make expectations more realistic, lengthen the timeline, and make connections work. Chayes offered two approaches to addressing these challenges:

- She repeated a very important mention by Dr. Bartoli—that "we haven't looked at all the models." We should "elevate the sights a little lower"—don't look at securing peace but rather think about achieving "islands of agreement."

- Also we should recognize that intractability—that the issue isn't just a failure of approach but rather the goals that are set. The "islands of agreement" are efforts that may not address the core of the conflict but instead address the spheres outside the basic rivalry, and so may be of value as an end within themselves. Examples include water agreements around Kashmir and many arms agreements between Russia and the United States.

Finally, Chayes addressed how cooperation would take place if it does. In her self-professed cynical view, cooperation and coordination does not work without the development of a concrete process, or international inter-agency cooperation.

Dr. Chayes: Exhortations are never useful unless a process is put into place that forces cooperation.

Dr. Walker: The invitation to this event was addressed to USAID to address Track One in this discussion, but I believe that USAID is situated firmly between Track One and Two, in Track 1½.

Strides have been made in institutionalizing this process of coordination, revealing important concepts and important underlying realities, including important opportunities for the nonofficial community. However, there are complementary and inherent deficiencies in both—so we need to address deficiencies in one with the strengths of the other.

Walker believes efforts to bring Track One and Track Two together are Track 1 1/2. In many examinations of the two tracks, four areas of commonality emerge: means, money, method, and mandate.

Dr. Walker: The U.S. government has tended to lack obvious methods for sustaining Track Two efforts, but with the establishment of OTI and CMM, it's beginning to have the means for supporting Track Two efforts and to support longer term efforts. While clearly government resources fluctuate with priorities, there remain resources to provide support for efforts on an on-going basis in Uganda and Sudan, with money that wasn't otherwise available.

Most discussion thus far has focused on developing fertile ground for negotiations, but we need to enlarge the negotiation process, as most take place off-site—so there is the tendency to lose touch with those back at home. So we need to bring the mountain to Mohammed—we need to provide a sounding board for negotiations in Sierra Leone. We also need greater reporting from negotiations to back home and vice versa, as seen in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

We also need to acknowledge that not all peace agreements are created equal—some are better, some are worse. When there are deficiencies in the construction of a peace agreement, we need to bring in assistance on negotiation and technical assistance.

Walker gave some examples.

Dr. Walker: Once an agreement is signed, it must be legitimized—negotiators must bring it home for people to talk about it and get excited about the possibility for peace.

Walker cited the example of Burundi using both official and NGO representatives. He said that unless a peace agreement is able to identify tricky elements, it won't have long term effects.

Dr. Walker: Most are sanguine in the room about cooperation and coordination and how to create strategic approaches to proceed in partnership rather than on an ad hoc basis, but I see progress in this area within USAID, and the government is beginning to put money behind it as well.

Ambassador Saunders: The intellectual framework that means the most is the multi-level framework because there are some things only human beings outside government can do, such as modifying human behavior and attitudes.

Dr. Solomon: Currently, the "billiard ball approach" to international relations dominates, but we need to take another step. But all the comments this morning focused on institutions, and no one is thinking about the untapped resources of individuals outside government; this is the project for the 21st century. Another possible mechanism would be for every country director within USAID to create a group that is intergovernmental to meet every few weeks to devise a strategy for that country—strategies that are rooted in what is going on and connect with the multilevel peace process.

Saunders then opened the panel to questions.

Question (Sarah Terry, CSM): I'm a freelance photographer/journalist, and if official groups are Track One and unofficial groups are Track Two, the media must be Track 99.

Terry said she is interested in conflict resolution and the rising issue of aftermath. Despite the fact that relationships with mainstream media are restricted, she has a relationship with Catholic Relief Services in Bosnia. She was curious to know where the panelists see relationships emerging with this track (journalists).

Dr. Green: Well, we don't want you to be Track 99! Working with the media is critical. Search for Common Ground is best in this area. They have a program in peace media which tries to bring media into Track Two meetings. But nongovernmental actors usually find it difficult to access the media and difficult to get coverage for their work, which is very important because is helps them to reach the public.

Terry said she had thought about building a website for freelancers working in development and conflict, a suggestion which many in the audience and on the panel seemed to support.

Erik Kjonnerod of NDU's National Strategic Gaming Center asked about how to increase cooperation, bring partnerships together. When there are difficulties in the U.S. interagency process, and when does this get implemented with Track Two? Kjonnerod also mentioned problems of cooperation "too early and too late" in the process.

Dr. Green: The interagency process is a useful but incomplete type of planning horizon. NGOs should be brought in from the very beginning because frequently they are implementers

and could leaven the inter-agency process. And doing this internationally is even more incomplete.

The biggest lump is civil–military coordination, and while the military won't reveal its war plans, they are revealed in improvisation, which isn't very helpful. And war-making is not helpful; rather we need a model for state-building.

Question (Shamil Idriss, Search for Common Ground): I take issue with two points in Paula Green's comments: the importance of limiting expectation, and relying more on planning. It may be a semantic difference, but I believe that it is important to shoot for something larger, and when we go in with a broader view, we are able to connect with actors on the ground that also hold this vision.

Nongovernmental actors can be more deliberate, but the planning is usually too linear. You can force them to be deliberate, but plans will need to be revamped within five minutes since conflict environments are fluid.

Dr. Green: It is a good idea to have a long term vision, but unless we understand that it may be a generation until peace is achieved, then creating islands of agreement are only stepping stones, so we also need realistic timeframes. We need to focus on process, not plans—the process of rising to meet demands rather than the plan itself.

Another questioner shared a story from his experience. He worked with student leaders in Kosovo and Serbia, had a long-term project going. Then the UN started the official process, with no consultation, and suddenly asked why they hadn't heard about his project.

Dr. Green: Disconnections are everywhere. The communication gaps are enormous within Track Two and between Track Two and Track One—and these are unhealthy.

Dr. Chayes: Lots of others have recognized the importance of the media and you can see that in the USIP website—getting messages out about the important role of media in all of this work.

LUNCH ADDRESS BY JAN ELIASSON

----------Moderator:
Chester Crocker, Chair, Board of Directors, USIP

----------Speaker:
Jan Eliasson, Swedish Ambassador to the United States

Pamela Aall introduced Chester (Chet) Crocker and outlined his background.

Crocker thanked Aall and expressed his happiness at being part of this forum. He stated his belief that cooperation between Track One and Track Two is very important to USIP, and he thanked a number of people for contributing to the issues.

Dr. Crocker: We study intractable conflict to learn what it is, how we come to grips with it, and under what circumstances conflicts become "tractable"—that is, manageable. One can't help but notice that there are risks of complexity: confusion, inviting forum shopping, having ponderous machinery.

Crocker related a story about his past work, how all of his time was spent on internal coordination within his own ranks.

Dr. Crocker: There are also risks of multiple agendas, but it is becoming more and more evident that the tracks need to communicate with and be informed about each other. That will make it possible to coordinate not only internally but also externally.

This whole discussion is affected by 9/11, which threw into sharp relief the changing role of government. Some do what they always did; others are determined to act like governments while others don't have the capacity. This is just a backdrop for today's forum.

Crocker then introduced Ambassador Jan Eliasson and outlined his background.

Eliasson thanked Crocker and expressed his thankfulness for this symposium. He said he had experience in Iran, Iraq, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Ambassador Eliasson: My work in Nagorno-Karabakh was conducted with full cooperation between Track One and Track Two. I had a team at a University, in addition to my official workers. I was careful in situations where I didn't want to wear my ambassadorial hat. There were discussions of autonomy that were very different to both sides.

Eliasson explained that, in circumstances where speaking as the Swedish ambassador might put too much of an official stamp on a situation, he was happy to be able to speak "wearing his hat" of visiting professor at Uppsala University in Sweden. In the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, a cease fire was achieved, but Eliasson stated he is still very unhappy about problems that are not solved (root problems).

Ambassador Eliasson: Susan Allen Nan encouraged me to speak about the role of NGOs, in my experience, throughout conflict through to reconciliation, and to give some concrete examples.

Let's start with the early warning. My best example was in Sudan and Somalia in 1992 and 1993. I was Undersecretary General of UN. It was very difficult to get strong, solid, non-dramatic assessment of the political situation. No government offices could really deliver that. We got pretty bland products. So I used a group, Interaction, to meet a group of NGOs once a month, and I asked them for monthly assessments of the situation in the field. So here is a clear role for Track Two in early warning. I was happy also that these groups passed the information along to the media so we could mobilize public opinion. Finally, we woke up, but it was far too late. But this role played by NGOs was very important to get the facts out. So in the early warning stage, there is definitely a role for Track Two.

In fact-finding, reports from NGOs and the media are very important. I would hope for more. In my reports to the United Nations, I wove in reports from NGOs. I think there could be better cooperation between official groups and the media so we could use fact-finding to have a stronger impact.

In the mediation phase. When I was at Uppsala, I had a lecture about mediation. It was very popular. I won't belabor it, but I'll quickly go over the "who": major power, smaller actor, and the Track Two/NGO group. The major actor was, of course, Richard Holbrooke. You use the major power when you need the muscle, need to tell the group people are watching. The second is where I have been asked in Sweden and smaller countries—people seen to be impartial by the parties. The third category is the group that I think has great potential for the future. I noticed demand for more unconventional actors was growing after 1989. That's when we had an explosion of civil wars and internal conflicts. United Nations involvement or involvement of a government gave legitimacy to the conflict: that meant that people like Jimmy Carter were approached from many different angles, including state actors, because of the lack of political consequences. These are the references to the "who" from my lecture.

The next stage is when someone could do preventive diplomacy. There was a good example in Macedonia. A similar role can be played by observers. I would cite the importance of international eyes and ears to make sure people from the outside stay inside. We didn't have that in Angola in 1993, one of the most forgotten tragedies in recent history, where people died by the thousands. I would broaden "preventive diplomacy" to "preventive presence." I understand Kofi Annan's pain about sending people to Iraq right now.

Then the next step before war breaks out is sanctions. I see a dual role for NGOs and Track Two people. First, to compensate for the effects of comprehensive sanctions—we need to make sure vulnerable groups are not affected. In the future, we need to go in the direction of smaller sanctions, to find those that really hit the people we want to hit.

Then comes the conflict, of course, and only the humanitarian work can be met by NGOs.

But in the post conflict phase there is a tremendous role for Track Two actors. We need to focus on civil society and building a democratic infrastructure. There is a need for that. We need to expand it. You can't just have a peacekeeping mission and then leave; we need to stay on to make sure that things work. A very important role for NGOs.

So those are the different phases of conflict and how we can coordinate.

Now on to strengths and limitations. First strength: the message you send by cooperating. You send a message to the parties that there is an urge from the outside world to come to settlement. You send the message not only one actor working. There is mobilization of public opinion. There is deeper involvement of parliament in different countries, and of course effect on resources. The second strength is the power of presence—you are international eyes and ears, both before and after a conflict. Lastly, the role of NGOs can provide face-saving power; it can avoid internationalization of a problem.

In very sensitive situation, I would strongly advise the U.S. government to go via a very professional, discrete NGO for negotiations.

Now the limitations and risks. There are risks, and I've seen them. I was in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. I wasn't helped by the Armenian Diaspora. Similarly, many were unhelpful in Sudan. The warning is that NGOs can easily be seen as part of the conflict, too enthusiastically supporting one of the actors, and by that giving them credibility.

There is also a risk for too much publicity. The Armenians didn't quite see that in Nagorno-Karabakh. As a diplomat I remind my NGO friends about the importance of timing . . . saving the truth.

The last limitation is that a multitude of actors who want to mediate might tempt partners to "forum shop," hoping for the best offer from the next NGO.

In sum, I would say that Track Two actors, the NGO community, and the media have their best chances in the following roles:

- early warning and public opinion;
- presence in conflict areas, being the international eyes and ears; and
- in some cases, there is a role as go-between, or even mediator.

This gives proof that Track One–Track Two cooperation is important, but we can certainly do more. Especially in the aftermath, to ensure that the conflicts do not begin again.

Lastly: don't exaggerate the role of a mediator. I have gone through so many times of disappointment, but I was told, "You can achieve very little without some amount of political will within the populace. There has to be interest to move on." If they don't want a solution, the mediator might need to move on.

Eliasson then opened the floor to questions.

Question (Paula Gutlove, Institute for Resource and Security Studies): I wanted to point out another limitation from the point of view of Track Two. There are times when cooperation can be damaging to both security and credibility of Track Two actors, in addition to Track One actors. So we might need to assess from both sides what the assets of cooperation are, and to protect each other from potential liability.

Ambassador Eliasson: Agreed. We should aim for a cool and detached analysis of division of labor. You have to agree, or the cooperation won't work. I was very open with the NGOs . . . they understood we were working for a good cause; we had a good open dialogue.

Question (name unknown): I wanted to comment on one element I remember of the meetings with Interaction. I was a troublemaker, fixed on Mozambique. You were using those meetings to do something, perhaps a further element of Track One–Track Two cooperation: brainstorming. You were using the room to get ideas, get alternatives. Somalia was a painful realization of how little the United Nations could respond to crisis of that

magnitude. I was pleasantly surprised to see the Undersecretary of the UN ask NGOs for their opinions.

Ambassador Eliasson: You gave a positive interpretation . . . I see how it shows how overworked and frustrated we were. I remember once riding in an elevator with Kofi Annan. It was 11 p.m. on a Friday night. We started to enumerate the conflicts we'd addressed that week, and between us, there were 14. It was like the Cold War had been a wet blanket over the world, and when it was removed, the world exploded.

Eliasson then related another story about needing a local cease-fire in a conflict situation, but obviously, as an ambassador, he could not exercise authority over a cease-fire. So he asked the conflict participants not for a cease-fire, but for the creation of a "humanitarian corridor"—and it worked. He just used different language and got the same results.

Question (name unknown): We see a similar phenomenon among Track One, that countries are quite suspicious of foreign intervention. I ask what do you suggest to Track Two communities to engage the Track One actors of other countries to overcome that suspicion? Part of this is the responsibility of the NGO community vis-à-vis credibility, but in your opinion, what has worked?

Ambassador Eliasson: You are quite right. If the United States has strong influence on Israel, why not "use" it? Recognize where you have comparative advantages. It's the same analysis whether it's Track One or Track Two. This shows there are different views. One advantage Track One can learn from Track Two: understanding of history and culture. Track Two actors understand what's driving these people. The starting point of any mediation is trust; to build trust you have to show respect, or at least understand the driving forces.

Eliasson related a story about negotiation between Iraq and Iran. The negotiations were not working. Eliasson said that he intentionally got angry, saying the proceedings were a waste of time. Then he said he wanted to go to the carpet museum. He'd been in this area a number of times, knew the carpets are a very important part of the culture, but had never been to the carpet museum. Then there was a debate among the Iraqis and Iranians about who would take Eliasson to the museum. Eliasson said, "I'll take all four of you"—and they spent hours at the museum. When they came back, the negotiations had a completely different tenor. They were able to move on.

Question (Andy Carl, Conciliation Resources): There is one sector not represented here today: all those with whom and for whom we're working. So I have a different question about civil society. You said the key time for civil society was in the post-agreement phase. So I ask: have you seen times when civil society can play key roles in earlier times, before post conflict?

Ambassador Eliasson: There is of course a role for civil society to be built before a conflict; I didn't mean to imply that should happen only after.

Question (Chester Crocker, USIP): You touched on the roles and assets of Track Two, now I wonder if you could address some more: expertise, depth of knowledge, breadth of contact. What secrets do you share with whom?

Ambassador Eliasson: You're right—you have to know more about the networks, who has the best contacts. I will give a compliment to the think tanks here in Washington—debate is crucial. What you have here is a chance to get people to come, sit here, and put the problem in the center. When you have this type of meeting to gather knowledge of expertise . . . then you have a weapon in your hands.

WORKING SESSION: TRACK ONE–TRACK TWO COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN

----------Facilitator:
Paula Gutlove, Director, Institute for Research and Security Studies

Dr. Gutlove: Welcome. I have two goals for this session. One, I'd like us to get to know each other—build relationships and think about what kind of cooperation is possible across track lines in Afghanistan. And two, I'd like us to identify some specific approaches to cooperation—what are the challenges and opportunities in cooperation.

Gutlove asked participants to introduce themselves and explain their connection to Afghanistan.

Dr. Gutlove: I work for an NGO in Cambridge, Mass. I do not and have never worked in Afghanistan. I've done work in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. I work with health care professionals. Most of it is post-conflict, social reconstruction using the health sector to build civil bridges. So I'm here to discuss using the health sector in Afghanistan as a way to increase local security and promote reconstruction.

Joe Montville: I am a student of the phenomenon of Track Two while I'm off duty. I worked closely with Hal Saunders. Both of us have a conception of the inability of Track One to do all the things that need to be done. There are things not in the conceptual toolkit of Track One diplomacy. The mother conflict is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: I'm interested in processes that look into reconciliation, the Abrahamic faiths and the "All God's children approach."

Sara Terry: I'm a documentary journalist, committed to promoting understanding that war is only half the story. The media is not going to change unless given a model for changing. I am working on developing a program to fund four photojournalists each year to cover post-war situations, and I'm hoping to do aftermath work in Afghanistan in 2004.

Hal Saunders: My interest in Afghanistan is potential and not present. I've maintained sustained dialogue in Tajikistan. They worked their way through peace negotiations and a peace treaty. Then they decided to create their own NGO to implement the peace treaty, and now they are conducting dialogues. The Tajik component to Afghanistan leads me here. We don't quite know yet what we should do with that connection. They want to stay home and do it in their own country before going to another country and trying it.

Merrick Hoben: I work with Israel/Palestine teaching mediation techniques. I have no experience in Afghanistan, but I am curious about the parallels. I work on broad-based policy disputes.

Dave Jirosh : My aim is to come up with ideas to solve the conflict as a citizen so I don't have to go back as a soldier.

Susanna Campbell: I'm interested in how to do effective multi-dimensional interventions in similar conflicts.

Toni Chayes: I teach this, study it, and write it. I do not work with an NGO although I have been involved with them. My interest is vicarious. I have two daughters who have been associated with Afghans for Civil Society. The Afghanistan I've heard about from them and others bears no resemblance to what the Under Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky was talking about—no Track One going on, backtrack diplomacy going on, little cooperation. Although what I've learned is primarily based in the south. The NGO–military relationship is terrible. That's not the case with Afghans for Civil Society because Sarah has been briefing the military. I want to discuss these things.

Rich Giacolone: I mostly focus on capacity building. We've been asked to work with USIP to transfer our agency's knowledge in dealing with the intractable conflicts today.

Heidi Burgess: I work with the Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base—and I would like to get others involved. I'm just here because I'm interested and want to learn more.

Pat Haslach: I'm the director of the Office of Afghanistan in the Department of State. I have two concerns: one is that the issue of NGO presence in the south and southeast is becoming a challenge for us in keeping them active in the most dangerous areas as we embark on the most difficult aspect of constitution building and elections . . . it is a critical, critical period. The second is the growing or renewal of the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In part it is being fueled by moving back and forth along the area that Pakistan has no control over. India is also involved. It's a potential flash point. The question is how to get civil society NGOs and the UN to stay and address that from a security perspective.

Sarah Harder: I have worked with women's movements in the United States and internationally. I've focused on coalition building. My academic work has focused in Russia and the North Caucuses. I deal with political participation of women, reconstruction issues. My conflict resolution experience has been learned by working with people in the field and with my background in coalition building. I've worked since 1995 on the Chechen issues. My interest has to do with the work of the women's issues in Afghanistan.

Erik Kjonnerod: . . . previous administration caused Presidential Decision Directive 56—a charge to create a cadre of government officials who could work better together in the coordination and planning of messy things overseas. The issue of coordination and collaboration is very much alive and well. Using the old approach of conflict resolution doesn't work . . . they don't have clearly delineated phases. The rule of thumb we've learned is that in planning for and initiating these things, no one should go away . . . you didn't work, so "you leave" and "we're taking over." That's old, and we now need to get everyone involved. How to bring all of that together in a coordinated, cohesive manner is impossible unless the culture is trained. My job is to change the culture through learning and education so we get a much better result across the spectrum. My interest in Afghanistan is simple: my son

just came back from Kosovo. He's in school now, and they were all told upon graduation they will all go to either Iraq or Afghanistan, and he'll go to Afghanistan.

Bill Stuebner: My interest is the collaboration not only with Track Two but particularly with the military. Of the three we're looking at today, Afghanistan is the one where we can directly apply this. In the past I've worked in de-mining.

Dr. Gutlove: We have an option to talk about the opportunities and challenges. It sounds like it would be easier to talk about it in specific cooperation examples. Would you be willing to talk about what we could do?

Mr. Montville: We need to decide what needs to be done before deciding what to do.

Ambassador Saunders: My direct interest in the confrontations is to try to bring the people together who are killing each other. My interest in the problem pre-dates that. I'd go to the State Department—this is what we can do, and would you be interested? We don't want to undercut what the Department of State is doing, but what do you think? I'd want to know if the Department of State feels it's an instrument that can be used.

Ms. Haslach: The agreement that governs what we do in Afghanistan is called the Bond agreement. The government is now considering re-negotiating the Bond agreement because the issues haven't been solved; it just put a band-aid over them. Who has the most people . . . there is no census, so we don't know who's who. The other problem has been dealing with the war lords. We have not been successful with disarming them, and they're making money by drugs.

Dr. Montville: Can you see—offer a political analysis of how that would work between the various groups?

Dr. Chayes: It is not a country in a post-conflict phase . . . it's in the midst of some conflict and post-conflict in other cases. The government doesn't have the reach for the warlord problem. There is vast insecurity. The Taliban is returning, and they're supported by Pakistan, and Pakistan is being held by the U.S. Al Qaeda is also returning. There's a lack of funding. The road from Kandahar to Kabul has had many killings. They're clearly targeted assassinations. It seems to me that there's a huge lack of attention on the problem of this twilight conflict . . . not only in the United States, but also in the EU. It's too dangerous for Track Two to operate with that level of insecurity, and there is no Track One. It's a disaster that is happening right now.

Ms. Haslach: There is one level of dialogue that has opened up with the U.S. and Pakistan. ISI still has remnants that are more aligned with Taliban.

Mr. Jirosh: We'd see capitals overrun if it were out of hand. There have only been nine deaths.

Ms. Campbell: This bond agreement . . . the peace process, this was a first step. Because it wasn't possible to negotiate because of time and the pressure and support needs to be maintained. We need clarification that we shouldn't see this as re-negotiating, but rather recognizing that this is a continuation of the negotiation process. On the security issue:

how can anything move forward in a reconstruction period with no security? Everything has to happen at the same time. You have to give them an alternative at the same time as they give up their arms. How do they all fit together?

Mr. Kjonnerod: I also head up the Policy Gaming site at the University. There is no rule as to how these policy games are conducted. You figure out what you're faced with, what you're going to do about it, and how you're going to do that. In order to do that, you have to have a strategic endgame in sight, with a road mp. Is there such a thing as a strategic road map that we've all agreed to and are working towards?

Ms. Haslach: At this point it is the Bond agreement.

Mr. Kjonnerod: What about the constitution?

Ms. Haslach: It will be if it's ratified. But the Bond is supposed to carry them through the elections, and then they go from there.

Mr. Kjonnerod: Then as part of this roadmap, we also have components of health and education and set up so that Track One can work with Track Two?

Ms. Haslach: Yes, but it's such a multi-faceted approach—the UN took up humanitarian work and elections; IMF, World Bank took up development. Military Operation Freedom still going on. The security force is under NATO. The G8 countries are in charge of different security sections.

Dr. Montville: Did the Bond conference come up with a plan for development?

Ms. Haslach: At the Tokyo conference. Identified massive needs from the ground up—identified what the needs are and what the goals are.

Dr. Chayes: Do you feel the implementation was reaching the expectations? And what were the areas you felt were weaker or stronger?

Ms. Haslach: No, we have not been able to meet the needs and expectations. We just recently got money to use quickly. Europeans donors do not feel our sense of urgency. We don't have it with the other donors.

Mr. Stuebner: I get the feeling that if we're going to get anything practical out of this session, we're speaking at too high of a level. There's a lot at Track One and Track Two that does not result in an overall agreement.

Mr. Jirosh: We have not met expectations—please do not associate not having met expectations with "we've gone back on our words." The idea of Americans is to have everything immediately accessible. The idea is that we put an element out into the field and have them support the local government. The trick is that you want to support someone without having them become a puppet or a target. Most soldiers serving on the Provisional Reconstructive Teams have served in the Balkans. The sense among soldiers (not speaking officially) is that by not intervening so heavily in Bosnia, we froze a situation

in place—all incentive for reconciliation evaporated. We made a calculated effort. We realized security would not come as quickly as if we took it over. Security in Afghanistan would come slowly, but it would be more lasting. Any action we take can be explained away as our own self-interest because we're the hyper power. We're hoping that, as the allies step up to the plate, that it'll be easier for the Afghan institutions to develop.

Mr. Stuebner: The next step has to be how can Track Two help the efforts.

Dr. Gutlove: How can Track Two help the Provincial Reconstructive Teams, and vice-versa.

Joe Collins joined the group.

Dr. Collins: Our biggest account is things related to Afghanistan. Before giving you a perfect answer to what I think your question is, can you clarify what Track Two means?

Dr. Gutlove: From a health perspective through an NGO . . . what kind of cooperation would be possible between health/humanitarian organizations and the Provincial Reconstructive Teams?

Dr. Collins: "Provincial" was used instead of "Regional" teams because warlords have regions in Afghanistan; the government has provinces. There is no one unified effort. There are 12 PRTs. By the time sub-PRTs are fleshed out, there will be between 20 and 30 spokes. In almost every province, you will have a PRT and a spoke. The size of PRTs varies on a day-to-day basis. In some things, the PRT is the wheel; in some things it's the grease.

But back to your question: what can the NGOs do for the PRTs? Directly, nothing. Indirectly, anything. PRTs are going to make it much easier for the NGOs to work in these areas. There is also $1.7 billion from Congress that is oriented on PRT projects….not the PRT, but in conjunction with and in the area of the PRTs.

Collins gave a detailed account of PRT operations.

Ms. Terry: What are the numbers?

Dr. Collins: In Afghanistan there is one security member for every 59,000 people.

The group agreed that, if this is true, it is clear why there is a security problem.

WORKING SESSIONS ON TRACK ONE- TRACK TWO COOPERATION IN ISRAEL–PALESTINE

----------Facilitator:
Donna Hicks, Harvard University

Dr. Hicks: I'm hoping to do three things here this afternoon. One: introduce ourselves, indicate who we are and what we do, and what relationship we have to the conflict. Next, ask in the large group, or perhaps in smaller groups, to see whether there are specific ideas about

collaboration in the Middle East context. It's difficult to determine WHAT to do, given the political crisis, but there may be things we can determine together that could lead to better results—specific areas where we may collaborate. Finally, I'd like to think about what the strengths and limitations are about collaborating on such a project (determined in part two).

Each member of the group introduced him- or herself. Present were Cesar Gayoso, Robert Frowick, Matt Hodes, Matt Stancil (sp?), Charles Nelson, Margaret Smith, Libby Hoffman, Frank Rotchik (sp?), Mike Hager, Chuck Lawson, Albert Cevallos, Susan Hackley, Paula Garb, Diana Chigas, Sara Cobb, Tamra Pearson d'Estree, Guy Burgess, Lou Kreisberg, David Thaler, Bruce Dayton, Esra Cuhadar, Ilana Shapiro, David Stroh, Donna Hicks.

Hicks asked if any of the participants would like to make a comment or question about the plenary sessions before beginning the Middle East session. Mike Hager referred to Ambassador Eliasson's comments regarding how Track Two could work with Track One during conflicts; specifically, Hager pointed out how Eliasson said that the conflict stage is all Track One work. But Hager wondered if that might be a good place for Track Two, especially if one of the belligerents is not recognized as a state.

Others answered, saying that a little more tough-mindedness on the side of Track Two could help. Someone noted that without violence, conflicts are ignored. Matthew Hodes said that, historically, there are a few cases where Track Two actors have acted at a Track One level. Proliferation has led to the emergence of more conflicts . . . and these types of discussions about who's at the table frequently are dictated by which actor is at the head of the process.

Hicks asked for suggestions from the group regarding ways Track One and Track Two could possibly collaborate in the Middle East. She invited the group to brainstorm and then focus on one or two topics. Participants raised a number of comments and questions, including the following:

- How do we leverage resources when, under the current administration, "conflict resolution" is a dirty word, and the act is seen as some kind of moral compromise?
- There are plenty of grassroots organizations with incredible work on the ground; they feel American policy makes their work harder.
- What can Track One do so that the local capacity for Track Two is better utilized? People answered that the two tracks need to find a common language, address gaps in communication, work to diminish the cultural divide.
- Collaboration difficulties can center around the issue of trust, not knowing each other. So it is incumbent upon those of us involved to do a better job of informing others of our work. Both sides need to find ways to make the tension between Track One and Track Two constructive, to discover where we went wrong.
- There has not been a discussion that differentiates between different Track Two roles. A lot of the Track Two groups present in the Middle East today are those that do dialogue work, and perhaps Track One is not interested in that type of Track Two work. So perhaps Track Two needs to address this—have a link to something necessary.
- Perhaps there is too much reliance on Track One—perhaps what's needed is a steering group, including major powers, that is tailored to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Some people answered that the quartet is that.

- What is heard from Israelis and Palestinians is that their voices are not being heard by the Track One community; they are looking, perhaps, to the Track Two community for that.

Matthew Hodes: At the Geneva negotiations for the Middle East, the idea was that you can't change the minds of the participants, but you have to somehow change the debate. Discussions were extremely heated, not facilitated, but over a period of time, the negotiators came to agreements. A document was created that addressed boundaries, the status of Palestinian refugees, and the usage of holy sites—even going so far as charting with satellite imagery. All of this was unofficial, to show the people that there could be peace, that there were partners in the peace process. This document is going to be sent to every household in Jerusalem/West Bank/Gaza. And polls showed that more than 40% of people in the Middle East would support this document without seeing it. That demonstrates faith in Track Two.

Another participant said that the common focus in the Middle East dispute is on conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. But what if, instead, the focus was on those who are opposed to compromise vs. those who are committed to compromise? Many in the group agreed that this was a very good idea.

The working group was then notified it was running out of time.

Dr. Hicks: In light of our short time left, can we sort of compile these answers into something usable? How do we address collaboration when the goals of Track One and Track Two seem so different—actually working against each other? How can we do anything unless we first address the huge cultural divide? Perhaps training together will help the two tracks to get to know the differences between us. Perhaps that's a good suggestion to take away—training together.

When there is commitment to cooperation, work is much easier. But recently the situation has been so ugly . . . people are just thinking about not getting killed.

So there are two things we could do: build relationships between Track One and Track Two through training, and figure out mechanisms to support people in both communities who are committed to finding a solution.

WORKING SESSION: TRACK ONE–TRACK TWO COOPERATION IN SUDAN

----------Facilitator:
Joyce Neu, Executive Director, Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice

The session began with introductions and work descriptions. Present were Joyce Neu, Michael Ranneberger, Andy Carl, Cynthia Sampson, John McDonald, Stephanie Smith, Chris Moore, Rob Ricigliano, Lisa Schirch, Holly Davis, and Mike Harwood. And highlighted as missing from the table was Doug Johnston.

Participants made the following observations and comments.

There are challenges to NGOs operating in the north (of Sudan) and the problem of one party (or at least one party) not respecting human rights. Also there are challenges to working with the government—both U.S. and Sudanese. This raised the issue of whether coordination is always good.

The interesting constituency of a black caucus, evangelical community, makes Sudan a key domestic issue; hence, there is need for dialogue with the NGO community. The result was monthly meetings between the State Department and the NGO community. Interaction is extremely positive and very actionable because there is a common agenda on Sudan (for example, a just peace between the north and south).

There are barriers to cooperation highlighted by NGO community: they couldn't get OFAC licenses for NGO groups, and so their receipt was facilitated by the U.S. government. There are also positive outgrowths of dialogue with the NGO community: south–south reconciliation, human rights language in peace accord. Originally many NGOs had a jaundiced view of U.S. government policy, but that has changed into understanding and cooperation.

How does the message reach individuals on the street? That is a good question for discussion—it maybe hasn't been as systematic as it should be. Also how does it feed back to the NGO community?

Abuse is heaped on Garang and the SRRA by the international NGO community because of a request for information a few years ago. The request may not have been as benign as it sounds because it asked for financial information and other intrusive information. It raised the problem of a faction to the conflict acting as the state.

This is a conflict where it is important to talk about the other tracks, including business and the evangelical community in the United States, as well as humanitarian relief. We also must discuss the role of oil companies and the religious right in fueling the conflict.

The Nuba Mountain people were second class (sic) citizens previously, but they now have become victims of a government "genocide" because of the presence of oil on their land. We can't forget how many people have died over economics.

The larger question for the day: in public–private partnerships, who is the "senior partner"? Who receives blame or credit? Whose responsibility is it to ensure coordination? In Sudan, the "gorilla" on the block is the U.S. government because of its presence in peace talks, and so the future of Sudan depends on U.S. attention and its even-handedness.

Northern Sudan also has splits within its Afro-Arab identification. The Sudanese are also concerned about the war in Iraq, and its impact upon on their government. They are tired of the cost of war in terms of refugees. There is interest in building a peace culture beginning in universities located in Khartoum.

There is a need to clarify U.S. policy, and this has happened to some extent in the dialogue group (mentioned earlier). But at least there is a broad common agenda, and that is hopeful. One positive example of operationalization—the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, as a result of the recommendations of the NGO community, incorporated area experts. But the U.S. government also wants feedback on how these mechanisms are working.

Attitudes of collaboration make all the difference, versus taking a dogmatic stance. Participants were interested in learning what sorts of ground rules work with regard to Track One–Track Two cooperation.

Question: How does all this work when we're discussing Track One–Track Two cooperation in a non-American context? Answer: It does, as evidenced by work with the UN and OSCE. But as Americans, we have a special responsibility to work with our government representatives. This terminology has been used in many part of the world—for example, in South Africa. But today's focus is really on Track One–Track Two cooperation as it relates to the United States.

If there is interest in Track One–Track Two coordination, then the State Department needs to invest resources, including personnel. It may be necessary to organize a follow-up to the Secretary's Open Forum on Track One–Track Two coordination at the State Department.

Question: But what is the effective channel for NGO efforts? Answer: The Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution (AICPR) represents a "who's who" of the conflict resolution field in the U.S. It needs to interface with Secretaries Powell and Armitage, and with USAID. It was suggested that AICPR should start at a top rather than at a lower level.

Also, what is perceived as NGO's "search for resources" can be interpreted wrongly when in fact they may be offering operational strength (by NGOs).

Some time in the past, a letter was sent to Secretary Albright by NGOs offering to sit down and simply talk about Sudan. The government response was a return letter seven months letter for the Office of Policy Planning saying, "Gee guys, we do this all the time."

NGOs should realize that there is no money to dole out in the State Department, only in USAID, and NGOs need to compete with the "beltway bandits" for funding from these sources.

In order to address the manpower problem, the State Department under Secretary Powell has created a new base of junior officers. But most of these only receive a course in negotiation, and all their other skills with regard to conflict resolution are learned in the field. Providing additional training in their area could be coordinated with the SFI and could be provided by AICPR.

Also the NGO community needs to be aware that "consultation doesn't necessarily mean agreement"—but it does provide a space for dialogue.

Still, the concern remains that spoilers will emerge from the current peace process as civil society, the SPLA, and others are currently excluded from the peace talks. The current assumption is that major constituencies will "bring others along." But "if we get too far off the reservation," people will feel so excluded it will be almost impossible to bring them back into the process.

Others suggested bringing women's groups into the peace process because they transcend the parties. One participant cited an example of women's groups in Somalia. There is also the example of a "women's minimum agenda" for Sudan, but the women who developed this agenda were ensured they wouldn't be included at the negotiation table because "women cannot keep secrets."

The group then presented nine points regarding a non-governmental forum on Sudan:

- Mutual understanding has been advanced.
- NGOs need to talk about concerns, not projects.
- NGOs helped the State Department focus on humanitarian assistance issues.
- There has been dialogue with the human rights community and war crimes group with input from six NGOs.
- For the OFAC licenses (from the Treasury Department)—the State Department was able to facilitate and expedite the process.
- Human rights groups helped develop language on human rights to be included in the peace accord.
- There should be a separate USAID dialogue with the State Department to deal with forward planning for development.
- The slavery issue—there should be creation of an "eminent persons group" to investigate slavery.
- Encouraging South-South dialogue has resulted in a raised profile and emerging projects on the ground with State Department funding.

Next Steps

- AICPR should write a letter to Secretary Powell and Ambassador Ranneberger introducing their organization and requesting resources.
- AICPR should look into working with the SFI in training junior officers as IMTD has done.
- Add NGO names to the list of those invited to the non-governmental forum on Sudan.
- Call Nicole Peacock in the State Department's Africa Bureau, Public Diplomacy at (202) 647-4531.
- Develop guidelines or principles for engagement.

REFLECTIONS FROM TRACK ONE AND TRACK TWO

----------Moderator:
William Stuebner, Executive Director, Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution

----------Panelists:
Joseph Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense
Aaron Miller, President, Seeds of Peace
Michael Ranneberger, Special Advisor for Sudan, U.S. State Department
Charles Lawson, Senior Advisor for Science and Technology, U.S. State Department

Commissioner Strimling: Our intent with this symposium was to start dialogue and not to finish it. Hopefully it will lead to further discussions among people who formerly did not know each other.

Strimling then introduced Bill Stuebner.

Stuebner introduced the panelists and outlined their backgrounds. He also said the importance of this symposium is that it will serve as a springboard to efforts to cooperate and coordinate between the Track One and Track Two sides.

Dr. Miller: I have six observations to make.

- The world of Track Two is not the world from which I come. I lived and worked in the world of Track One. I lived my life in transaction diplomacy (business negotiations). It's crucial for ending conflict, but in order to get to societal development, transformation diplomacy needs to occur.
- In my judgment, Track Two diplomacy, the transformational element, should be used in that manner, not as a substitute for diplomacy.
- The reason Track Two diplomacy has not succeeded in the Arab-Israeli conflict is because it depends on public opinion to have an impact on the political system. Public opinion has only been negative; it's been a drag on officials. It's corresponded to one directive: leaders of a heroic nature slip into the dark to negotiate secretly and then sell to their constituents. This imposes an enormous burden and challenge on Track Two.
- The real value of Track Two is to help condition publics and develop a human infrastructure for peace, perhaps set up channels of negotiations as a reference for formal negotiations.
- A serious strategy must involve a marriage between the two.
- We cannot find a way in which governments can do transformational diplomacy, so we rely on NGOs.

Ambassador Ranneberger: In our involvement with Track Two in Sudan, we realized their work in dialogues with humanitarian efforts, but that was it. Track One was not active on the ground with Track Two, and the NGOs were—they could be active in influencing a culture of peace on the ground.

I've found this dialogue to be constructive. The NGO community plays an extremely important role. The Secretary places enormous interest on Track One–Track Two interaction. We need to extend our outreach. Outreach in Sudan was the idea that it was an important domestic issue for this administration . . . NGOs are a first point of alert for issues in Sudan. The human rights component of this dialogue formed a sub-group based on their concerns on war crimes. They worked to overcome licensing problems with the Treasury, helped us to develop language on incorporating human rights issues into the text. How should slavery issue be addressed? What is its impact on peace building? The dialogue has been driven by a broad common agenda, and that has helped make it effective.

Things that could be done to improve it: inclusivity, feedback both ways. We were limited by limited resources.

Dr. Lawson: I agree with much of what Dr. Miller said. The biggest impact in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is going to be on the transformational side.

After Madrid, we set up multi-lateral talks between Arabs and Israelis. We set up these working groups to bring together these groups. When there was a political impasse or stalemate, the water people said they want to continue the talks. So, water officials from

both sides have been working together. There is much pragmatism involved, but it's also kept dialogue alive. There is little communication in other areas between Israelis and Palestinians.

This is just working on technical issues, but it's officials working together. Officials have brought in NGOs and other non-governmental experts from all three parties. It's being used in Palestinian, Israeli, and Jordanian schools. This is one example of where Track Two or Track 1½ can sustain things even when Track One has not been able to work anything out.

Mr. Collins: There are facts of life that impact Track One and Track Two business. There are changes in what appears to be the ways wars are fought and conceived. People are—now in western canon are considered to be innocent. There has been a high correlation in recent years between local conflicts the United States was engaged in and humanitarian conflicts. For the United States today, its allies and enemies are non-state actors. The upshot of all this is that humanitarian assistance doesn't just happen during wars—it happens before, during, and after wars. These things are all mixed up together, as are the people. This, in turn, means opportunities for achievement and for friction and suspicion.

Collins shared an example of how military people wearing civilian clothes were a threat in Afghanistan.

Mr. Collins: Alongside the friction and suspicion, there are many more examples of achievement. There was communication and sharing of information between NGOs, IGOs, and the military which allowed us to—in the final stages as the war was escalating—to increase the food supply to the Afghani people. Another example of cooperation are the Provisional Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs . . . We will have a civil-military presence in all the provinces.

The danger in Afghanistan is that the outlying outfits (Taliban) attack aid workers. They know if they attack these aid workers, then they will have trouble hanging in, and Track One efforts will be hampered.

Mr. Stuebner: Due to time, we'll limit ourselves to two questions.

Question (Pearson d'EstreeConflict Resolution Program, University of Denver): I was intrigued by your presentation on cooperation between water officials. I'm struggling to understand why the governments involved would allow continued talks between water officials but not between officials from other sectors. What would be the sectors most likely to bring this success?

Dr. Lawson: It's an existential issue . . . people are reasonable enough that they've agreed to allow it to continue because it significantly impacts the three governments.

QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

----------Moderator:

Susan Allen Nan, Director, Alliance for Conflict Transformation

----------Panelists:
Ambassador John McDonald, Law Professor, Georgetown University
Joseph Montville, prior Director of Preventive Diplomacy, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Dr. Nan: We've asked two pioneers in Track One, Track Two, and multi-track issues to speak to future directions and the future of Track One–Track Two coordination.

Ambassador McDonald: All of you don't realize how historic this day is. Ten years ago only ten people showed up to an event on the same topic.

In 1985, I wrote a book on multi-track diplomacy, but it wasn't published because my supervisor believed it would show another path besides the State Department. The concept was ahead of Track One's time.

McDonald then expanded his idea of two tracks to include five tracks, but when he sent a chapter on this topic to two reviewers, he received two letters saying that the chapter was not worthy of publication. But—it was published some months later in a compilation book, and he was heartened when a press release was issued and most of it was devoted to his chapter.

In 1991, he wrote "Multi-track Diplomacy" with Louise Diamond. So this concept emerged over a long period with practical work in the field.

Ambassador McDonald: Track One is government, Track Two we've already discussed, Track Three is business, Track Four is people-to-people, Track Five is educational training, Track Six is peace activists or "people power," Track Seven is religion, Track Eight is money, and Track Nine is the inner circle linking other tracks, which is the media. It brings all the other together but also highlights the need for communication generally. This framework emerged because two tracks were inadequate.

With the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, McDonald said he has worked in Cyprus and Palestine, Bosnia, Africa, and Kashmir; he also worked on water and peace issues. His primary goal over the years has been to establish an office in the State Department and an Under Secretary for Track Two diplomacy.

There have been two breakthroughs in this area:

- The role of the G8. Early in 2000, a group of NGOs wrote a paper to the G8 requesting that it take up the idea of conflict prevention. Later the G8 issued a communiqué addressing these issues. It also explored the role of women and established an action plan and resources for Africa.
- Outside OTI, USAID has had a very troubled decade, but Elisabeth Kvitashvili, who spoke at the AICPR meeting, is very committed to infusing conflict resolution into USAID's work. She is addressing these issues in her new role as Acting Director of the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.

Montville then took the floor. He endorsed McDonald's idea that some organizations are really absorbing contributions of non-governmental actors, but there is still lots of confusion about terms and concepts. Track Two tries to transform relations so that they are bearable rather than pathological. Montville disputed Aaron Miller's comment that Track Two has had no influence in the Middle East; rather, Montville said, Track Two has really been field testing concepts that emerged in the Oslo agreements.

Regarding directions for the future, Montville said what is necessary is transforming the psychology of relationships. We need to understand human motivation: What moves people to be combative and murderous, and then what moves them in a positive direction.

Montville then discussed how religion plays a role in conflict.

Dr. Montville: Western intelligentsia have filtered out the positive contributions of religion and focus on the negative—the enmity between groups, and those who believe "God doesn't love them and so it's okay to murder them."

From a psychological perspective, both peoples (Jews and Muslims) have suffered brutally and suffer from "battered self syndrome." Montville's work seeks to the revive the image of Muslim Spain as a model for Muslim-Jewish cooperation, which can help begin the process of acknowledging that both have suffered at the hands of history.

Next June, there will be an "Abrahamic residency" at the National Cathedral. Several religious scholars, including Rabbi Marc Gopin, will spend two weeks exploring how people use religious texts to perpetuate conflict, and how politicians use them to justify marginalization of the other. The hope is to develop "multi-sectarian societies." And here is yet another benefit of Track Two involvement in conflict management: unlike Track One, Track Two can address psychology, religion, and healing.

SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION

----------Speaker:
Andrea Strimling, Commissioner, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service

Commissioner Strimling: This has been an incredibly full day, in terms of speakers and the richness of what we're hearing. We were trying to pull things together, and framing questions: how can we do it better and why. We realized today something that's embedded in that question is also "when."

Here are some of the themes we heard today:

- Communication is centrally important. When it happens regularly and well, that's cooperation.
- We need role clarity. We need to be clear on what our own roles are—and what they're not.
- We need flexible and adaptive joint planning that evolves in changing environments.
- There is a role to be played by groups in convening and coordinating cooperation.

- Relationships are centrally important to effective cooperation—especially knowing whom to go to, and under what circumstances.
- It seems important for there to be key individuals in Track One who understand the possibilities of Track Two and are open to their cooperation.
- There is a role for cooperation, coordination, etc., at every stage in the evolution of conflict in a peace building process.
- Finally, successful cooperation, especially between individuals or individual organizations, can lay the foundation for effective cooperation in other regions.

Some specific ideas that emerged for follow up are as follows:

- We should be distributing a summary. As long as you make sure your contact information is correct on the sheet at the back of the room, we can do this. And a lot of proceedings will be posted on the Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base web site, www.beyondintractability.org.
- There should be regional meetings of Track One and Track Two actors.

Another important issue is our connection to the media. We hope there will be concrete ideas and commitments in that area. I'll emphasize part of this is informal networking, and that's part of the reason we distributed bios not just of the panelists, but also of the attendees. We recognize there are many other possibilities of follow-up, and that it depends on the people in this room.

Our vision is large and important—really effective cooperation that results in sustainable peace and security—but of course that will come in small steps.

I hope this day has been useful and interesting.

Strimling then shared her thanks with all of the people who made this symposium possible: the speakers, moderators, facilitators, the people who participated in interviews, all of the participants, and all of the people working behind the scenes. She thanked the rapporteurs: Katie Johnson-Hamlin, Elizabeth Blinn, and Rebecca Roehrich. Rebecca also worked with Strimling and Nan since early spring to make this event happen. Thanks also went to Tamlin Bason and Val Jordan from the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution, and to Reina Kim and other colleagues from USIP. Special thanks went to the symposium funders: the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Compton Foundation, the Catalyst Fund through Peace Discovery Initiatives, the Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base, and the four sponsoring organizations (USIP, ACT, AICPR, and FMCS).

Finally, Strimling thanked her colleagues on the planning team: Pamela Aall of USIP, Bill Stuebner of AICPR, and Susan Allen Nan of ACT.