Mobilization Slowing: Additional Resources
These references supplement the Knowledge Base Essay, Mobilization Slowing.
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Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts: Online (Web) Sources Krieger, David and Catah Ong. A Briefing Book on the Status of Nuclear Disarmament. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Available at: Primary Link [Backup Link] This briefing book outlines some key treaties and concepts in the realm of international arms control including, de-alerting, Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and No First Use. These are not only potential disarmament policies, but also policies that could simply slow the mobilization of nuclear arms in the case of a crisis. Taylor, Tony. A De-Alerting Primer. Available at: Primary Link [Backup Link] This article provides some background information on the concept of de-alerting nuclear weapons, as well as key arms control issues of the late 1990s that revolved around the lingering threat posed by U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. There are various aspects to de-alerting nuclear weapons, but the general result is that it lengthens the nuclear fuse, and increases the time needed to launch a nuclear strike. Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh. De-Alert Nuclear Weapons. Available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/nwc/mon1sidhu.html [Backup Link] This page offers a brief discussion of the notion of de-alerting the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the U.S., ten years after the end of the Cold War. Rector, Chad. Getting there is Half the Battle: How Military Mobilization Costs Influence Crisis Bargaining. University of California-San Diego. Available at: http://home.gwu.edu/~rector/papers/rector.midwest.2003.pdf [Backup Link] This paper provides an economic cost-benefit anlaysis of military mobilization in a diplomatic crisis situation. This paper makes two central arguments: mobilization increases a state's demands in negotiations, and mobilization is useless as a signaling device to aid in negotiations. Mutual Assured Destruction. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutually-assured-destruction [Backup Link] This page explains the lingering Cold War nuclear doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). It is the legacy and inherent flaws of this nuclear policy that drive the movement for de-alerting nuclear weapons and the development of other mobilization slowing mechanisms. Examples Illustrating this Topic: Online (Web) Sources Krieger, David. NATO: Abandon First Strike Doctrine, De-Alert Nuclear Weapons. Available at: Primary Link [Backup Link] This article discusses NATO's nuclear policy as of 1999, which was still based upon nuclear deterrence and a first use option. This article argues for a change in these policies, particularly reductions in NATO nuclear arsenal and to de-alert its nuclear forces. Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures Between India and Pakistan: Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament. Available at: http://www.indianet.nl/nucrred.html [Backup Link] This fairly in-depth article discusses the clear need for nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs) to be instituted in the ongoing crisis between India and Pakistan. Both nations possess nuclear capabilities and this paper explores ways to prevent each nation from using their arsenals. The paper outlines various ideas for how to establish NRRMs, which are essentially a type of mobilization slowing mechanism. |




