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Incentives: Additional Resources
These references supplement the Knowledge Base Essay, Incentives.
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Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts:
Online (Web) Sources
"Economic and Social Measures: Conditionality/ Incentives for Conflict Prevention." , 2002 Available at: Primary Link [Backup Link] "Conditionalities and incentives are offered by third parties, typically governments or multilateral organizations, to encourage an authority, usually a government, to change policies or actions to promote specific objectives." This page includes information regarding conditionality and incentives as a tool in conflict prevention and resolution. Rothchild, Donald S. Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. The Brookings Institution Press, 1997. Available at: http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815775938/html/index.html [Backup Link] This book examines the state's role as both negotiator and mediator in relations with ethnic interests. The author asks under what circumstances will it be possible to promote negotiation and cooperation between states and ethnic groups or between ethnic groups themselves by re-channeling interactions among these leaders and changing the preferred outcomes at the national and international levels? Abrosimov, Viacheslav. Preventing Missile Proliferation: Incentives and Security Guarantees. Available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd57/57abros.htm [Backup Link] This web-page is a summary of the Second International Working Meeting of Experts on the Problem of Creating a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies in 2001. It particularly focuses on non-military responses to missile proliferation, such as economic incentives and security assurances.
Offline (Print) Sources
George, Alexander L. Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991. George defines coercive diplomacy as the purposeful combination of threats and diplomacy aimed at persuad[ing] an opponent to stop or undo his effort to alter a status quo situation that itself endangers the peace or "already involves naked military aggression" (p. xi). This book provides a theoretical framework for and lays out the practical implications of using this strategy. He then looks at how the use of coercive diplomacy by the United States has played out in historical cases. Cortright, David. "Powers of Persuasion: Sanctions and Incentives in the Shaping of International Society." International Studies 38:2, 2001. This is an analysis of Hedley Bull's theory of international society. The author considers how sanctioning would fit into Bull's theory. The author is supportive of sanctioning as a tool to help shape international society. The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, September 1, 1999. This work poses the question whether or not it is sensible to "buy" cooperation from critical states and examines various recent cases of nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy, including experiences with Ukraine and North Korea. In exploring the conditions under which positive incentives are effective and efficient in resolving international collaboration problems, the essays draw on a wide range of social science theories and results of empirical research. Primary Link [Backup Link] Crumm, Eileen M. "The Value of Economic Incentives in International Politics." Journal of Peace Research 32:3, 1995. This article provides a model for the value of both positive and negatvie incentives in international politics, with a particular focus on the impact of market forces on their implementation.
Examples Illustrating this Topic:
Online (Web) Sources
Cortright, David. Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention. Available at: http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/price/toc.htm [Backup Link] "Carrots and sticks have always been used in combination in diplomatic affairs, but scholars and policymakers have focused more on the sticks than the carrots. In this provocative study, policy-savvy scholars examine a wide range of cases--from North Korea to South Africa to El Salvador and Bosnia--to demonstrate the power of incentives to deter nuclear proliferation, prevent armed conflict, defend civil and human rights, and rebuild war-torn societies. The book addresses the "moral hazard" of incentives, the danger that they can be construed as bribes, concessions, or appeasement. Incentives can take many forms--economic and political, as palpable as fuel oil and as intangible, yet powerful, as diplomatic recognition and 'constructive engagement.' The cases demonstrate that incentives can sometimes succeed when traditional methods--threats, sanctions, or force--fail or are too dangerous to apply." - Editorial Review
Offline (Print) Sources
Long, William J. Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1996. William Long uses three case studies to develop a theory of how trade and technology incentives can affect interstate cooperation and provides some guidelines for policymakers regarding when incentives work and the factors that enhance or limit their success. Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. This edited volume uses case studies to explore the effectiveness of sanctions, engagement and incentive packages in foreign policy strategies. Zartman, I. William. "Negotiating Internal Conflict: Incentives and Intractability." International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice 6:3, 2001. "Internal wars occupy the largest sub-category of intractable conflicts (the other large sub-category being enduring rivalries between pairs of states). Among these long-lasting civil wars, South Africa (1952-90), Mozambique (1974-92), Mali (1962-94), and Tajikistan (1991-97) provide cases of intractable conflicts that were apparently resolved, whereas Cyprus (since 1955), Colombia (since 1964), and Sri Lanka (since 1983) furnish prominent examples of repeated attempts and failures at conflict management. Notably, Cyprus and Sri Lanka entered into new rounds of negotiations in 2002, just as Colombia appeared to be leaving its latest round empty-handed. Comparisons between the two sets of cases can provide useful insights into the conditions for dealing with intractability, and possibly even timely commentaries on the chances of the ongoing negotiations." On-line abstract, available at http://interneg.org/interneg/reference/journals/in/volumes/6/3/abstracts.html |
