These references supplement the Knowledge Base Essay, Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA).
Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts:
Online (Web) Sources
Why Is BATNA Important?. The Negotiation Skills Company.
Available at: http://www.negotiationskills.com/qaprocess12.php
This page explains what BATNA is and how it is useful in negotiating.
"Dealing With Impasse." ,
Available at: http://www.adr.af.mil/compendium/dealing.html
This article discusses two tools mediators can use to get past impasse, reality testing and BATNA.
"Limits to Agreement: Better Alternatives." ,
Available at: http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/problem/batna.htm
In order to know whether or not to accept a proposed settlement obtained through negotiation, you must know whether or not you can get a better outcome in some other way. This site looks at the concepts of "BATNA", which stands for Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, and "EATNA's", estimated alternatives to a negotiated agreement.
Available at: http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/realtest.htm
In deciding which conflict management strategy is most promising, parties must make assumptions about their own power, their opponent's power, and the likely outcomes of different options. It is easy to make inaccurate assessments of any of these factors, however. Often an outside party can help review the accuracy of these assumptions and help parties revise them appropriately when they are invalid. This site explains how reality testing helps parties assess their BATNA's (best alternative to a negotiated agreement). It also has links to examples of reality testing and related ADR processes.
The Art of Getting the Best Deal. Financial Times.
Available at: Primary Link
This article outlines some of the basic steps of a business negotiation, including determining BATNAs and identifying a zone of possible agreement.
Offline (Print) Sources
McCarthy, William. "Bargaining Power and BATNAs." Negotiation Theory , January 1, 1991.
This piece offers a critique of some of Fisher and Ury's main principles as outlined in Getting to Yes. The article mostly supports the ideas put forth in that foundational work, however, McCarthy disagrees with the limited treatment of the role of power in negotiation. He argues that the role of power is not thoroughly examined and that simple notions regarding the power of BATNAs are substituted for true analysis.
Watkins, Michael, Susan Rosegrant and Shimon Peres. "BATNAs and ZOPA." In Breakthrough International Negotiation: How Great Negotiators Transformed the World's Toughest Post-Cold War Conflicts. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2001. Pages: 26-35.
This excerpt discusses the development of alternatives and options for settlement in negotiation. The advice provided here revolves around setting oneself up to reach the best possible outcome of a negotiation, whether it is reaching a mutually acceptable agreement or walking away all together. The authors talk about building up one's own BATNA as well as how to identify a zone of possible agreement. They explain that the nature of the ZOPA is dependent on whether the negotiation is about claiming or creating value. Primary Link
Burgess, Heidi and Guy M. Burgess. "Definition of BATNA." In Encyclopedia of Conflict Resolution. ABC-Clio, November 1997. Pages: 33-34.
This section of the Encyclopedia of Conflict Resolution provides a nice, brief overview of what BATNA means and how it applies to negotiation situations.
Fisher, Roger, William L. Ury and Bruce Patton. "Original Explanation of BATNA." In Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, 2nd Edition . Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., April 1992. Pages: 101-111.
Getting to Yes is the work in which the concept of BATNA was first introduced. Chapter Six of this edition focuses entirely on the concept of BATNAs, explaining why negotiating with a bottom line is less effective and beneficial than developing a solid BATNA. The authors explain why a good BATNA gives you power in negotiation, how to develop your BATNA, and to consider the other side's BATNA. Primary Link
Lax, David and James Sebenius. "Power of Alternatives." In Negotiation Theory and Practice. Edited by Breslin, J. William and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds. Cambridge: The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, January 1, 1991.
While not using the actual term "BATNA", this chapter does examine how alternatives to potential negotiated agreements shape which outcome parties will settle on. The authors understand negotiation as an interactive process by which two or more parties seek to do better together, than they could do individually. Based on that definition, they argue that the measure of any negotiated agreement is whether it offers a better outcome than the course a party could take on its own. The main idea is that all potential agreements should be evaluated as competitors with other possible agreements that could help a side reach its goals.
Susskind, Lawrence and Jeffrey Cruikshank. "Unassisted Negotiation." In Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes. New York: Basic Books, January 1, 1987. Pages: 80-136.
Breaking the Impasse offers a guide to consensus building strategies for resolving public disputes. The authors describe possible obstacles to agreement and techniques for getting past those obstacles. The first few pages of the chapter entitled, "Unassisted Negotiation" present a helpful section on BATNAs and why people tend to underestimate others' BATNAs and overestimate their own. Primary Link
Examples Illustrating this Topic:
Online (Web) Sources
Mussweiler, Thomas, Adam Galinsky and Victoria Husted Medvec. Disconnecting Outcomes and Evaluations: The Role of Negotiator Reference Points. Social Science Research Network.
Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=304969
Two experiments explored the role of reference points in disconnecting objective and subjective utility in negotiations. Negotiators who focused on their target prices, the ideal outcome they could obtain, achieved objectively superior outcomes compared to negotiators who focused on a minimum goal, their best alternatives to the negotiation (BATNAs).
Kray, Laura. Gender Stereotype Activation and Power in Mixed-Gender Negotiations. Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc..
Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=305011
We hypothesized that the distribution of resources in a mixed-gender negotiation would depend on the relative power advantage of men versus women, as well as the manner in which gender stereotypes were activated in the minds of negotiators. More specifically, we expected negotiators who had a strong alternative to the current negotiation (BATNA) to reap more resources than negotiators who had a weak alternative. We predicted that the effect of power (possessing a strong BATNA) would be especially important when gender stereotypes were explicitly activated compared to when they were implicitly activated because the explicit activation of gender stereotypes was expected to marshal cognitions that relate to power.
Offline (Print) Sources
Ury, William L. Getting Past No: Negotiating With Difficult People. New York: Bantam Books, January 1, 1993.
This book provides step by step approaches to defusing confrontation and developing creative solutions toward resolving conflicts through negotiation. In particular, it focuses on developing communication skills that facilitate cooperation. Primary Link