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Arms embargoes have been around since time immemorial and have three general purposes:
- to signal disapproval of behavior by a certain actor,
- to maintain neutral standing in an ongoing conflict, or
- in the hopes of limiting the resources an actor has to inflict violence on others.
Indeed, every state attempts to regulate the ability for potential adversaries to acquire certain material that may be used against them. However, embargoes have increasingly become more of a symbolic gesture toward undesired actions. Although the effectiveness of embargoes is often brought into question, they are often used because the imposition of such sanctions allows states to voice opposition to certain behavior in a manner that stops short of violence.
The Cold War posed significant difficulties toward effective embargoes because both Moscow and Washington sought to undermine international objectives of the other. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, arms embargoes have become an increasingly prevalent means of foreign policy. The United States has used arms embargoes to disadvantage potential adversaries such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea . Yet, unilateral arms embargoes often have little material effect. For instance, North Korea has been able to acquire significant stockpiles of military equipment and to develop a formidable indigenous production capability despite a stiff U.S. embargo.
To be sure, unilateral embargoes are unlikely to pose significant obstacles to weapons procurement by a determined target-state. As long as a dealer exists, the buyers are able to circumvent embargoes. Many times, the arms dealers will move through covert channels to sell their product, as the presence of an embargo makes armaments an increasingly scarce and thus more lucrative commodity.[1] However, such unilateral measures also signal disapproval of an actor's behavior in order to help galvanize international pressure toward countering such unwanted policies, and to encourage other countries to abide by such limits on arms transfers.
The emergence of human rights catastrophes that accompanied a resurgence of ethnic conflicts after the Cold War led to a greater international consensus of the need to impose universal arms embargoes on certain actors. For instance, international military cutoffs---of both hardware and advice---have been imposed on Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Liberia, Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia, in the last dozen years. Most of these have been sanctioned through the United Nations. However, it is also questionable how effective these multilateral measures are. For instance, South Africa managed to acquire significant military capabilities during the UN arms embargo that aimed to curtail its policies of apartheid. Nonetheless, such measures make it much more difficult for countries to obtain weapons and able to more effectively impose their will. This signals international opposition to certain behavior that can also spread into other areas of diplomacy and international pressure.
Until its involvement in World War II, the United States often placed automatic and unilateral military embargoes on any country involved in a conflict, regardless of who initiated hostilities. Rather than signaling its discontent with such behavior, or to curb an actor's destructive capabilities, this was simply an attempt to maintain neutrality and keep the United States out of wars overseas. However, some argue that placing embargoes on belligerents inherently takes sides and cannot be considered neutral because it locks in the positions of those who are better armed at the beginning of a conflict. Indeed, the arms embargo placed on the former Yugoslavia during the hostilities of the early 1990s arguably secured military superiority of Serbian forces with regard to the opposing two forces.
Arms embargoes have become an increasingly prevalent tool of diplomacy that allows states to voice disapproval of certain behavior short of war, but with real material consequences that often places significant pressure on target-states. While the ability for embargoes to actually stymie weapons acquisitions by a determined state is questionable, they can help galvanize international pressure to not only help impose the embargoes but to also help secure support for overall opposition to certain policies.
[1] See Michael T. Klare, "The Subterranean Arms Trade: Black-Market Sales, Covert Operations and Ethnic Warfare," in Cascade of Arms: Managing Conventional Weapon Proliferation, ed. Andrew J. Pierre (Cambridge: The World Peace Foundation, 1997), 43-71.
Use the following to cite this article:
Smith, M. Shane. "Arms Embargo." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: November 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/arms_embargo/>.
Sources of Additional, In-depth Information on this Topic
Additional Explanations of the Underlying Concepts:
Online (Web) Sources
Lumpe, Lora. "A 'New' Approach to the Small Arms Trade." Arms Control Today , January 2001
Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_01-02/lumpejanfeb01.asp.
This article looks at the emerging effort to curb the illicit arms trade through the United Nations and how these initiatives can be combined with other arms control arrangements.
Nazarkin, Yuri. "Arms Control And Disarmament: Analysis and Prospects." , July 14, 1998
Available at: Click here for more info.
This umbrella paper covers a wide range of arms control and disarmament issues, and functions as an introduction to a collection of individual studies on specific issues and, to a certain extent, as an Executive Summary of those documents, inasmuch as it contains some key points of those studies.
Colton, Nancy E. W. "The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects." Waging Peace , July 2001
Available at: Click here for more info.
This article discusses the proceedings of the July, 2001 conference held at UN Headquarters in New York titled "The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects." The goal of the conference was to address non-proliferation of small arms, and participants included government officials, businesses and NGOs.
Offline (Print) Sources
Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment. Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, 2002.
This book examines traditional theories of arms control, and discusses how, or if, these approaches are appropriate in today's post-Cold War era.
Arms Control: Toward the 21st Century. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996.
This book examines the changing nature of arms control since the fall of the Soviet Union and shifting regions and weapons of concern and actors involved.
Pierre, Andrew J., ed. Cascade of Arms: Managing Conventional Weapons Proliferation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
"This book examines the policies and practices of the major arms-supplying nations, looks at the impact of weapons purchases on the principle recipient regions and the possibilities for regional arms control, and disects the economics of arms exports for the producer nations in botht he developing and industrialized worlds." --Editor's abstract.
Clawson, Patrick. "Sanctions as Punishment, Enforcement and Prelude to Further Action." Ethics and International Affairs 7, 1993.
This article looks at some major goals that have been set for sanctions and evaluates how effective sanctions have been at reaching those goals. It also examines the costs of sanctions, i.e., the impact on civilians and on international support for sanctions. Clawson concludes that sanctions are useful only as a short-term response in situations in which the world community is prepared to use force in the likely event that the target regime does not change its behavior. If there is not will to use force to back the sanctions, then the sanctions are morally dubious: they impose suffering and may cause deaths without offering a reasonable prospect of accomplishing good.
Lumpe, Lora and Jayantha Dhanapala, eds. Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues. London: UNDIR/Ashgate, 1999.
The 29 papers collected in this volume were originally prepared for four regional workshops organized by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs to inform the work of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. These workshops were held during 1995-96. Most of the papers were updated in 1998. Authors include academic, military, governmental and activist experts.
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Examples Illustrating this Topic:
Online (Web) Sources
Arms Control Today Online.
Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2006_01-02/.
This site provides access to Arms Control Today, which is an online journal by the Arms Control Association that addresses the issues relating to effective arms control policies. The online journal provides full access to past and current issues and indices, as well as subscription information.
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.
Available at: http://www.unidir.org/.
United Nations' research institute on disarmament provides reports on emerging arms control issues and evaluations of past initiatives.
Offline (Print) Sources
Knight, W. Andy. "The United Nations and Arms Embargoes Verification." , 1998.
This analysis explores political, legal, operational and financial aspects of applying verification in the context of UN arms embargoes. This book focuses on the lessons learned from the monitoring experience, particularly the recent cases of Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, and offers specific recommendations for improving verification regimes in the future.
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