This rough transcript provides a text alternative to audio. We apologize for occasional errors and unintelligible sections (which are marked with ???).
Eileen Babbitt
Assistant Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law, Tufts University
Topics: refugees, establishment of personal relationships, facilitators
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Q: So, can you please give me a brief overview of your work?
A: Yes, I can. It focuses in several different directions, one is primarily
facilitation work. Organizing, conducting, discussions, dialogues, between
identity groups of various kinds and the place where I've done this the most is
in the Middle East. Israeli/Palestinian, Jewish/Arab, etc. I'm actually also
facilitating an Arab/Jewish dialogue here in the United States in the adjacent
community. So that's where I've done this the most.
The other major trajectory is training and cross-group training in other
words bringing together members of disparate groups and groups in conflict in
the same room and conducting a training with all of them together. So I've done
that in the South Caucasus, we just colleagues of mine and I just planned a
training program in Kashmir which I was not able to attend but I was part of the
planning and we're going to be continuing that discussion and a little bit in
the Balkans doing that kind of training. And I said there were two themes but now
there's actually a third which is the research component and that's more of a
function of this academic appointment that I have at the Fletcher School and
looking more from an evaluation perspective at things that are going on
particularly in post-settlement societies. Countries that are coming out of
violent civil wars and looking at what is going on in those countries to try and
recreate community connection and inter-group relationships that make the
country actually viable to govern and to work. So those are the three things.
That's my work.
Q: OK. So what is going on in those countries where there are refuges that
need to come back?
A: Well the project that I've been working on most recently is initially an
evaluation project for the UN High Commissioner on Refugees and it was initiated
by the previous high commissioner Mrs. Ogata At the very end of her tenure in
that position, she was high commissioner for 10 years and in the last 2 years
she was reflecting on two of the most difficult circumstances of her tenure
assignment there which was returns to Bosnia and Rwanda. Part of the
challenge was not only the numbers of people and the complexity of the return
process this was you know people returning from many different external
locations, under very adverse circumstances etc. etc. but also it strained the
capacity of UNHCR because their before the Cold War most of their return
enterprises were not necessarily to divided communities to countries where there
were strong ethnic divisions. So even though there were legal challenges and
logistical challenges there weren't so many of the inter-communal relations challenges.
What
they found in working in Bosnia and Rwanda in particular, these were their most
difficult cases, was that in addition to all of the other problems of getting
people to come back and reintegrated into the society they were coming back to
communities where they were really, really unwanted. Most of them were coming
back to places where, in Bosnia, where before the war were places where they
were a majority population and now post-war they are the minority so another
group has literally taken over moved into their homes, and many of those people
are also displacedm, traumatized, etc. and they're not about to simply give up
everything and welcome the returning refugees with open arms. They're threatened,
they're frightened, they're antagonistic. So there's been a lot of difficulty
and in the places where people are returning in Bosnia to communities where
their group is the majority, still, it's not been a problem, but if they're going
back to places where they're the minority, it is.
And so what HCR and likewise in Rwanda. The Rwandan context is even more
complicated because you have refugees from previous purges in Rwanda you have
Tutsi refugees in Uganda, Tanzania, etc. from decades ago who in after the
genocide began returning so you had about 800,000 people killed in Rwanda during
the genocide. Most of them Tutsi, but some Hutu and you still have about 800,000
Tutsi in Rwanda because most of them are returning, but they've lived in exile
for decades. They're not so necessarily welcomed again. They're
welcomed by the government but they're not welcomed to the places where they're
returning. They've been socialized and acclimated in other countries and are now
coming back and there's a real difficulty in figuring out how to integrate them
into an incredibly traumatized country because of the numbers of deaths in the
genocide. So those are the circumstances under which HCR was interested in
figuring out what should we be doing here. What kinds of programs should we be
funding that would facilitate this reintegration process, which in effect is not
in my opinion no just a technical process.
I mean being a conflict resolution person I'm not only interested in what
laws should be put in place and what government institutions should be given
power to do whatever, but I'm also interested in what it means for people to
live in the same community after going through the events that they've just
lived through and what that means. So we constructed and they wanted us to do
this evaluation in these two extreme cases those were the countries they chose
and they also chose the communities in which they wanted to do the evaluation,
which were some of the most difficult.
Q: So straight to the hardest case.
A: Straight to the hardest case. And also in wonderful UN and UNHCR fashion
they wanted us to do this in a year.
Q: laughs
A: Which became completely impossible and I won't go into all the details of
the project but they chose two communities in Bosnia that were very difficult
one which was a Serb town before the war, during the war it became a Croatian
town and now the Serbs are returning and it's also a seat of Croat nationalism.
So it's not just sort of passive Croats who are sitting there as the Serbs are
returning, it's very hostile Croats, many of whom themselves are displaced from
somewhere else in Bosnia, so they really have no place else to go.
The other place in Bosnia is a place where there was a lot of Serb/Muslim
antagonism during the war and it's right near where some of the concentration
camps for Muslim men were set up. And now the Muslims are coming back and it's
now a majority Serb area it's actually in Republic of Serbska so it's in this
inter-entity sort of no-man's land it's in the Serb part and there's tremendous
anxiety in the Muslims who are returning and terrible as you can imagine but a
lot of commitment to come back and settle this area.
In Rwanda, the areas that they picked were the Northwest of the country,
which is a Hutu stronghold, and is the area from which the president who died in
the plane crash which was sort of the spark for the genocide, this is the area
from which he originated and his tribe but it's also the place where once the
Tutsi government took over after the genocide, there were incursions across the
border this is on the border with DRC There were incursions of Hutu militia. So
it's a place where the current government, although it's called a government of
national reconciliation, and there are both Hutu and Tutsi, it's very much
dominated by the Tutsi and so it's a place where the government does not pay a
lot of attention because they consider them sort of their enemy. There's Hutu
coming back to that area who were who left the country at the time of the
genocide because of being fearful of their own lives after the government, after
the RUF Forces came in.
And they there's within the Hutu community; there's lots of division because
there's those that stayed in the country and those who left and those who left
who are returning there's a suspicion on the part of those who stayed that they
might be part of the genocide?? And all of this is very unspoken. It's not
explicit at all and I don't claim to be a Rwanda expert this is only
interpretation from people I know who are and who have given me a lot of
insight. It's a very difficult country to understand because people are very
very closed. They do not talk they're very hospitable and wonderful and they tell
you almost nothing and it's not surprising.
Q: So there are inter-party problems to resettlement but also intra-party
problems.
A: Absolutely, absolutely. So what we were trying to do in the same on the
Tutsi side and etc. So the project was trying to set up a mechanism for
evaluating what was working in these difficult divided communities to create
relationships across the divide.
Q: What was working. So sort of an appreciative inquiry approach.
A: Well, we actually did not do appreciative inquiry. We did more because in
our view, appreciative inquiry was an intervention in itself. My understanding
of appreciative inquiry is that the process, by its very name creates a support
for whatever it is that people are doing. We were trying to be a little bit more
distanced from what we were observing and trying to understand what people were
doing without saying, "Yes you're doing a great job," or "No you're not doing a
great job."
So that seemed a little further than what we felt comfortable getting
involved with. What we did instead was to set up a series of tracking processes
that tried to identify how different kinds of interventions created ripples in
the community and what those ripples were and not just in terms of relationships
but in terms of reputation for the interveners, feelings of increasing comfort
on the part of individuals engaging in these activities, the extent to which
they felt comfortable getting colleagues, peers, family members involved in
things they were doing and the viability of these things over time.
Unfortunately the evaluation project was so short lived most of the finding
in terms of sustainability had to be very provisional because we just didn't
have a two year we didn't even have a two year data point. I mean the projects as
we were evaluating them were only about 6 months old, which is nothing in terms
of relationships. So we could extrapolate from the information we
gathered we did a lot of interviewing, we hired local interviewers, we trained
those local interviewers because we wanted the interviews conducted in the local
languages.
Q: People who understand maybe even the non-verbal stuff...
A: Exactly.
Q: The contextual problems.
A: Exactly, exactly. And there's, you know, both strengths and weaknesses of
that approach. The strengths are exactly as you say, people who can pick up the
nuance, they understand the body language, and they know what words mean in a
level of subtlety that an outsider could just never get. And you would never
catch if you forced people to speak English. On the other hand you have to be
very careful in choosing those local people because there's also things that
people will say to an outsider that they may not say to an insider.
So we had to try and figure out multiple ways of triangulating the same
information. Local contacts, outside contacts, us, insiders, etc. And so that's
how we did it. And I had I was the overall coordinator of the project. I had one
person who was working primarily in Bosnia, one person primarily in Rwanda who
was French speaking and then the set of local people who collaborated with us as
well.
The way HCR works as well as most international organizations they have
organizations they call implementing partners. They come in with the money and
with the framework of the project, what it's supposed to look like and then they
put out an RFP and people respond and they choose an organization to be their
implementing arm. So HCR implements very little on it's own.
Q: So like USAID or any sort of granting institution.
A: Exactly and in Bosnia, the implementing partner was a local NGO a Bosnian
NGO based in Bonyuluka??? Which is the Serbska part of Bosnia, with a lot of
experience doing contracting work and a strong psychosocial background. They did
a lot of work with traumatized children, with women's groups; with community
sort of community health issues and some of the people on their staff are
psychologists. And for the HCR office in Bosnia, they felt that was the best
profile.
In Rwanda, they did something different because they didn't feel that the
local NGO's had enough organizational capacity to be able to carry out
this project in such a short space of time and they didn't have enough staff to
bring those local organizations up to speed. So they chose to work with two
international NGO's- Oxfam Great Britain and Norwegian people's aid. So we had
a very interesting comparative study two countries five regions, three
implementing partners two of whom were international, one was local so it was an
incredible opportunity to grapple with too many variables.
Q: Perfect storm.
A: Exactly, exactly, exactly. Great metaphors. And we came up with
I think some very good but preliminary findings and advice for HCR. Some of
which they knew already but there organizational culture is such that putting
them into practice is just so difficult.
Q: Meta-evaluation?
Be: Exactly, exactly. But many of the things are things that as a conflict
resolution professional were not surprising. The importance of choosing the
implementing partners and making sure that the partners had
the kinds of skills for not just logistical administration, but understanding
what was really happening on the ground. A real sophisticated view of what's
going on in their respective countries and that made enormous amounts of
difference, enormous difference.
Goodwill is not enough. People really need to know what's going on and you
have to really find people who know, number one. Number two, you've got to find
people who are able to be creative. This is not
something where there are standard operating procedures. We don't yet have a
checklist of what works and what doesn't. So you have to have people who can
think on their feet who really can be creative and but can evaluate as they go
and are smart enough and self confident enough to make adjustments as they go
along. The third thing is that the whole project has to be self-reflective. That
you can't just do an up-front something or other and end output thing there has
to be...
Q: Benchmarks?
A: Not just benchmarks but there's a research methodology in political
science called process tracing, in which you actually look at
what happens over time but not in terms of. It's not benchmarks. It's not saying
how does this activity time T1 relate to our goal. It's what's happening at T1
and how does in react to what's happening at T-1. So you're trying to see how
things play out in certain over time following certain themes. The most
important and challenging thing was figuring out what it was you wanted to be
tracing over time.
What we discovered is that there were some things that you could choose to
look at that you could evaluate in any context in which you were working. Whatever the project, tracing the way relationships
developed within organizations across organizations between organizations and
governments between leaders and followers. I mean these are the kinds of things
you could predict, but there were other sorts of things that were very context
specific and you could not necessarily always identify ahead of time what those
might be really had to work with the local partners and with the organizations
themselves to identify those almost as in process.
One of the weaknesses of the work that we did was insufficient resources to
keep somebody on the ground during the whole evaluation. Our evaluation team had
to keep going in and out and the local partners could be there all the time but
expecting them to be completely self-reflective as they did every single thing
is really asking a lot. This is not a mode of operating that is familiar. And
although particularly the people from psychology in Bosnia, although they took to
it very quickly and understood the benefit of it right away, both the time
and the skill to do it were things they were building as the project went along.
So the whole project was a set of self reflections.
Of us reflecting on what we were doing, of our local partners reflecting on
what they were doing and then reflecting that back to us, of the projects
themselves it was iterative as we went we learned a tremendous amount and all I
can say is that in order to do this well in the future we have to do a lot more
work up front of training work to get people a little more comfortable with what
the methodology will be as the project unfolds. Is this making sense at all?
Q: Yeah, I just want to clarify which level of project you're talking about.
The evaluation project or the reintegration project?
A: All of them. At all of those levels. At the level of the reintegration
projects themselves, at the levels of the implementing partners who are
overseeing those projects, and at the meta-level of the people who are evaluating
both. There were strands going on at all three of those levels. I guess in
terms of the reintegration itself again these are things that for many of us are
not surprising but to begin to gather data on it is what is so important these
are processes that have to take time. They can't be rushed. The fact that these
international organizations go in with this extremely short turn around times
because of donor pressure is an incredible shame because just as people on the
ground are starting to get the hang of what it is that's going on, it's over.
And it's heartbreaking because you can see, you can watch they just begin to get
a glimmer of where they could be going and the funding is over. It's just
heartbreaking. So I think that you know we of course know this but to begin to
see how it actually works in practice and to begin to document it.
There's also some assumptions that are being made from donors about what
kinds of projects work in these circumstances and one of the assumptions is that
if you give people money to create income-generating businesses and you force
them to bring everyone from party A and party B into these businesses and work
together, they will form these fast friendships because everyone wants to be employed, so it gives them a common
goal a common whatever and in the context of this everything will be OK. Not so.
I mean we just saw that in the projects that we looked that it was not the case.
People tolerated each other. Did they form friendships? Certainly not in six
months the businesses were not viable they weren't given training on how to run
a business. So there were a lot of assumptions made about how you go about this
co-existence work that in practice turned out not to be so effective. And HCR
was sort of open to getting this feedback but sort of not.
Q: So what does work? Did you see things that worked? Or was
anybody doing the right thing?
A: Well what we saw that seemed to be the most effective again this is not
surprising, were organizations that understood the complexity of relationship
building. Whether they were creating jobs, putting together basketball teams,
putting together community cooperatives to grow strawberries whatever the
content of the project it was the sensitivity on the part of the implementing
organization to how difficult it was going to be for people to work together and
to provide some kind of interpersonal and intergroup sort of sensitivity
training almost to help them overcome those barriers.
They didn't call it that of course but
they themselves had the training, the background, and the knowledge to understand
when things were being difficult, to see what was difficult and to intervene at
that point either at a personal level between two people, or at an intergroup level
they knew what to do. They could either create a discussion forum if they thought
that would help. They could some sort of interpersonal mediation, but in a very
particular way that raised the sensitivity of the people involved but in other
words they understood these activities were taking place in a particular kind of
social psychological context and they knew how to work knowledgably in that
context that's what made a difference so that the content of the contact was
almost secondary to the process that was used in that contact if that makes
sense and there are some organizations both local and international that are
just masterful at this.
Q: The content may have been secondary to relationship building but I imagine
that just for attracting an audience it was primary right.
A: Well that's a very good point they obviously had to find activities that
drew people, of course. The income generating activities do that. There's no
question about it. In both of these countries and in many post settlement
countries. The economics are in the pits and there's very little external money
that's coming in because the environment is unstable and you don't have the kind
of international investment that you should have.
This is especially true of Bosnia. And people are desperate. They're really
living on what's the equivalent of international welfare where you know the
international aid organizations are still providing the bulk of the food and
other things that medical care that people need because other things simply
aren't functioning. So yes the content is critical, the social contacts
between women between children are also critical.
I mean kids want activities that bring them in contact with other kids. This
is where the basketball and other sports kinds of things come in. And one group
put together a rock band with both Croats and Serbs and it was just so heart
warming they're you know late teens and this is a town that's terribly depressed
both economically and psychologically and they said you know we just want to
make people smile, we want to give them a lift and so they put this wonderful
band together and they play everywhere. People come, and they listen, and they
dance. This is not just for the youth this is for the community at large. And
so it's really looking for what will the community respond to. Both income
generating and non. That will yeah that will entice them to work together.
Q: So it sounds like a bit of a complimentary cycle then. I mean there
needs to be some kind of content or substantive hook to bring people in but even
that's not going to last if there's not some sort of deeper more subtle
relationship conflict addressing mechanism.
A: That's right, that's right, that's right. Absolutely. And the people, the
organizations that were able to provide both were doing tremendous work.
Tremendous work.
Q: So the rock band and any other specific examples of things that were
working in that way that were using both elements, the substantive and the
relational?
A: There weren't too many. The ones that were notable were mostly projects
geared toward young people and a couple of projects geared to women. The income
generating projects were just simply not getting the kind of support they
needed. There was really this sort of mindset that giving people a job would be enough and it just wasn't. And in every circumstance it
wasn't. The youth projects were as I said the sports projects, basketball, a
girl's soccer league, which was incredibly successful, wonderful. And let's see
I'm trying to remember what some of the other ones were.
One of the wonderful projects in Rwanda was a women's project between Hutu
and Tutsi women and the women themselves actually launched the project with the
help of a local priest, against a lot of both spoken and unspoken resentment in
their respective communities. Not only because it was a mixed project but
because it was women this is a very patriarchal culture and the women were very
much going against a lot of the norms of their villages as well as of the
country. But incredible women, just amazing and very clear what it was that they
wanted to do and they've now formed a network this is in southwestern Rwanda
they've now formed a network of something like 4,800 women scattered around many
villages and towns.
Not all of whom have contact with each other all the time but are part of
sort of this larger web and they're amazing. They're really really amazing and
that was largely their own initiative they get a lot of sustenance not so much
psychosocial, but spiritual. They're very much it's very much a religious sort
of prayer group as well as an organization for social support.
Q: That's interesting. Now what about the notion of scale up or re-entry or
moving from communal transformation or personal transformation to something
societal and if you want we can pause if you want to munch on that.
A: Yeah, let's pause for just a second.
Q: OK. You're on.
A: OK, the scale up issue the scaling up issue is as you know incredibly
challenging in the context of this HCR project, there was only one
organization that was dealing with it explicitly and this was Oxfam Great
Britain. Their project in Rwanda is stunning. And in and of itself is a case
study that needs to be written. Oxfam at some previous point before we got there
in 2001, they had already decided that their poverty reduction programs in Rwanda were not
working. And to their credit, and I don't know whose decision this was if this
was the country director or the regional director, they literally stopped what
they were doing for about six months which is quite amazing or dramatic to do an
assessment.
Why was what they were doing not effective and what was really at the heart
of the poverty issue in Rwanda and what they came to was an understanding of the
power dynamics within the country such that for reasons both political and
historical people do not feel confident and able to handle anything on their
own. It's a sort of a learned passivity. And it's not just post-genocide and
it's not even post-colonial. It actually is even further back in Rwandan history
and culture and what Oxfam decided is that they needed to be working to create
more confidence, skill, and I guess incentive for people to begin to learn to
make decisions at the local level to not expect or look for people higher in the
hierarchy authority figures to do it all for them.
Q: Sort of ???anti-patron-client breaking mold.
A: Exactly. Exactly. And the way they decided to do this was two-fold. One
was to piggy back onto a decision by the Rwandan government to institute a
decentralization structure. Now, cynics would say and maybe not even cynics
maybe realists would say that the real reason that the Rwandan government was
doing this, was to get their people installed at every level from the cellule
which was the village all the way up so that this devolution of power looked
like it was a giving away of responsibility but what it was what it might
actually become was a way for the government to exercise control all the way
down to the level of the household basically. However, Oxfam decided to take it
at it's to assume that it had constructive, positive goals and to use this
decentralization structure to provide training and support for projects at the
very smallest level of this devolution, which was the cellule.
The cellule is a collection of households making up usually a very small
village. So they decided to work at the very smallest unit, but they also
decided number one but number two was the skills that they wanted people to get
at that very smallest level were not only decision making skills, but conflict
management skills. The idea was and this is what we all believe of course, if
people could learn to manage the daily conflicts, that it would give them
confidence to manage conflicts at higher and higher levels. So those were the
two foundations of their work.
They began a process of training at this grass-roots level. People nominated
by their communities to come to these training programs which did a remarkable
thing it first of all got the skills out but secondly it invested people with
authority in these communities that the community people trusted. So they would
send people who they felt would well represent their community to these training
programs and then when these folks came back with these conflict management
skills-negotiation, mediation-people listened to them and they became
local authorities on these topics and people started going to them for these
disputes. Family disputes, community disputes, husbands against wives, you know
before they used to go to the mayors. And people in the authority positions and
now they would go to these community people who had been trained so that was the
first contribution but I'm getting to the scaling up.
They also realized that in order for this to work they needed to be training
people at the very most local level but all the way up the hierarchy to the
national level so that there would be support for this empowerment process all
the way up to the I've forgotten now what the different rings of the Rwandan
social structure are, there's the cellule and there's the prefect and there's the
province and whatever. And they did these trainings at all levels. They did them
separately.
Initially, they tried to bring everyone together but the people who
were the officials of the provincial level were not so happy about coming to the
trainings at the grassroots level with the people who didn't wear shoes. So they
realized the trainings had to be hierarchical but they were giving the same
skills at all levels. And they were informing the people at the higher levels
what kind of work they were doing at the grassroots.
So their goal throughout was to make this process completely transparent and
to get the people at the higher levels to see the benefit of creating skill and
empowerment further down in the hierarchy. It worked incredibly well, incredibly
well. And the most important things I think that it did were at the grassroots
level it got people involved. What they did is they gave each of these cellules
an amount of money. I don't know how much, a small amount, I don't know $5,000.
Very little, but in Rwandan terms, significant.
But the only way they would get the money would be if there was a community
decision on how to spend it. It couldn't just be the leadership, it had to be
the whole community. And it had to be beneficial to the whole community it
couldn't just all go to one person and so what it did was it energized a
community decision making process and the people who were trained, the newly
trained people in negotiation and mediation, became the facilitators of those
community decision making processes. Not by imposition, but simply because they
now understood what had to happen in order for a discussion and a consensus to
be built. And they stepped forward and said, "You know I can help you do this." And
since the community had sent them to the training and felt invested in their new
knowledge they said, "Oh yeah, of course."
So they took over and facilitated these meetings. And they at one point would
look around and say, "You know there's none of the women in the community at this
meeting and I think probably at the next meeting they should come." And the next
meeting the women came. And they'd look at in communities where there was this
third group, the Twa, and say, "You know, they're not here. Twa not here, need to
be here. They're part of this." And the next meeting, Twa were at the meeting and
it was quite an incredible thing. This just never happened before, not happened.
Q: And this all related to the reconciliation and the re-entry of refugees? I
mean this is all with that in mind?
A: Well, what this was doing from Oxfam's point of view and this was a little
bit of a point of tension between Oxfam and HCR, because HCR kept saying, "What
does this have to do with refugees?" And Oxfam kept saying it has to do with
everything. Because if these communities can't function, then whatever the issue
is that's on the table whether it's refugee return, economic development,
healthcare, education, they're hopeless, they're lost.
They're completely at the mercy of manipulative leaders, and they will just
passively sit here and wait until somebody does something for them. And what
we're trying to do is give them a set of skills and a set of perspectives on
their ability to affect the quality of their own lives that will help them no
matter what the issue. And they commissioned an independent evaluation, which is
quite wonderful and it's on-line and you can get a hold of it, where they looked
at whether the processes that they put in place were actually helping at the
local level and also to what extent they were creating any consciousness up the
chain. It's a very long process, the scaling up. It's very very long as it is to
do it at the interpersonal and inter-group level, it's even more time consuming
and it's even a more protracted process if you're trying to start at the bottom
and have it move up.
What they were trying to do was at least create the consciousness, the
awareness and the acceptance at the higher levels of what they were doing and
what positive benefit it would be. So that the people at the higher levels, at
least, would not be getting in the way and would not be undermining what they
were trying to do. Their hope is over time to be able to move these skills and
this consciousness up in the community from the grassroots, progressively up. And
they've gone back to their headquarters in England to continue to get financial
support to do the work in that way. They have a long-term plan, but they see it
as a 10-year process.
Q: So to say, "No, no, we want to deal with the refugee problem," is to ignore
the fact that you're dealing in a complex system and the inability to absorb
refugees is probably just a symptom of the deeper problems when you're dealing
with conflict and dealing with difference.
A: Yes. Exactly. Exactly. The advantage in Rwanda that you don't have in
Bosnia, I mean there are advantages and disadvantages in both places. In Rwanda,
you have the advantage that the government has initiated this decentralization
process, so there's attention being paid to developing leadership at the most
grassroots level and they're piggybacking on this. And number two, you have very
small communities so it's possible to go into a relatively confined group and
have a pretty significant impact.
You don't have either of those in Bosnia. You don't have a good
decentralization process going on. There's still a lot of mayors in Bosnia who
are really nationalistic. And they haven't really been able to pay attention to
reform at all levels. And B, the units are not consistently small. I mean you've
got Sarajevo and Banja Luka, large cities as well as very small villages. I
don't think the Oxfam organization in Bosnia is doing the same work as the one
in Rwanda, the Rwanda one is really kind of a pilot for the whole Oxfam Great
Britain organization and they haven't really replicated it other places.
Q: OK. Should we talk about the dialogues?
A: Yes.
Q: OK, talk about the dialogues and how they feed into your present work.
A: OK.
Q: What happened, let's see you started a dialogue between women in the
Middle East. Why?
A: Because the it grew out of a long series of workshops conducted by
professor Herb Kelman, with whom I was working at the time, over many years
between Israelis and Palestinians, using his social psychological process of
focusing on needs and fears, which is the interactive problem solving model
coming out of John Burton, which you probably know by heart from ICAR. The
observation for many years of conducting those workshops was that in those
workshops they were usually mixed workshops i.e. men and women. Although much
fewer women than men. Usually in a group of 10 people there would be two or
three women, and the rest men. But a consistent observation that it was often,
not always, but often the women participants who would shift the tone of the
conversation by using a personal story, or being able to reflect in a personal
way and or to express empathy that began to change the tone of the conversation
of the whole group.
So the question was, if you brought only women together would you see more of
this behavior? In other words, would the group actually make more progress on
this empathy building, relationship building, working through stereotypes, etc.,
which is the purpose of these interactive problem-solving sessions. And that was
the purpose of the workshop was to identify, this was in 1992 that we did this,
to identify women political leaders from the Israeli and Palestinian
communities. These were not lower level. These were high-level people. Some of
whom were members of parliament all of whom were politically active and
acknowledged as politically powerful in their communities and by their
communities.
So that was number one and the other thing we were wanting to do because of
evaluation purposes, was to build into the process an agreement on the part of
the women that within a year of the workshop itself we would go back to each of
them individually and interview them about the impact of the workshop on their
subsequent personal and political activity.
Q: So it was right up front. To participate, they knew they were going to be
asked a year from now, what do think now?
A: Right exactly. And can you trace again the impact of this workshop on your
subsequent thinking, feeling, activity, interaction with the "other,"
bla bla. We also constructed the third party to be all women. Because
again we wanted to see if having the energy in the room be primarily
feminine energy, if this would make a difference in terms of the content of the
discussion and the tone of the discussion. What we found in the workshop itself,
and Tamara and I have written this up in a couple of places, the political
psychology journal for one, was that the disagreements among the women were no
less acrimonious, they were no less deep. It wasn't as if people checked their
identities at the door and just said well we're all women let's embrace and you
know create peace. They still felt very strongly about the needs of their
respective communities and the realities that their respective communities had
to face.
However, there were two major differences. One was their interest and ability
in combining the personal and the political. There was no difference for them.
Discussing their personal experiences was part of understanding the political
dynamics. It wasn't separate for them. The second was, they were very concerned
about creating space for each other. Meaning, allowing people to speak. Even if
they violently disagreed with what people were saying, they respected each
other's points of view to the point where they wouldn't allow people to
interrupt each other. They did it themselves, we didn't have to do this. They
really wanted everyone to have a chance to express themselves fully. Very
different from mixed groups or all-male groups in which it's very common for
people to interrupt, shut each other up, say I don't want to hear that, etc. The
quality of the interaction was very different, even though the beliefs that were
held and the concerns that were held were just as antithetical as they would be
in any group. So that's what we found there.
In the follow-up when we did just the interviews, I guess it was less than a
year, it was six or eight months after the meeting. A couple of things, again
not consistent. One was, for women for whom this was their first or early
dialogue, people who hadn't been engaged in a lot of Israeli-Palestinian
connection. I know it's hard to believe that there's anyone left in Israel or
Palestine who hasn't been a participant in these meetings, but in fact
there are a lot. For those for whom this was a first session, it was a
tremendous eye opener, it was like a life-changing experience to be able to sit
down in a civil way and actually engage with these really difficult political
and personal issues was just wonderful and they loved it. For the women for whom
this was not their first dialogue, who had been doing this for years, it was
more frustrating because they wished they could make more progress. They had
this assumption let's just get on with it now. We don't need to be back here
trying to understand each other, we understand each other, let's get to solving
the problem.
Q: We learned that last year.
A: Exactly. So they were more impatient. But what they also said was that
there's tremendous benefit in repeated contact because it's not just in one
encounter that your relationship and your perspective on the "other"
changes. I mean this makes sense, it's with repeated contact where you can watch
what happens in between. You can hear what people say, you can see how they
present themselves. This is what you would do in any relationship, right? You
meet somebody for the first time they come off in a particular way and you think
Oh, OK.
And then there's a space and the next time you meet them and they're either
the same or they're slightly different and you see a different aspect of them
and in the meantime there may have been some contact at a distance and you're
trying to make sense of what's true about this person. How authentic are they?
Do they say what they really mean? Do they act in accordance with what they say?
It's only with repeated contact with people over time, that you can actually
begin to make a judgment about that. And the women who were in these repeated
dialogues, felt it was incredibly important to have that ongoing contact because
they could actually begin to see who they could trust and who they couldn't. Who
was being honest and who wasn't. And otherwise it was too hit or miss. You know
you're really creating the context for a relationship to be established and
relationships are simply not established in one meeting. I mean, they are, but
it's only superficial. There's no ability for it to go deep and it's
only by the repeated contact that that can happen. So that's what the women told
us.
And it wasn't even just repeated contact that we would orchestrate. It was
repeated contact through multiple organizational connections, you know. Because
there is a group in the Middle East, in the Israeli-Palestinian context who get
repeatedly invited to participate in these things and those people get contact
over and over and over again. And then they wind up on panels and they end up
establishing personal relationships that are much different from the ones that
they establish more superficially. So that was our experience there.
Q: And this is just I mean dialogue for understanding, dialogue for
brainstorming? I mean this isn't exactly a problem solving workshop where you
come up with solutions?
A: It was a problem solving workshop.
Q: It was?
A: It was. Yes, yes, yes. It was a problem solving workshop coming out of the
Burton-Kelman tradition. Where you begin with the needs and fears, but you move
from that to a discussion of shapes of solutions. And as I said the women for
whom this was an initial dialogue were much more interested in staying with the
discussion of the needs and fears. The women for whom this was a more advanced
process, were really interested in getting to the solutions. You know, we know
the needs and fears already, let's just talk about what we do about them. And it
was very interesting, because what we realized is that there's advantages to
having these workshops with groups who are at different stages of understanding,
i.e. the people who are sort of farther along can help the people for whom this
is new or just a little scary or frightening.
On the other hand, they're also impatient, the more experienced ones. They
don't remember what it was like to come to the first one and they didn't
understand what the other side was saying, and it was very emotional, and they
felt a little vulnerable, and all those things that happen when you first make
contact with the enemy. And they were so far beyond that, that they wanted to
rush it for the people for whom they were still in that sort of initial place,
if this is making sense.
So one of the things that came out of this workshop was a sense that it may
be more beneficial to bring together people who are more at the same place in
terms of their psychological development vis-a-vis their relationship to the
other community because they're all more in the position to make the same kind
of moves at the same time, rather than to bring together people who are at
different places along that continuum.
Q: So, let's call that a pilot project then and zoom forward to a more
sustainable form of that initial project, which might be considered some kind of
scale-up or...
A: Well, it's actually a sort of horizontal move. In the very both wonderful
and troubled years after '92, I mean Oslo came after '92. Oslo came in '93. So
that of course changed the whole context of the relationship and there were huge
numbers of things that were going on, workshops, problem solving of all
different kinds.
And we didn't go back to the all-women format, but continued to do the mixed
groups and I was still working with Kelman, the project that was set up at
Harvard, PCAR where I was the first deputy director, worked with Kelman and
our colleagues for two years, did a whole series of Israeli-Palestinian meetings
and there was a lot of hope that we were really making headway and the next big
hurdle was going to be the final status issues. Refugee return, right of return,
Jerusalem, settlements. The things on which the conflict continues to founder.
Q: Boulders in the road.
A: The boulders in the road. So, we had working groups on those issues and
there was progress being made, slow, but progress. Then of course you had Camp
David II, the nosedive in the negotiations, the visit to the mosque, which
everyone says didn't create the intifada but it certainly was a catalyst in my
book. And then, of course, the second intifada. And huge, enormous
discouragement, just unbelievable drop in both the Israeli and the Palestinian
communities in terms of hope. And people who had been working for peace for
years just giving up, just saying can't do it anymore, obviously it's not
possible, you know. Slowly but surely that community coming out of it's
tremendous depression and beginning to take some steps.
The project I'm doing now is with a group in Israel itself. This is a group
that is headquartered in Haifa. It's called the center for negotiation and
mediation. The woman who runs it is an Israeli Jew. Her name is Yona Shamir. And
she basically set up this program to sort of permeate the Israeli culture with
the study and practice of negotiation and mediation. So, she brought people in
to train people in environmental negotiation and mediation, community, legal.
You know everything that's happening in the ADR movement within the United
States, she was trying to replicate within Israel. And there were others doing
this as well. And I think she's made remarkable contributions in this regard and
it's really starting to percolate through the culture you have most of the ADR
work is still being done, unfortunately, my bias, by lawyers. But there are
people doing mediation who are not legally trained and it's starting to become a
much more common practice.
So with that success behind her, Yona decided it was time to take on the
inter-group problems and she looked at the Israeli Palestinian issues within the
territories and decided it was beyond her to take that on. It was too difficult,
too explosive and there were other groups already doing that. What she felt was
not being sufficiently attended to was the relationship between Arabs and Jews
within the 67 borders, within Israel itself. And that's where she decided to
begin her work. And so she wanted us to design a training program for a group of
Arab and Jewish facilitators. These are people who would work in pairs. One
Arab, one Jew.
Q: Arab-Israelis, though.
A: Yeah, these are all citizens of Israel. And work within Israel on
inter-communal conflicts between Arab villages and Jewish towns. Particularly in
the north, in the Galilee, where there are a lot of land ownership issues,
water, resource issues and community services issues, where there's disparities
between the Arab villages and the Jewish towns. And she had already picked out
two adjacent communities, whose community leaders had agreed to, in principle,
to use a sort of dialogue model to begin to look at some of these issues in a
problem solving mode rather than in legalistic mode.
So she identified a group of people who were interested in being trained in
this regard. Some of them had had mediation experience previously in other kinds
of community disputes or whatever, most of them had not. All of them are
professional people in other realms, lawyers, city planners, business people,
teachers, psychologists. So they have a profession, they do something else. And
this was something that they were going to do in addition. Because they really
see that this is one of those problems right under the surface that in a
particularly difficult circumstance could simply blow up and did in fact.
One of the reference points for all of this work was in the fall of 2000
right after this intifada started, there was some kind of demonstration in, I
don't even remember what town it was in, but it was somewhere in the north part
of the country, of Israeli-Arabs, in solidarity with the intifada. And the
Israeli army killed 13 people. And there was an incredible uproar as you can
imagine. Just shock, anger, unbelievable disappointment. And there was an
investigation, there was a commission set up called the OR commission for the
name of the judge who was put in charge of this from the Israeli Supreme Court,
to investigate these shootings and why the Israeli police used live ammunition
on citizens. And killed them. Why did this happen when they're not killing
Jewish citizens? Why did they do this? So there's this undercurrent which is
very volatile. It hasn't broken through the surface but there's a worry and a
fear that if the situation with the territories doesn't resolve or even if it
does, this other thing is sort of boiling under the surface.
So, we went to do this training and we decided that this needed to be
something more than a problem solving workshop. First of all, people
needed skill, they were trained to be facilitators so this wasn't only about
understanding the needs and fears of the others and it wasn't only, if at all,
about finding solutions. It was about facilitating others to find solutions at a
community level. I mean at the community level it's kind of a microcosm of
what's happening at the national level. But how do you, if you're a member of
the community, how do you facilitate that discussion? So that was the challenge
and we didn't even frame it that way until we were about halfway through the
project and we thought, you know what we're doing here, is we're training
insider facilitators. And it's obvious to me now but I wasn't thinking of it in
explicitly those terms. And what kinds of different skills might they need than
the ones we already can think of that facilitators need.
So here's what we did. The training was done in three stages. In part,
because of finances and of course the Iraq war was in the midst of all of this
and so it got delayed. The first session which I did with a colleague of mine
here in Cambridge, Pam Steiner, who's a psychologist. The first training was
working on the problem solving workshop model and we introduced them to the
social psychology of conflict and the issues about stereotypes and all of the
social psychological parameters. We took them through the first couple of stages
of the problem solving workshop model with the idea being, number one to give
them familiarity of what it means to talk about needs and fears. And also to
begin creating relationships among them. Because if they were going to be
working together they were going to have to again be a microcosm of the macro
change that they were trying to have happen in these communities. They were
going to have to deal with it.
So we did this and it was incredibly intense. It was in January of this year.
It was a week-long program. And one of the things that was clear is that people
had a very hard time, and we've seen this in other workshops, had a very hard
time listening to each other. Very hard time. And a very hard time asking
open-ended questions. And we talked a bit about this, but it was hard for them.
So we recognized that the next thing that people really needed was
communications skills. They really needed to understand better especially if
they were facilitators, what it means to have a conversation to listen to what
the other person has to say, even if you don't like it. And then to be as a
facilitator helping other people do that same thing.
So the second week of the training was on consensus building and
communication skills. And Pam and I didn't do that training. That training was
done by a trainer from Australia who's a very good friend of Yona's. She's a
lawyer and she's Jewish. She donated her time, which we all did. She came from
Australia and she did a week-long session with them. And it was, by all
accounts, we weren't there, fabulous. She shifted the frame of the training. It
wasn't so deeply personal as the interactive problem solving is. It was much
more skill oriented, much more pragmatic. How do you run a consensus building
process? How do you listen without judging? How do you ask open ended questions
that elicits people's response and doesn't push them into a corner? You know all
those things that both as facilitators and hopefully as members of a
constructive negotiation you would be doing. So it was very skill-based.
So the third week of the training, the challenge was number one, to build on
what they'd already done. Number two, to go deeper because that's what they
wanted to do. To go deeper in themselves and to work more with narrative, which
was what they wanted to do. And to prepare them after this third training to
actually go out and begin doing some facilitation on their own. Which is a
pretty hefty assignment.
So here's what we did. We decided to use yet a third model. The first one was
the problem-solving workshop. The second one was consensus-building and
communication. The third one was a process that's been developed by an Israeli
psychologist whose name is Dan Bar-On. And you probably know about his work
with children of Holocaust survivors and children of Nazi perpetrators,
incredibly powerful stuff.
Q: South Africans and Northern Irish folk.
A: So you've read his work. Yes, exactly.
Q: Well actually, I talked to Julie Chayden??? And she told me all about it.
A: Ah yes. Yes. So they've now called this process "to reflect and trust," TRT.
So we introduced the TRT process.
Q: All three? I don't understand. At the same time?
A: I know. Here's how we did it. We said, as insider facilitators, you have
to be able to manage the emotion in the room. In an empathic way. And in order
to do that, you have to begin to understand what's going to trigger you. Because
it had already happened with us, that people who we had facilitating a session
would suddenly get dragged right into the conversation because it was about
stuff they really cared about and they are of the community they're not separate
from it. So we said you have to begin to understand what your trigger points
are. What are the things that for you, create an emotional response. And also in
doing that, understand what it's like for other people to get triggered so you
can be empathic in those moments and don't just jump on them and tell them to
shut-up. Because that really isn't going to be helpful.
The way you're going to learn how to do that, is by getting to the heart of
the matter and here's what we're going to do. We're going to use this TRT
process, which we explained. And you're going to facilitate each other telling
your personal stories. We're going to ask you to be in groups of two or three, I
can't remember how many, I guess it was three or four people, two Arabs, two
Jews. We're going to do this over the course of two days. There will be a
different set of facilitators each half day. It will be your responsibility to
determine the ground rules under which the storytelling, the narratives happen
and to manage the dynamics in the room as people tell their stories. It was so
incredible. This process. We were literally making this up as we went along.
But we were so clear that people needed this a key thing, for all of us.
When you're working with incredibly volatile conflict, that has a depth and an
emotional valence, you have to go into yourself, you've got to be clear yourself
how you feel. How this volatile, what this volatility might bring up in you. If
it frightens you, if it angers you. If it kicks off something in you that you
feel you're not going to be able to handle because you need to able to sit with
people, which means that we as facilitators and mediators have to work on
ourselves as much as we need to work on our mediation and facilitation skills.
That is part of what we have to do is know ourselves extremely well. It's
very hard. Very, very hard. And there's not a lot of explicit work on that as
you prepare to do this professional work. There really isn't, it's sort of hit
or miss. Well we were very convinced particularly with insider facilitators that
this was key. You can't go in there unconscious and think that by simply knowing
how to do consensus building and you know generating an agenda, you're
going to be able to manage a really volatile conversation between people who are
frightened and angry and hurt and all the other things that people bring into
the room in these protracted conflicts. You have to feel it yourself.
Q: So the TRT part was to prepare the facilitators to learn how to do the
first and second part of the training, which was the consensus building and the
problem solving.
A: Yes, exactly. Exactly. Exactly. Exactly. And, in the context of doing the
TRT, they had to practice their communication skills. They had to be able to sit
there and listen and it was very hard for them, very hard for them. The first
step in the TRT process is to only ask questions of clarification. How hard is
that? It was really hard. Because what people wanted to say, and there was one
for example, one Palestinian person, an Arab person who spoke about, because we had
people from the Israeli Arab community who were not only Arab Muslims, they were
Arab Christian and Arab Druze, which is yet another section, subgroup of the
Arab population.
And the Druze, when the state of Israel was established, the Druze elected to
swear allegiance to the new government. Whereas the Arab Christians and the Arab
Muslims did not. Therefore the Druze serve in the Israeli military and the other
Arabs do not. So you can imagine what the relationship is between the Arab
Muslims, Christians and the Druze. The Druze are considered sort of traitors in
a way even though they are Muslim, it's a certain sect of Muslim. There's also a
very difficult relationship between the Palestinian Christians and the
Palestinian Arabs, which we began to see in this group.
Someone in the Arab community was telling his story what we asked people to
do was talk about their families going two generations back and the impact of
their family history on their experience of the Arab-Jewish conflict. And one
person was doing this and so someone said I have a question of clarification and
the question was something like, "But don't you think that, in fact, what happened was
du du du du du du?" And the people who were facilitating said that doesn't seem
like a questio
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