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Introduction:
Chester Crocker of Georgetown
University suggests that the success of the peace
process in Mozambique is a shining example of great coordination between several
actors, excellent trade craft, and good luck. He
talks about the role that NGOs, Track I, and Track II actors played in the
development, implementation, and monitoring phases of the peace process.
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This rough transcript provides a text alternative to audio. We apologize for occasional errors and unintelligible sections (which are marked with ???).
Track I/II and Mozambique
Chester Crocker
Georgetown University
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Q: You mentioned Mozambique as a success and having learned lessons from the
failure of Angola. What elements do you think made that a successful
intervention?
A: There's two phases to Mozambique. There was the Sant'Egidio phase, which
was actually negotiating the G.P.A. [General Peace Agreement], which was
endorsed in 1992. That took two or three years and it was led by an
Italian-Catholic lay organization called Sant'Egidio, which is pretty well
described and documented in lots of places now, including Herding Cats. What
made that a success was a very skilled Track II intervention, which had cultural
linkages, as well as arguably political and other kinds of linkages to the
country concerned. Interestingly enough, that country was Italy.
You may ask
yourself, why Italy? Italy doesn't have a colonial history in Africa apart from
Somalia and Libya. Italy, in part, because one of the largest foreign assistance
programs in Africa for Italy was in Mozambique because the Catholic Church
played an important role in Mozambique. It was a bridge to Mozambique, in a
sense. I think the Socialist Party of Italy had some ambitions, and perhaps even
some very practical considerations in wanting to do well in Mozambique;
a lot of factors came together. Sant'Egidio's tradecraft was that of a small,
modestly funded NGO, but with very good linkages to the Italian government and
to other Italian institutions. Their smartest move was to be able to build
confidence among the Mozambiquean parties, and to link what they were doing to
the actions of the major states, in the Track I sense, who would be players in
any kind of future for Mozambique, including the implementation of an agreement.
That meant that they were very open, put their cards on the table.
They talked a
lot with the U.S., with the U.K., with the Italian government, with the
Portuguese, with the South Africans, with the neighboring Africans, Zimbabwe and
Malawi and so on-recognizing the limits of Track II, and the need for Track II
to be there at the crucial moments when you get to defining military accords and
guarantees for military commitments. You need states for that. NGOs can't do
that stuff. There was a very good sort of a meshing of Tracks II and I. In the
second phase, the implementation of the G.P.A., what accounts for success has a
lot to do with that inherent structure and with the coherence, again, that an
Italian international civil servant appointed by the U.N. secretary general.
He's a very skillful guy. His name is Aldo Ajello, and he didn't know Mozambique
before this, but he was given this assignment and he played his cards very well,
maintained the unity of the donors and the key countries that had embassies in
Maputo, so that the parties were not given a lot of slack. When parties are
given too much slack, they mess around, they play games, they get divided, and
they get greedy.
Q: Slack by whom? Who gives them slack?
A: The third party. If the third party gives the contending parties too much
opportunity to mess around and play games, inevitably they will. There's got to
be a sense of focus and intensity to make this thing succeed at the
implementation phase. Agreements don't just self-implement, as a rule. They need
some kind of adult supervision, going forward.
Q: That's an interesting way to put it. Let's explore, just for a second, the
notion of slack. How much authority does a third party have to give or remove
slack in an agreement?
A: Well, the idea of slack may sound like it's all top-down and controlling,
and in some ways it is, but more than anything else, it's just keeping the
parties engaged, keeping them in touch with each other. If there are
problems blowing up, then solve the damn problems, don't just let them fester.
That's the point I'm making, you've got to keep the think alive, focused, and
moving ahead. You don't want to leave long periods of inaction or drift, or
periods when there are no meetings so parties begin to develop the sense that
the other side is just engaged in massive cheating, and never intended to go
forward in the first place. That's what I mean, really, by slack.
Q: It sounds like holding the parties to the agreements that they sign.
A: Yeah, and holding them to regular communications, and if problems arise,
discussing them and working them out. In other words, what I'm saying is the
settlement is really just one phase of an overall process. The signatures at the
bottom of the page are just one phase. You have to assume that there'll be other
issues to be negotiated going forward.
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