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Introduction:
Peter Coleman discusses the transformation of a track two process to a track one process and how that transformation so fundamentally changed the process.
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This rough transcript provides a text alternative to audio. We apologize for occasional errors and unintelligible sections (which are marked with ???).
Transformation in Olso
Peter Coleman
Assistant Professor of Psychology and Education at Teachers College, Columbia University, and Director of the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution at Columbia
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A:...Herb Kelman talks about a dilemma that he faced at some point
right around Oslo which was that he had had this process as a
"container" process for years. It was out of the media, it was
unplugged from the Track I peace processes. It influenced it indirectly by
people maybe going into that mode eventually or influencing their communities
through worship or through the media or things. And that was the point but that
was the point in and of itself and it was by definition a confidential space.
That was the only way it worked. And then at some point, I think it was
around Oslo, they decided that they needed to change that decision because there
was this peace process that was on-going and maybe they should react to it and
respond to it and work together to put out these white papers that this group
eventually did. And as soon as they did that, Herb talks about this quite
eloquently. As soon as they made that choice, it changed the nature of what they
did, because suddenly the constituents were not involved in a private process
where they're just being transformed as human beings, they're in a political
process and potentially signing a piece of paper that their constituents are
going to see. And the other sides going to see. And that has a whole different
feel to it and it was a critical decision that they made. So it's the decision
about private versus public process and fundamentally what are you doing and
they made this decision to change and it changed what he were doing and whether
or not it's the right or wrong thing to do, who knows. But it was a very
important decision.
Q: It's certainly a trade-off. You're trading someone's safety and trust in
order to gain constituents support and actually change something.
A: Well, again it depends on your theory of change. If you're theory of
change is that you have to ultimately go through the main tract diplomacy in
order to affect change because Herb's theory of change was to change society,
not just get a peace agreement, you have to change the society. And this is the
mechanism for which to change the society. And then at some point because of
Oslo, they said we have to get involved, we have to inform this process but by
doing so, it impaired this process of the transformation of people and of
indirect influence in the community. Now who knows why he did it. Maybe he saw
it as impatience, or as a window of opportunity and really wanted to try to feed
it but then the Middle East fell apart again and I don't know, was it a good
thing or a bad thing? I don't know. But it's an important choice, I know that.
Again, the long-term implications of this are unknown but whether or not you
view a process like problem solving workshops as container processes to
transform influential individuals in societies at a different level and maintain
that and protect that or open it up which shuts that process down and makes it a
different kind of process would have an impact on the long-term nature of the
conflict.
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